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Abstract  
 
China has experienced significant growth in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market during 
the last decade. During this period, venture capital (VC) has been playing an increasingly 
important role in the IPO market. The main aim of this thesis is to empirically examine the 
impact of both VC-backing and VC reputation on the long-run performance of Chinese IPOs, 
and to explore whether the impact is subject to where the IPO get listed, e.g. ChiNext Board 
(a Nasdaq-type Board in China).  
The thesis measures IPO performance with both share price performance and operating 
performance. In particular, the former is measured as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
where the each IPO has its own matched portfolio as the benchmark. The latter is measured 
by the return on equity. These measures are calculated for up to three years post IPO. 
Significantly, this thesis acknowledges the wide range of possible metrics that can be used for 
measuring reputation and examines the importance of metric choice on the performance 
measurement outcomes. A special feature of the reputation used in this thesis is the use of a 
real-world and market-based ranking measure for VC reputation created by the Zero2IPO 
Research Group for the China market, which is more multifaceted than many of the 
traditional proxies for reputation used in earlier studies. This thesis constructs a cross-
sectional sample consists of more than 1000 IPOs listed during the nine-year period from 
January 2004 through December 2012.  
The thesis finds that although IPOs generally experience long-run underperformance in the 
Chinese stock market, VC-backed IPOs show better long-run performance than their non- 
VC-backed counterparts. In addition, there is some evidence that the higher the VC’s 
reputation, the better their invested IPOs perform in the stock market relative to non-VC-
backed IPOs. This pattern is driven primarily by IPOs listed on the ChiNext Board (a 
Nasdaq-type Board), and the results are independent of reputation proxy. However, within 
the sample of VC-backed IPOs, the difference in performance between IPOs backed by high-
reputation VCs and those backed by lower-ranked VCs is found not to be statistically 
significant and so this study is unable to provide conclusive evidence that VC reputation 
influences the performance of VC-backed IPOs. In the case of operating performance, neither 
VC-backing nor VC reputation affect post-IPO performance significantly. This is likely due 
to the limited forward-looking characteristics of historic accounting data, especially for early-
stage and hi-tech firms. These results are robust to a range of additional tests.  
The thesis brings forward some important policy implications based on the results. For 
example, the government should broaden the sources of funding to make private VC to 
participate more into the IPO market, provide more favourable tax policies to VC and 
encourage more involvements from VCs.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis explores the impact of Venture Capital (VC) and VC reputation on initial public 
offering (IPO) firms’ long-run post-issue performance, based on an emerging economy like 
China. This market has experienced significant growth over recent decades. As the 
government of China strives to stimulate economic growth by promoting the development 
of high-tech industries, VC has been playing an increasingly vital role in assisting the 
success of start-up firms. China therefore provides an ideal environment for exploring the 
study of associations between VCs and IPO performance. This chapter first reviews the 
specific institutional background of the Chinese IPO market and the VC industry. After 
that, the research objectives are proposed followed by the conclusive summation of 
outcomes of this study.  
 
1.1 IPO Market in China 
IPO is the first time that a private company issues shares to investors to raise capital and 
thereby transfers to a public listed company. Through IPO, a firm could attract more 
investors, improve brand recognition, and earn generous returns. It could also benefit firms 
to improve their enterprise system and managerial structure. Therefore, going public is the 
optimal choice for private firms if they are eligible to do so. The China stock market has 
exhibited great expansion during the last 30 years. The number of IPO companies steadily 
rises every year. 
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Figure 1.1 illustrates the number of A share IPOs listed on the Shanghai stock exchange 
(SHSE) and Shenzhen stock exchange (SZSE) from 1990 to 20121. Generally, the IPO 
market in China was vibrant. Across the 32 years, there are 2,548 A share IPOs. However, 
the number of IPOs fluctuates in this period. For instance, in 1996 and 1997, China 
approved more than 200 IPOs in each year, but in 2005 there were only 15 new-issued 
firms2. With the establishment of ChiNext board3 on Oct 30 2009, the number of IPOs 
soared to 349 in 2010, 282 in 2011, and 155 in 20124. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Distributions of A share IPOs from 1990-2012 by SHSE and SZSE. 
 
Comparing the IPO frequencies by exchanges provides additional insight into the 
development of the China stock market. From 1990 to 2004, the SHSE took the leading 
role and had more IPOs than SZSE for most years. From 2001 to 2003 only one IPO was 
                                                             
1  A more detailed discussion of China stock can be found in section 3. 
2  This was because from the May 2005, one year after the establishment of SME board (May 2004), the CRSC suspended 
the process of IPO after the SME board accomplished the 50th IPO case. Meanwhile, the whole market was dedicated into 
share-split reform during this period. Eventually the IPO market resumed in May 2006. 
3 This is a Nasdaq-type board, especially for start-up firms to get listed.  
4  The IPO market was suspended from Oct 2012 for the second period of adjustment. It reopened 14 months later in Jan 
2014. 
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issued on the SZSE, while there were 212 on SHSE. However, the situation reversed since 
2005, the total number of IPOs listed on SZSE was about 7 times more than on the SHSE.  
This reversal was mainly due to the launch of the SME in 2004 and the ChiNext board 
in 2009 on the SZSE, respectively. These two boards provide opportunities for small- and 
medium-sized and great growth potential firms to raise funds for further development. Thus, 
there is a huge and growing number of IPOs on the SZSE on account of the expansion of 
privately-own enterprises in many emerging and non-traditional industries. The apparent 
drop in the number of IPOs on the SHSE is also because of the new listings were halted for 
11 months between 2005 and 2006 and 10 months between 2008 and 2009. This makes the 
Main board IPOs more tough and strict. 
 
1.2 The ChiNext Board 
It is obvious that the ChiNext board has played a very important role in China’s IPO market 
and the continued development of the China stock market. Nearly all the mature capital 
markets possess a second board, e.g. the Nasdaq of America, AIM of UK, Jasdaq of Japan, 
and the GEM of HK, etc.  A Second board is an indispensable segment of an integrated 
stock market, and the establishing of the ChiNext board has symbolized the beginning of 
multi-level capital market in China. 
The existence of ChiNext board provides a number of advantages. First of all, it 
incentives and encourages venture firms’ operation and development. Once listed on the 
ChiNext board, IPO firms will face a more efficient financial system and structure and more 
strict regulations, under which the raising and spending of money become more transparent, 
thereby avoiding abuses such as black-box operations. Besides, it can stimulate the entire 
venture industry, because to VCs IPO is the best way to liquidate their investments and 
accelerate capital turnover speed. The ChiNext board is well designed for the development 
of VC. A great number of studies have shown that VC is of great importance to the 
development of small and medium sized and innovative firms. Thirdly, the ChiNext board 
is mainly designed for the domestic growth start-ups, emphasising support for firms with 
creative independent intellectual property rights, good prospects, and positive employment 
opportunities5. It generates more opportunities for venture firms to go public. While being 
                                                             
5  In particularly, it prefers to support burgeoning industries such as New Material, New resources, IT, Medical 
Biotechnology, Energy-conserving and Environment-protective, and Morden Service, etc. 
- 4 - 
 
different with the western second board, the ChiNext is not limited to the IPO of high-tech 
venture firms but is available for other industries. 
Table 1.1 displays the notable contribution the ChiNext board has made to the China 
stock market, by comparing the number of IPOs and the total IPO market capitalizations 
from 2009 to 2012. In 2009, 36% of IPOs were listed on the ChiNext board, while in 2012 
the proportion rose to 47%. Such trend is also applicable to the total IPO market 
capitalizations. For instance, in 2009, the 36 ChiNext board IPOs only contributed to 6.67% 
of the total IPO market capitalization, but in 2012, the ChiNext board IPOs contributed to 
39.63% of the total IPO market capitalization.  
Overall, the data proves that ChiNext has become an increasing vital component of the 
China stock market. It is particularly meaningful to the small and medium size growth 
enterprises as this board promotes the integration of technology, knowledge and capital, 
the transformation from ideas to physical products. More strikingly, it is an ideal place for 
VC investments to exit. 
 
 
Table 1.1 IPO Frequency and Market Capitalization of ChiNext 
 IPO Numbers  Market Capitalization 
 ChiNext Full Market %  ChiNext Full Market % 
2009 36 99 36.36  1,610.08 24,150.37 6.67 
2010 117 349 33.52  7,365.22 25,693.44 28.67 
2011 128 282 45.39  7,433.79 20,730.30 35.86 
2012 74 155 47.74  8,731.24 22,029.41 39.63 
In Table 1.1, the market capitalization is measured by the unit of Billon Yuan.  
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1.3 VC Industry in China 
The founding of American Research and Development Corporation in 1946 is treated as 
the birth of the modern VC industry6. Since then, VC has attracted the world’s attention 
due to its ability to produce enormous rewards. VC is a major impetus for the global 
development of high-tech industry, and it has been supported by governments in most 
countries. Generally, VC is acknowledged as a specialist-managed capital investment form. 
However, there is still a lot ambiguity in the standard definition of VC. According to the 
US National Venture Capital Association, VC is defined to be one kind of private equity 
that targets the investment towards the enterprises that have high potential, high growth 
rate and dramatic competing strength. The European Venture Capital Association 
emphasises the particular behaviour of VC investment, i.e. VC investors do not only offer 
capital, but also get involved in the management and operation of the funded firms.  
The definition of VC varies with the development of the VC industry. In the early years, 
VC was associated with the early stage investment in high-tech firms, i.e., seed and start-
up. Nonetheless, VCs have gradually extended their investment range beyond this narrow 
sense. An increasing number of VCs started to step into projects at the expiation and mature 
stages, and also attempted to widen their business to more traditional industries. 
Consequently, a broader concept of VC now appears to be more appropriate - all the capital 
investments towards pioneering, innovative and creative projects could be defined as VC 
investment. In fact, this description is more acceptable in Europe and Asia, for example, 
the British Venture Capital Association recognizes VC investment as an equity investment 
to unlisted UK company. 
In recent years, the broad sense of VC has been gradually replaced by an even broader 
concept - private equity (PE). A PE investment is a private investment form which 
purchases equity stakes of unlisted companies or the non-tradable equities of listed 
companies. Generally speaking, VC is a subsample of PE which targets early stage 
investment. Even though VCs and PEs have diverse investment preferences, they both are 
pre-IPO equity investments aiming at long-term capital appreciation. Besides, in addition 
to money, they both provide services to venture firms that are contributable to the business 
expansion, new-product development, operations and management efficiency. In fact, 
boundaries to separate VC and PE are more and more unclear currently. A few specialized 
                                                             
6 In 1957, ARD invested $70,000 to the Digital Equipment Corporation; while later in 1971, the market value of DEC 
had grown by more than 5000 times and reached up to $3.55 billion, which ballooned investors’ values dramatically. 
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PE institutions participated in VC projects, while many VCs have also intervened in the 
business activities of PEs.  
VC was introduced to China in 1980s7, and it has experienced enormous growth with 
the support of Chinese government. In China, VC is primarily defined as equity investment 
into the high-tech, high growth rate and high potential start-up firms, but not limited to the 
early stage investments. It is crucial to mention that there is no strict distinction between 
VC and PE in China. These two terms are often reported or presented together as VC/PE. 
Generally, any equity investment into the unlisted companies by the VC/PE firms all are 
classified into the equity investment category. Indeed, VC and PE institutions are 
frequently stepping into each other’s business scope. For example, the traditional PE like 
Carlyle Group also conducted many VC investments (Ctrip, Target Media). In this research, 
all the IPOs invested by VC and/or PE institutions are classified as the VC-backed IPOs. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Distribution of VC Quantity and Gross capital Raised. 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the 20-year development of Chinese VC industry from 1994 to 
2012. From the table, it is clear that before 1999 VC in China developed at a very low pace. 
The quantity of VC institutions and the scale of capital raised were hovering around low 
                                                             
7 The first VC institution, “Chinese New Technology Venture Capital Corporation”, in China was established in 1985, 
which is sponsored by State Scientific and Technological Commission and People’s Bank of China. 
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levels, and the usage of fund was less efficient at this stage. With the expansion of global 
economy across the world in the late 1990s, VC played a prominent role in pushing the 
technological innovation and economic growth in China.  
In spite of being influenced by several global economy cycles, the VC industry in China 
experienced steady growth. During this period, there was a great demand for funding as a 
large number of enterprises were established under the prosperity of high-tech knowledge-
based industry. Given the issue of several encouragement policies, the launch of SME and 
ChiNext boards, and the participation of overseas VC funds, VC has developed 
considerably in China. In 2012, there were 942 VC institutions raising totally 331.29 billion 
yuan, an increase of 547% compared with 2000. The total investment amount reached 
235.51 billion yuan and the average investment amount in each project reached 13.23 
million yuan. China’s VC industry is not only vital for capital market growth, but also 
accounts for a large share of China’s IPO market.  
 
1.4 VC Reputation   
Reputation is recognized as a unique, cumulative, irreplaceable and comprehensive asset 
which is formed imperceptibly throughout the life span of a firm (Barney, 1991). According 
to Fombrun (1996, p.72), “reputation is a perceptual representation of a company's past 
actions and future prospects that describe the firm's overall appeal to all its key constituents 
when compared to other leading rivals”. Commonly, reputation has been affirmed as one 
of the indicators to distinguish a firm’s quality. The benefits that reputation generates could 
be enormous. A good reputation carries a signal of reliable and experience to the investors 
and consumers. One may also regard firms which cooperate with reputable firms to be of 
higher quality too. 
The above definition of reputation is completely applicable to VC firms. Reputation is 
of great importance to VC firms, since it could reflect the competitive advantages and 
qualities of VCs (Dimov et al., 2007). Given their unique characteristics as financial 
intermediaries, VCs are the bridge to connect capital and investment opportunities. 
Nonetheless, in such a competitive industry, it is difficult for VCs to raise funding and 
select the ‘right projects’. Raising capital, as well as the ability to identify better projects 
would be much easier for a reputable VCs. Moreover, reputation is not only crucial to VCs, 
but also essential to the firms funded by VCs.  
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The measurement of VC reputation has attracted great academic attention because there 
is no explicit measure for it, given its nature (i.e. an intangible asset). Hence, there have 
been many studies (e.g. Shu et al., 2011, Cho and Lee, 2013 and Barry and Mihov, 2015) 
on the exploration of how to measure VC reputation, and how well can different 
measurements capture the true effects of VC reputation.  
 
1.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
A majority of studies find that VC-backed firms exhibited superior post-IPO performance 
in the long-term than the non-VC-backed IPO firms due to VC’s function of Certification, 
Screening and Monitoring (e.g. Lahr and Mina, 2012), as well as Value-added functions 
(Croce et al., 2013). On the contrary, another group of studies also found that VCs display 
a negative impact on IPO firms’ long-run performance. The inferior performance of VC-
backed IPOs is suggested to be the consequences of the Adverse Selection between VCs 
and the portfolio firms (e.g. Rosenbusch et al., 2013) and VCs' Grandstanding behaviour 
(e.g. Hsu, 2013). Therefore, our first research question is to whether VC-backed IPOs 
experience significantly different long-term performance pattern than the non-VC-backed 
IPOs in China. This research question is addressed by formally testing the following 
hypothesis: H1. The VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly superior long-run performance 
than the non-VC-backed IPOs in China. 
In the course of investigating the performance of VC-backed IPO firms, a few studies 
have been carried out focusing on the properties which are unique to each VC, e.g. the 
reputation. However, the results are not conclusive. On the one hand, a few studies have 
verified that reputable VCs are more experienced in selecting projects and nurturing 
promising companies. Hence, it is more likely for reputable VC-backed firms to develop 
rapidly and became successful, and VC reputation is concluded to be positively associated 
with IPO firms’ long-run performance (e.g. Lahr and Mina, 2012). On the other hand, some 
studies suggest a negative impact from less reputable VCs (e.g. Rosenbusch et al. 2013). 
Therefore, the second question of this thesis is to understand whether VC reputation exerts 
a significant impact on the post-IPO long-run performance in China. This question is 
addressed by formally testing the following two hypotheses: H2. VC reputation exhibits 
significantly positive impact on the long-run performance of IPOs in China; and H3. High 
- 9 - 
 
(Low) VC reputation exhibits a positive (negative) impact on the long-run performance 
relative to the non-VC-backed IPO in China. 
In general, this body of research usually focuses on the developed markets like the US 
and UK. China has shown significant economic growth since the 1980s. Due to the 
significance and intangibility of the reputation to every financial institution, it is a 
considerable task to test how VC’s reputation accounts for their effects in such a specific 
market. However, to the best knowledge of this research, studies that explore the impact of 
VC reputation on China IPO market still needed to be enriched. The last two decades have 
witnessed the success of VC investment in China. The quantity of VC-backed IPOs has 
grown up sharply in China and a large population of them are listed on the ChiNext Board. 
Therefore, the third question is whether VC/VC reputation exerts an exceptional impact on 
the ChiNext board IPOs. This question is answered by formally testing the following two 
hypotheses: H4. VC exerts significant impacts on post-IPO long-run performance for firms 
listed on the ChiNext board market and/or Main board market in China; and H5. VC 
reputation exerts a significant impact on post-IPO long-run performance for firms listed on 
the ChiNext board market and/or Main board market in China. 
 
1.6 Research Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several aspects. 
1. This thesis examines both the post-IPO long-term stock market performance and 
operating performance in the context of China and finds that VC-backing/VC reputation 
plays different roles on China IPOs’ long-run stock market and operating performance. 
2. This thesis makes improvement on the measurement of long-run performance as buy-
and-hold abnormal returns. The thesis construct IPO-specific portfolio as the bench 
mark to each IPO firms, in order to precisely estimate the abnormal returns. More 
specifically, for each IPO firm, the portfolio consists of firms with M/B ratio and market 
capitalization both being no smaller than and no larger than the corresponding values 
of the IPO by 25%.  
3. This thesis acknowledges the wide range of possible metrics that can be used for 
measuring reputation and examines the importance of metric choice on the performance 
measurement outcomes. In particular, a special feature of the reputation used in this 
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thesis is the use of a real-world and market-based ranking measure for VC reputation 
created by the Zero2IPO Research Group for the China market, which is more 
multifaceted than many of the traditional proxies for reputation used in earlier studies. 
4. According to the specific institutional background of China stock market, this thesis 
also examines the impact of VC reputation (by high and low) on the long-run IPO 
performance across different boards, i.e. the Main, SME and ChiNext boards. 
 
1.7 Research Findings 
From the analysis of stock market performance, this thesis finds that the 36-month Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) of VC-backed IPOs are significantly superior to the 
non-VC-backed IPOs. VC-backed IPOs are significantly older, exhibit lower initial returns, 
and own less state-owned equity stakes than the non-VC-backed IPOs. What is more, the 
analysis with VC reputation generates several findings. Firstly, VC reputation does not act 
as a significant role in identifying variations of VC-backed IPOs' post-IPO long-term 
returns. Compared to the non-VC-backed IPOs, both IPOs funded by more reputable VCs 
and those funded by less reputable VCs display significantly better performance. Although 
the positive effects of more reputable VCs are stronger, the preponderance is not very 
notable. Examining across different boards, the above reputation effects of VCs are only 
significant on the non-main-board IPOs. This indicates that the impact of VCs on China 
stock market performance is driven principally by the impact on smaller firms with high 
growth potential. 
However, the analysis of long-run post-IPO operating performance illustrates that VC 
and VC reputation unlikely exerte on the stock market performance.  The ROE reduction 
is serious across all the IPOs in China over the three years after flotation, whereas VC-
backed IPOs do not demonstrate any significant benefits. Neither the reputable nor the less 
reputable VCs are found to have a significant impact on the three-year’s post-IPO ROEs. 
Moreover, the examination by boards also fails to catch any significant impact of VC 
reputation on the operating performance. 
Overall, this thesis finds that VC-backing and VC reputation have a significant positive 
impact on three-year’s post-IPO stock market performance but no impact on the three-
year’s operating performance at all. Why such results? One explanation is that the stock 
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returns are ‘forward-looking’ indicators which integrate the expectations of investors, while 
the accounting data used for calculating operating performance are primarily ‘backward-
looking’. 
The stock prices can easily fluctuate as investor sentiment towards the firms’ expected 
returns alter. In accordance with the Certification hypothesis, the involvement of VC is a 
symbol of good quality and high growth potential. Therefore, the superior stock prices of 
VC-backed IPOs might be because of investors’ positive attitudes to the future prospects. 
By the same token, even if VCs completely exit, investors still incline to be more optimistic 
about IPOs, given that they had been labelled as VC-backed. The operating performance 
measure are backward-looking accounting-based indicators which reveal current and past 
performance. Hence, when VCs leave the IPO firms and the guidance and service 
terminates, their impact on firms’ operations terminates. In this sample, a large number of 
VCs completely exit the IPO firms after 12 months of floatation, meaning that using the 
three-year’s post-IPO period may not be sufficient to capture the exact impact of VC/VC 
reputation. The lack of significance of VC reputation on operating performance might, in 
part, be the result of this limitation.  
The robustness of the above findings is examined by using the Heckman Two-step 
model which controls the selection bias of VC investors. The empirical results demonstrate 
consistent effects of VC/VC reputation. The associations between the various 
measurements of VC reputation are then explored. These reveal that measures used in the 
prior studies are far from being perfectly correlated and this may explain why some prior 
studies generate conflicting findings. 
 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this study is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review of IPO 
long-run performance and the impact of VCs on long-run performance. Summaries of the 
studies of VC reputation have also been included in this Chapter, including the functions 
and the measurements of VC reputation. Chapter 3 introduces the institutional background 
of China’s stock market and the development of the VC industry in China across the 20 
years. Following the discussion from the previous chapters, Chapter 4 develops hypotheses, 
designs the empirical models and explains the methodologies for this thesis. The 
descriptions of the IPO dataset are presented in this Chapter as well. Chapter 5 first reports 
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the results of the empirical models that are put forward in Chapter 4 and then discusses the 
findings. Chapter 6 presents additional analyses including robustness checks of the above 
results and the associations between various measurements of VC reputation. Finally, 
Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks. In chapter 7, the results of this thesis are 
summarised and implications to the VC investors, venture entrepreneurs, and the policy 
makers in China are discussed. Finally, the limitations of this thesis are explained, together 
with proposals for future studies.  
 
1.9 Conclusions 
This chapter introduces the IPO market and VC industry in China. VC has been playing an 
increasingly vital role in China. Therefore, China therefore provides an ideal environment 
for exploring the study of associations between VCs and IPO performance. The chapter 
then describe ChiNext, which has played a very important role in China’s IPO market and 
the continued development of the China stock market. This suggests that to study the 
influence of ChiNext on the impact of VC-backing and VC reputation is important in China. 
Moreover, the chapter describes the research questions, and demonstrates how they are 
addressed and linked to the main research hypotheses. Furthermore, the research 
contributions are clearly illustrated. Finally, research findings and the structure are 
described.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of Prior Studies 
This chapter summarises prior studies regarding the research questions described in the 
previous chapter. Firstly, the chapter reviews the studies on the IPO long-run performance. 
For the purpose of raising large amounts of capital to expand their business, going public 
has become the optimal goal for most companies. However, going public does not 
guarantee perpetual success. Maintaining promising performance is essential, otherwise 
firms might be suspended or delisted from the exchange. An overwhelming majority of 
studies have found IPO firms’ post-issue performance during the three to five years are 
significantly weaker than the listed firms that have been traded for years. Then, the paper 
reviews the studies on the role of VC and VC reputation in the IPO long-run performance. 
Since the measurement of VC reputation is one of the main contributing claims in this thesis, 
this chapter also summarizes the studies on the measurement of VC reputation. 
 
2.1 IPO Long-run Underperformance 
IPO long-run underperformance after the issue of IPO has been documented in the literature. 
This section will review these studies and the explanations of this phenomenon.8 The long-
term post-issue underperformance of IPO firms have been found in a great deal of studies. 
For example, Ritter (1991) examines the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) during 
                                                             
8 However, there are some exceptions of long-run outperformance. For example, Kim et al. (1995) using 169 firms listed 
on the Korea Stock Exchange during the period 1985–1989 find that the Korean IPOs outperform seasoned firms with 
similar characteristics. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) using 454 Malaysian IPOs during the period 1990 to 2000 and find 
significant outperformance for equally-weighted event time CARs and buy-and-hold returns. Michel et al. (2014) also 
find positive abnormal returns after IPO using a sample of 1801 IPOs that occurred between January 1996 and December 
2006. Bird and Yeung (2010) find that Australian IPOs over performed by 12%. 
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the three years’ post-issue period of 1,526 IPOs listed on the US market from 1975 to 1984. 
Compared to the controlled listed stocks one-to-one matched by market value and industry, 
the three-year’s BHARs of the sample IPOs significantly underperformed by 27.39%. Such 
findings indicate that investors would lose money by buying and holding shares of 
companies that recently accomplished the IPO. The post-IPO underperformance pattern has 
also been found by Loughran and Ritter (1995) based on an even larger sample which 
contains nearly 4,753 US IPOs listed between 1970 and 1990. Their results claim that 
investing in IPO firms is hazard for investors’ wealth. The post-issue five years’ average 
annualized return of IPO firms only 5%, which is significantly lower than the same period 
returns of the matched non-listed firms (11.8%). Alternatively, IPO firms’ five-year’s 
BHARs are -50.7% and -41.6% relative to the matched non-listed firms by size and the 
value-weighted market index, respectively. Their results give further support to the prior 
evidence of long-run underperformance. Brau et al. (2012) using 3,547 IPOs from 1985 
through 2003 find that the mean 3-year style-adjusted abnormal return is negative at 15.6%.  
Inspired by Ritter’s work, a large number of studies was conducted to explore the long-
run post-IPO performance, and most of them are based on the US market (see for example, 
Ritter and Welch, 2002; Krishnan et al., 2011; and Hoechle et al., 2018). In general, those 
studies extensively acknowledge that the new issued companies underperform the 
companies that have been listed on the stock market for many years, i.e., their post-IPO 
performance, for a period of 3 or 5 years, are significantly lower compared with matched 
companies or the market index. For example, Loughran (1993) expands Ritter’s study 
(1991) and further explores the six calendar years’ post-IPO performance on a larger 
sample (3,656 IPOs) during 1967-1987 from the Nasdaq Market. His result demonstrates 
that the average six-year’s post-IPO returns considerably underperform the equally-
weighted market index, i.e. the returns are 17.29% vs. 76.23%. Meanwhile, the wealth 
relative mark is found to be 0.666, which is even smaller than that in Ritter’s study (0.831). 
Jain and Kini (1994) examine the operating performance of 682 US IPOs from 1976 to 
1988, measuring by ROA and operating cash flows over the total assets. Compared to the 
one year pre-IPO level, the post-IPO operating performance dropped dramatically after five 
years of floatation. Their finding is in line with the view of Pagano et al. (1998) that the 
post-IPO reduction in profitability results from the window of opportunity hypothesis. 
Krishnan et al. (2011) also finds that the abnormal returns are negative, especially for the 
IPOs that are not backed by VC. Hoechle et al., (2018) using a sample of 7,487 U.S. IPOs 
between 1975 and 2014 continues to find significant underperformance. 
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The post-IPO underperformance has found to be a worldwide manifestation. It is not 
only identified in US markets but also in the other developed markets such as UK (e.g. 
Espenlaub et al., 1999; Espenlaub et al., 2000; Coakley et al., 2007). Levis (1993) 
computes the 3-year’s post-IPO returns on 712 IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange 
from 1980 to 1988, choosing three different market indexes as the benchmark. The IPOs 
exhibit significantly inferior returns by 23% relative to the market index. Then Espenlaub 
et al. (2000) enhance the measurement of long-run post-issue returns in Levis’s study by 
adopting several additional benchmarks and models. Consistent with the previous literature, 
their three-year’s post issue operating performance (measured by ROA) display a 
significantly decline compared to that one-year pre-IPO level. Coakley et al. (2007) using 
around 590 UK IPOs from 1985 to 2003 and find significant underperformance during the 
1998–2000 bubble years. Gregory et al. (2010) provides a more recent study of the IPO 
performance in UK market. They use a sample of 2499 firms issued from 1975 to 2004 and 
find a significant underperformance of IPOs, e.g. a negative 16.4% 3-year BHARs relative 
to the weighted size-matched portfolios. Studies based on the non-US/UK markets also 
support the underperformance pattern.  For instance, evidence is found in Germany 
(Ljungqvist, 1997; Derrien, 2005), Italian market (Pagano et al., 1998), Australian (Rosa, 
2003 and Suchard, 2009) and French (Boissin and Sentis, 2014). For example, using 
various methodologies, Boissin and Sentis (2014) find that IPOs in their sample performed 
poorly relative to the comparison portfolios over the 1991–2005 horizon. Furthermore, such 
underperformance not only exists in developed markets, but also takes place in developing 
markets. For example, Agathee et al. (2014) focus on the African market. They examine 
the long-run performance of initial public offerings on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius 
and show that the 3-year equally weighted cumulative adjusted returns average is negative 
at 16.5%.  
 
2.2 Long-run Underperformance of Chinese IPOs 
In recent years, China’s capital market has been a superstar in attracting VC financing. 
However, due to the relatively late start point of the stock market (in 1990s), there are still 
various studies that explore the China IPOs’ long-run performance.  
Although the Chinese stock market was established much later than those in the 
developed countries, it generally follows the similar pattern of the post-IPO long-run 
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underperformance as well.9 For example, using of IPO firms from 1992 to 1995, Chen et 
al. (2000) find that the BHARs (relative to market returns) of China IPOs exhibit a 
continually declining trend in the long-term and their BHARs become substantially 
negative at 212% at 3 years after IPO. Cai et al. (2008) using IPOs listed on China’s 
Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2001 find that three-year post-IPO BHARs are 
negative at 29.6%, indicating a significant underperformance. Primarily, studies of VCs in 
China derive from prior studies on the US market. With the sample covering period after 
2000, the results are also consistent. Su and Bangassa (2011) report that their sample of 
590 China A share IPOs during 2001-2008 exhibit significantly negative 36-month market-
adjusted BHARs is (-21.74%). Liu et al. (2012) also find that the 3-year buy and hold 
returns (BHRs) of 627 IPOs during 2000 to 2007 are found to be significantly lower than 
the matched IPO firms by size and B/M ratio, and are negative (-0.447), confirming the 
underperformance of China IPOs.10 
The findings of underperformance are sensitive to the method of calculation and 
measurement. For example, Su et al. (2011) provide a piece of evidence with 936 A-share 
IPOs during 1996-2005 based on a set of more rigorous methods. More specifically, the 
abnormal returns of sample IPOs are based on matching size and industry IPOs: the equal-
weighed three-year BHARs significantly outperform the benchmark primarily owing to the 
better performance of small-sized IPOs, whereas the value-weighted BHARs are much 
lower and do not show any significantly difference. At the same time, the three-year CARs 
show no significant difference either calculated in terms of equal-weighted or value-
weighted metrics. When using the market index as the benchmark, the sample IPOs are 
found to exhibit significant negative underperformance both for the BHARs and CARs. 
Finally, the sample IPOs do not show any significant performance differences if using 
calendar-time approaches, i.e. the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model.   
Given the robust pattern of underperformance in China, some studies aim to find some 
China-specific factors to explain the pattern. For example, Cai et al. (2008) find that 
government retained shareholdings, the allocation success rate, the post-IPO earnings 
                                                             
9 There are also expectations. For example, Chen et al. (2004) find that in the long run, the 36-month BHARs of A share 
IPOs are not significantly different with the matched firms by using size and B/M ratio. Like Chan et al. (2004), Chang 
et al. (2010) claim that the 36-month post-IPO BHARs only slightly underperform (-7.8%) the benchmark IPOs, using a 
group of China A share IPOs listed from 1993-2004. The calendar-time regressions (performance adjusted by the Fama-
French three-factor models) present mixed results while there is no significant underperformance for regressions on the 
full sample IPOs. 
10 Wang (2005) finds that the post-IPO operating performance also exhibits sharp declines in the long-term post-IPO 
compared to the pre-IPO level, e.g. the industry adjusted ROA and sales to asset declined significantly from 4.41% to 
0.45%, and 26.92% to 1.35% three years before and after IPO, respectively. Generally, this finding is consistent with the 
prior research that China IPOs experience substantial underperformance in the long-run. 
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growth rate and whether the IPO firms also issue B-shares all exert significantly positive 
impact on both the long-run BHARs. Besides, in accordance with expectations, factors such 
as the underpricing level, pre-IPO earnings and whether the underwriter and referee are the 
same institution are all negatively and significantly related to the IPO long-run performance. 
However, the offering size seems to be negatively associated with the long-run performance, 
which runs contrary to the traditional assumptions since large offering size firms are 
supposed to receive more funds for development. Another explanation is provided by Chen 
et al. (2004), suggesting that firms have the intention to window dress their financial status 
before IPO, which leads to the overestimation of firms’ true value at the time of IPO. 
However, their true values are revealed in the post-IPO period and shows 
underperformance. Chang et al. (2010) find that the aftermarket P/E ratio and board size 
are negatively associated with long-run performance. They also find that underwriter 
reputation exerts positive impact on the performance, which is consistent with the statement 
that prestigious underwriters lessen the uncertainty and information asymmetry 
surrounding IPO pricing. This finding is also consistent with Su and Bangassa (2011). 
Due to the unique characteristic of the China stock market during its early period, i.e. 
nearly all IPO firms are transformed from SOEs, various studies focus on the ownership 
and political connection to explain the long-run performance of China’s IPOs. On the one 
hand, it has been found that state ownership seems not important to affect the long-run 
performance. For example, Chang et al. (2010) and Su and Bangassa (2011) find that state 
ownership shows no significant influence on the long-run IPO performance, which is 
consistent with Sun (2003) and Wang (2005). As argued in Wang (2005), the lack of 
significance of ownership types might be because the negative influence of government 
intervention is offset by the benefits associated with government connections.  
On the other hand, political connections have exhibited significantly positive impact on 
the long-run performance. For example, Liu et al. (2012) shows that the three-year BHARs 
of IPOs with political connections are significantly larger than their counterpart IPOs. In 
particular, for the size-matching and B/M-matching, the IPOs with political-connected 
CEOs outperform the IPOs without political-connected CEOs by 18% and 20.5%, 
respectively. This mechanism behind the results is that firms which have connections with 
government have better access to benefits such as bank loans, resources, advantages in 
particular industries, and more financial credits (e.g. Tian, 2001; Wang, 2005 and Francis 
et al., 2009). Wu et al. (2012) and Wu et al. (2013) also find similar results. The former 
paper shows that the political connections have a positive effect in assisting private firms 
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attain tax benefits, while they do not exert this effect in SOEs. On the contrary, the fully 
government-controlled firms, i.e. the SOEs, suffer from serious over-investment problem, 
which are found to be detrimental to the long-term performance. The latter shows the 
central government connected IPOs display significantly better performance (raise more 
net proceeds), than the non-political-connected IPOs, whereas the regional government 
connected IPOs do not show a significant difference. However, the effects of political-
connection differ in regions of different market conditions. The positive impact of central-
government connections will be weakened in those regions with high market restrictions 
but strengthened in the regions that are industries regulation-oriented. 
 
2.3 Explanations of Long-run Underperformance 
The fact that IPO firms perform poorly in the long run after floatation is a consistent finding 
across markets with different institutional backgrounds (e.g. the stock market regulations, 
corporation laws, and taxation system, etc.). Therefore, a rational explanation for this 
universal anomaly is necessary. This section briefly explains some explanations in the 
literature. Generally speaking, the explanations could be interpreted from three sides.  
2.3.1 Information Asymmetry  
It is widely acknowledged that in all stock markets, information is unevenly distributed, 
and that information asymmetry existing between the issuing firms and external investors. 
As the side that have information superiority, issuers usually hold more information about 
the IPO firm. By contrast, the only way external investors get to know an IPO firm is from 
the information publicly disclosed in the IPO prospects. Consequently, this could possibly 
lead investors to make wrong investment decisions. Deriving from the theory of 
asymmetric information, several hypotheses have been proposed to illuminate the long-run 
weak performance of IPOs, including signalling, principal-agent/agency cost theory, and 
window dressing.  
The signalling theory (Welch, 1989) was initially used to explain the underpricing 
puzzle, which demonstrates that underpricing is a signal of firms’ quality. The rationale of 
this theory is that the issuer is perfectly informed about the value of the firm but investors 
are uniformed. For the purpose of mitigating information asymmetry and differentiating 
from less qualified firms, high quality firms are willing to set low issuing prices at IPO. 
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Unlike the lower quality firms, high quality firms are able to afford the cost of underpricing 
in the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Therefore, more underpriced IPOs, or higher 
quality IPO firms, should be associated with higher operating performance and higher stock 
market returns in the post-IPO long-term period (Levis, 1993; Ljungqvist et al., 2006).  
The Agency Cost Theory stems from the proposition that there are conflicts of interest 
between firm managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In order to achieve 
the largest profits, the former tends to invest the money, either gained from the stock issuing 
or spare cash flows, to some inferior projects at the expense of shareholders’ profits. During 
the process of IPO, as firms sell shares to the extensive external investors the ownership 
concentration of the management team lessens and the agency costs increase, thus leading 
to the reduction of managers’ incentives. Accordingly, the post-issue performance of firms 
will decrease, attended by the downward adjustment of the new shares’ intrinsic value. 
Therefore, the weak performance is observed in the long-run. Nevertheless, this theory only 
has mild support from the empirical evidence. Mclaughlin et al. (1996) propose similar 
ideas as the divergence of interests, finding that quoted companies which hold more cash 
flows exhibit a decline in their long-run performance. Mikkelson et al. (1997) state that the 
more the managers disperse their stakes at IPO, the worse the aftermarket operating 
performance. While Cai and Wei’s (1997) study based on the Japanese market could not 
provide support for the ownership effect on the long-run stock profitability.  
Given the difficulties to meet the listing financial requirements and the heavy reliance 
on the disclosed information, applicant firms may be tempted to manage their earnings, i.e. 
window-dressing. For investors, historical information on the issuing firms is essential. 
Generally, investors are able to evaluate the risk and returns through the extensive analysis 
of the historical information, and accordingly they make investment decisions. Since 
outside investors have access to limited information, they have no choice but to rely on the 
IPO prospectuses which report firms operating information in the last three years, 
especially for recently established firms (DeGeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993). Window-
dressing means that the accounting numbers (e.g. accruals) are manipulated in order to 
make firms’ pre-IPO financial performance meet the requirements and be attractive enough 
to investors (Dechow and Skinner 2000). This manipulation is also called “window-
dressing” and such behaviour leads to an overstatement of pre-IPO operating levels and 
understatement of post-IPO operating levels. In the long-run, firms’ performance will 
converge to its intrinsic value, IPOs will exhibit obvious underperformance. Rangan (1998) 
concludes that there is a significant negative relationship between earnings management 
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and the post IPO long-run performance. Teoh et al. (1998) demonstrate that the more 
serious the manipulated earnings, the worse the post-IPO long-run performance. 
 
2.3.2 Behavioural Factors 
Through the extensive detection of IPOs’ underperformance, Ritter (1991) proposes the 
explanation from the perspective of behavioural finance. In a similar vein, a number of 
studies have also found that the long-run performance puzzle is attributed to irrational 
investor sentiments, i.e. investors may either be systematically overoptimistic about the 
prospects of IPO firms or was overreact to the disclosed information on the IPO market. 
Nevertheless, as time passes and more information is disclosed, the true value of stocks 
will be exposed. The investment passion of overoptimistic investors will fade away, leading 
the stock prices approaching their true level. Therefore, the behavioural finance theory 
suggests that it is the irrational investor sentiments and behaviour which cause long-run 
underperformance (Loughran et al., 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Pagano et al., 1998). 
The explanations could be systematically divided into three types: heterogeneous 
expectations, impresario hypothesis and windows of opportunity and fads. 
The hypothesis of heterogeneous expectations denies the homogeneous expectation 
hypothesis proposed by EMH, suggesting that there are two types of investors in the 
secondary market, the optimistic ones and pessimistic ones. Investors exhibit 
heterogeneous expectations: different investors have disparate anticipations to listed firms’ 
further cash flow and potential growth rate. Miller (1977) first tries to adopt this opinion to 
explain the long-run weak performance. He stresses that investors anticipate the new 
issuer’s value based on their own information and they always give excessive trust to this 
information (Daniel et al., 1998). Confident investors are more likely to be the purchaser 
of stocks issued by IPO firms. Due to the uncertainty of the stock value, the pessimistic 
investors’ evaluation will be lower than the optimistic ones. That is to say, the offering 
price of IPO is determined by the most optimistic investors who will pay much more than 
the true value, leading to highly irrational underpricing. Since there will be more accessible 
information for the stocks in the long-run, the divergence of expectations will be lessened. 
The prices will unavoidably adjust downwards, resulting in weaker post-IPO long-run 
performance. In short, the greater is the difference in expectation, the higher the 
underpricing, and consequently, the poorer the long-term performance. However, a 
problem with this hypothesis is that, with the increasing evidence of long-run weak 
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performance, even the optimistic investors would suspicious about whether the new issues 
were worth such high prices. So, whether this theory is the best way to find the key of long-
run underperformance puzzle remains to be seen. The problem with this theory is that it is 
not easy to find a sound way to proxy for investor sentiment and expectations. 
The impresario hypothesis is put forward by Shiller (1990), suggesting that whether the 
issuing is successful or not, and how many shares are sold, both exert impact on the 
reputation and commission incomes of investment banks. In order to have a smooth IPO 
process, the investment banks act as the role of ‘Impresario’ when making up and 
promoting the new issue firms. These investment banks, also called underwriters, will 
always publicize the new shares (often via a low offer price) in order to create the illusion 
of excess demand. The large amount of uninitiated investors will then rush to buy shares at 
IPO, so that the initial stock prices are hyped. But the intrinsic value of the stocks will 
appear as time goes by and so stock prices will go back to their fundamental values. This 
hypothesis stresses that there is a negative relationship between the initial underpricing 
ratio and the long-run performance.  
The definition of windows of opportunity is that there is a short time period during which 
an otherwise unachievable opportunity exists. The good opportunity will disappear when 
the window ends (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Applying to the long-run performance 
puzzle, it is also called ‘The Timing Hypothesis’ (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) whose premise 
is that issuers tend to issue new shares at the peak time of enterprise development or at the 
time when investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of the firms (Aggarwal and 
Rivoli, 1990). Inherent in such views is a conflict of interest in which insiders take 
advantage of outsiders. In other words, for a particular time period, investors tend to fix 
their minds on the new issues when underwriters concentrate to issue stocks on the bull 
market, which will lead to the overvaluation of the new issued shares. This fad activity 
causes incredibly high demands in the short period after IPO, but simultaneously pushes 
the pessimistic investors to sell their stocks, thereby causing the long-run 
underperformance (Daniel et al., 1998). Many studies have shown that the IPOs during ‘hot 
markets’ are more likely to perform worse in the long-run (Helwege and Liang, 2004; 
Derrien, 2005; Ljungqvist et al, 2006), supporting the previous statements that investors 
only feel optimistic about the invested firms for a short period. As a result, investor 
sentiment becomes the main factor that drives the stock prices to a high level. However, 
this hypothesis is questioned by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) who establishes an excess 
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expectation model which argues that the IPO long-run underperformance is an equilibrium 
phenomenon, denying the rationality of windows of opportunity. 
 
2.3.3 Measurement Problems  
Except from the possible reasons that may cause the long-run underperformance as 
mentioned above, this confusing puzzle might simply be a ‘bad model problem’ (Fama, 
1998). Weather an IPO underperform in the long-run is highly depended on the 
measurements of performance. Moreover, the same measurement calculated by the same 
method may still produce diverse results when applying to different markets conditions. 
For instance, Moshirian et al. (2010) show that the existence of long-run underperformance 
for Asian IPOs is subject to the used methodology. This is in line with Gompers and Lerner 
(2003). Moreover, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that the selection of IPO sample, e.g. the 
time period and the selection criteria, also matters when estimating the long-run 
performance of IPOs. More specifically, the measurement problems can be summarized 
into three categories.  
The first type of problem is caused by the selection of benchmarks. Choosing 
appropriate benchmark is essential, because whether one can conclude the IPO is 
outperformed or underperformed is relative to how the benchmark performs. Given the 
great sensitivity of long-run performance to the benchmarks, it is plausible to consider that 
the underperformance might be merely due to the benchmarks used. A number of studies 
choose the market index as the benchmark (e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Brav and 
Gompers, 1997). However there arise problems if the time-varying systematic risk is not 
suitably controlled. It is impossible that all the firms are facing the same systematic risk 
(not all the betas equal to 1), neither are the risks constant over time (Clarkson and 
Thompson, 1990). Ritter (1991) and Ljungqvist (1995) suggest the underperformance is 
robust after controlling such risk, while Brav et al. (2000) find the underperformance 
disappear when the benchmark is value-weighted. There are also many studies that 
construct a matched portfolio of firms as the benchmark. Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
create portfolios for IPO firms that are matched by industry and size. Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) find that the 5-years’ BHARs of IPOs are significantly lower than the non-IPO firms 
match by size, by 50 percent. Brav and Gompers (1997) construct a portfolio of listed firms 
for each IPO that matched by size and book-to-market ratio. They find the 5-years’ BHARs 
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of IPO firms are higher the compared to the controlled portfolios. However, the IPOs are 
found to have underperformance when the market indexes are adopted as benchmarks.  
The second problem emphasizes that the long-run performance is significantly affected 
by the measurements of returns, and the magnitude of the bias is different if different 
measurements are used. Debates have mainly concentrated on the comparison between the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the BHAR is better because it takes the investors’ 
experience into consideration and the returns calculated in this approach are compounding 
returns which are believed to be necessary. 
The third problem is the statistical inferences from the comparisons between long-run 
performances. Kothari and Warner (1997) suggest that when matching firms with the 
counter group, the standard parametric test statistics might violate normal distribution. 
Moreover, Lyon et al. (1999) claim that the traditional t-test might yield an over rejection 
of the null hypothesis (there is no positive abnormal returns). Besides, Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) argue that the performance among individual firms might be correlated in calendar 
time, thus leading to an unreliable result. In order to deal with this problem, they suggest 
that the bootstrapping distribution can be adopted. 
 
2.4 VC and IPO long-run Performance 
IPO is recognized by VCs as the most preferred exit option since it provides the highest 
rate of returns. The market value of firms increase notably as their shares are sold to the 
public investors (Barry, 1994). For VCs, the returns corresponding to various exit patterns 
differ largely, i.e. on average the return is between 30% and 60% for exiting through IPOs, 
and around 15% for repurchase and merge and acquisitions (M&A). Hence, to receive the 
maximised profitability, bringing portfolio firms to IPO has always been the optimal choice 
for VCs. On the other hand, the engagement of VCs also impacts the IPO firms. VC-backed 
firms experience the same issuing procedures as the non-VC-backed firms. They both have 
to choose underwriters, determine the issuing time, and set the offering prices and share 
amounts. The biggest difference between them is that non-VC-backed firms can only 
receive money from the traditional fund-raising channels (e.g. banks), while VC-backed 
firms can access money from a wider range of sources. The additional benefits VCs could 
bring are various: they are able to provide expertise consulting service, supervise company 
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activities and serve in the board of directors to help with strategic and operational decisions, 
and even strengthen and extend the social networks for the invested portfolio companies 
(Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Casamatta, 2003; Chemmanur et al., 2011). Therefore, it is 
reasonable that the VC-backed IPOs present distinctive aftermarket performance patterns. 
In fact, during the last 3 decades, considerable efforts have been made to uncover the 
relationships between VC investments and their portfolio firms’ IPO performance. 
 
2.4.1 The Impact of VC on Long-run Performance 
The leading studies were initiated from the US stock market as it is the largest and the most 
developed and mature financial market in the world. VCs have been found to have 
significant impact on the post-IPO long-run performance. studies through various aspects. 
For example, Therefore, VC syndication has been one of the aspects (e.g. Tian, 2012; and 
Chahine et al., 2012). As argued by Tian (2012), VC syndication can help firms to enhance 
the innovation productivity and improve the product market value, which generate more 
patents with more profound influences. It also works well in improving firms’ market value 
since syndicated VC-backed firms have higher successful exit rates (exit through IPO and 
M&A). Tian (2012) shows that the syndicated VC-backed IPOs are significantly less 
underpriced and have higher IPO market valuation, because VC syndication can efficiently 
alleviate information asymmetry within the IPO process. VC syndication has also been a 
factor to affect the pre-IPO earnings. For example, Chahine et al. (2012) find a numerous 
VC syndication involvement is likely to increase pre-IPO earnings management, which is 
then following by high initial returns and low long-run performance. The possible reason 
is that the discrepancy within VCs not only exacerbates the agency-principal conflicts but 
also aggravates the principal-principal conflicts. These results are in line with Gangi and 
Rosaria (2008). 
VC’s experience is another aspect that is studied as the mechanism of the VC’s impact. 
Gompers et al. (2008) find that VCs increase their investments when the market heats up 
and that behaviour is exhibited mostly by VCs who have the highest industry-specific 
experience. At the same time, such reaction does not exert a significant influence on the 
success rate of VC investments. What is more, during the hot market more experienced 
VCs perform better than the less experienced VCs, although it is only slightly better. This 
result runs counter to the viewpoint of “overreaction” indicating that less experienced VCs 
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are more likely to increase their investments during the hot markets and the consequent 
investment outcomes will reduce greatly. Overall, this study proposes that the high 
volatility of VC is primarily due to the volatility from industry fundamentals, rather than 
the overreaction to market signals. They also find out that industry networks VC possessed 
are the most essential factor if they want to identify valuable investment opportunities and 
then provide follow-on value-added services. Chemmanur et al. (2011) find that VCs are 
able to select higher quality firms compared to non-VC-backed firms, with VC-backed 
firms exhibiting higher efficiency before the VC investments. 
VC’s functions, such as the governance, screening and monitoring, has also been 
considered in literature. For example, Jain (2001) examines the relationship between 
functions of VCs and VC-backed IPOs’ post-issue operating performance in the long-run. 
In this study, the potential influencing factors on firm performance are controlled in order 
to exclude the indirect influence of VC investments, i.e. managerial strategy and industry 
structure. The empirical analysis shows that the quality of VC (due diligence), syndication 
size of VC, number of VCs on broad, time length of VC service, IPO size, the technology 
innovation inspiration and VCs’ equity stake retention of the outperformed group are all 
significantly superior relative to the underperformed group. Their multivariate logit models 
reveal that VC have stronger effects on the post-IPO performance than the managerial 
strategy and industry structure, though the joint effects of VC and the management strategy 
are more significant. As a result, they conclude that there is usually a long-term 
commitment in the guarantee of good performance. What is more, VC’s function will be 
more effective when venture firms are keen on receiving VCs’ expertise. 
The literature has also documented the VC’s impact on the long-run performance in 
other markets, including both other developed markets and emerging markets. For example, 
Coakley et al. (2007) examine the five-year’s operating performance of UK IPOs listed 
from 1985 to 2003 and find the significant impact of VC on the long-run performance. 
Suchard (2009) finds that VC improves the corporate governance of Australia IPOs, which 
is suggested to be beneficial for the long-term performance. With Italian IPOs, Gangi and 
Lombardo (2008) find that VC-backed IPOs exhibit continually declining operating 
performance. Croce et al. (2013) find that the ability of VC to improve firms’ productivity 
growth is actually due to the value-added effects rather than the screening effects/selection 
effects. Besides, they suggest that the value-added effects last even after VC exits the 
invested firms.  
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Although many papers find that VC can significantly improve IPO firm’s performance 
through a variety of aspects, this finding is not universal. For instance, Chemmanur and 
Loutskina (2006) dismiss the certification role of VC. Instead they put forward a hypothesis 
called “market power” of VCs, which also improves the VC-backed IPOs’ performance. It 
specifies that VCs can attract higher quality market participants, such as investors, 
underwriters and lawyers. The integrated benefits of all the participants mutually contribute 
to better performance. Alperovych et al. (2015) design their research based on the Belgian 
context and claims that VC is responsible for the notable reduction in productivity. 
However, breaking down the VC-backed IPOs by ownership, the impact of VCs is 
surprisingly adverse. More specifically, firms invested by government-backed VCs sustain 
productivity reductions, while private-held VCs are related to the promotion of firms’ 
production efficiency. In other words, the impact of government-backed VCs is the drivers 
of the negative impact of the entire VC group. 
It is well known that stock markets of emerging economies are less developed and often 
lack sound systems, in terms of trading, law, regulation, and information disclosure. 
Because of the significantly positive effects of VC on the developed markets, do VCs play 
a similar role/function on firms listed on emerging markets? The existing studies show 
mixed findings.  Wang et al. (2003) examine the operating performance and market 
performance of new-issued firms on the Singapore stock market from 1987 to 2001 and 
find VCs exert mixed impact. Contradicting the Monitoring role proposed by Jain and Kini 
(1995), they find that the operating performance of VC-backed IPOs decline faster than the 
non-VC-backed IPOs. In fact, the declining performance is primarily owing to IPOs with 
short VC investment durations, while the longer VC investment durations are associated 
with lower underpricing. The market performance of VC-backed IPOs (BHARs), are 
significantly higher than the non-VC-backed IPOs in the first six months after IPO. But 
there are no significant differences over the longer periods. Such results indicate that VCs 
exert negative impact on IPO’s long-run performance, but positive impact in the short-run. 
Thus, evidence from Singapore market not only supports VC’s Certification role, but also 
confirms VC’s adverse selection and Grandstanding roles. 
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2.4.2 VC and IPO Performance in China 
The substantial differences of VC industry pattern between China and the western markets 
are caused by the institutional discrepancies, especially the way VCs exert their functions 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). One the one hand, before the investment, VCs in China pay 
more attention to the due diligence, particularly on the firms’ financial background, and 
they barely select a firm without any documented financial statements. On the other hand, 
VCs in China tend to provide less value-added service, and VCs are willing to exercise the 
monitoring function to the portfolio firms only within closer geographic distances. 
Ahlstrom et al. (2007) analyse the development of the VC industry in China in comparison 
with the US and specifically how VCs gradually integrated into China’s special institutional 
context. The fast-growing economy has caused strong demand in capital stock and 
technological innovation, thus providing an ideal environment for firms’ development. It 
is a great opportunity for VCs to emerge and expand their business in such an institutional 
context. However, the lack of efficiency, stability and legitimacy of a developing economy 
like China had led to more systematic risks and challenges for VC investors. To minimize 
investment failures, VCs in China must place extra emphasis on ex ante investigation (i.e. 
due diligence) and monitoring firms more carefully and actively. In addition to money, 
more value-added activities are sought by China venture firms, especially in the high-tech 
sector. VC’s suggestions, networks and global perspective are all vital to the VC-backed 
firms’ development and success. The social relationship/control between VC investor and 
the firms’ management team is more effective when VCs are delivering inputs (e.g. 
suggestions and guidance) to invested firms. In addition, given the difficulty for private 
firms to reach IPO in China, VCs usually prudently choose the best exit way for firms. 
VC’s monitoring role has also been supported in China. For example, Otchere and Vong 
(2016) using China A share IPOs from 1990 to 2008 find that demonstrate that in China, 
VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs both experienced declined long-run 
performance, but VC-backed IPOs perform significantly better than the non-VC-back IPOs. 
Guo and Jiang (2013) examine a sample of China entrepreneurial firms during 1998-2007. 
VCs are found to exert significant positive impact on firms’ performance and the R&D 
activities. VCs not only choose better performing entrepreneurial firms to invest initially, 
but also can significantly improve firm performance after investment. At the same time, the 
post-IPO value-added impact are dominated by the FVCs, whereas domestic VC-backed 
firms demonstrate no significant performance improvements after receiving VC 
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investments. Furthermore, the syndication VC-backed firms experience significant 
performance improvements relative to the matched non-VC-backed firms, while this 
impact does not apply to the individually VC-backed firms.  
VC investment performance varies remarkably depending on the ownership of VC firms 
in China (Ke and Wang, 2017). Firstly, in terms of successful exit rates, the privately-
owned VCs (PVCs) outperform the foreign VCs, which outperform government-backed 
VCs. Given the fact that many foreign VCs have been participating in the China capital 
market and they have occupied more than half of the market share, the role of foreign VC 
has been particularly studied by some papers (e.g. Wang and Wang, 2011; Humphery-
Jenner and Suchard, 2013; Huang et al., 2015). Wang and Wang (2011) focuse on the 
impact of the human capital in foreign VCs, e.g. network, reputation, and experience. 
However, these factors in FVCs exert very limit influence on their investment performance. 
In contrast, the founder (CEO) and manager’s experience of Chine venture firms’ play a 
notable role in the success of VC investments, e.g. exit via IPO or M&A. Humphery-Jenner 
and Suchard (2013) analyse the impact of foreign VCs on promoting the successful exit 
rate of venture firms in China. They point out that entirely foreign-financed VCs are not 
able to improve the success exit rate of venture firms, but firms which are jointly foreign 
and domestic financed are associating with higher successful exit rates. Generally, foreign 
VCs perform better in late-stage investments if they spread their investments across various 
industries. Moreover, compared to domestic VCs, foreign VCs are more likely to choose 
M&A or buyout as their exit method, rather than the IPOs. They argue that the restrictions 
on foreign investment institutions and the regulations of the China stock market (e.g. the 
long lock-up period) might limit the functions foreign VCs exert on the China stock market. 
From a different angel, Huang et al. (2015) explore the patterns of syndication investment 
decisions FVCs made with the Chinese domestic VCs. Firstly, FVCs are more likely to 
syndicate with China VCs in late-stage investments where uncertainty is the lowest, 
whereas in early-stage where the uncertainty is magnitude, FVCs prefer to avoid co-
investing with China VCs. Moreover, FVCs are more willing to conduct syndicate 
investment with China VCs when they have already accumulated some experience in China. 
Finally, FVCs who have branches located in China also prefer to fully fund the portfolio 
firms by themselves or syndicate with other FVCs without the corporation with China 
domestic VCs. Therefore, they conclude that the social status and organization background 
identity is another factor that influences FVC’s decisions of syndication investments 
objects.  
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2.4.3 The Explanations of Positive Impact  
Traditionally, empirical studies examine the functions of VCs through comparing the 
portfolio firms’ performance to similar firms that had never been invested by VCs. The 
significant functions VCs exert on portfolio companies are widely recognized, and several 
hypotheses have been put forward. Briefly speaking, the impact of VCs can be summarized 
into two contrary viewpoints. On the one hand, VCs contribute to the improvement of 
portfolio firms’ performance due to their Certification role and Value-added services; on 
the other hand, conflicts between VCs and firm owners are detrimental to the performance 
if they fail to achieve a consensus objective, which is the result of adverse selection.  
(1) Certification and Monitoring   
VCs get actively involved in the management and the operation process soon after they 
invest venture firms. VCs prefer early stage projects (seed and start-up stages) which are 
associated with extremely high risks. Meanwhile, there is no guarantee for the money VCs 
invested, neither do the venture firms set up an institutionalized management system for 
operation. Hence, VCs must get involved with the venture firms and monitor the operation 
activities prudently. In this way, VCs can respond immediately to any potential risk and 
take appropriate rescue actions before the losses aggravate. It is not exaggeration to say 
that defusing crises is one of the most valuable contributions VCs make to the portfolio 
firms.             
The positive role of VC emphasizes that VC-backed firms enjoy superior long-run 
performance, whether compare to their own pre-IPO levels, or to the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Barry et al. (1990), Sahlman (1990) claim that VCs have a ‘Monitoring’ function due to 
their elaborate initial due diligence. The monitoring function is validated because VCs 
usually retain part of the equity after IPO and hold nearly one third of board seats on the 
board of directors. The experience and expertise VCs provide to the IPO firms reduce the 
underpricing, thus, conveying a message to investors that VC-backed IPOs are high quality 
firms. Lerner (1995) also provides the evidence of the Monitoring function. Jain and Kini 
(1995) report that the P/E ratio of VC-backed IPOs is significantly higher than the non-VC-
backed IPOs, inferring that the ‘Monitoring’ role of VC lasts even after IPOs.  Apart from 
the 3 to 5 years’ post-issue performance, VCs’ positive impact on industrial development 
have also been studied. Brown (2005) uses a group of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs 
(matched by industry, size and B/M ratio), and demonstrates that the annual growth rate of 
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VC-backed enterprises in the ten years after IPO is much higher than those who did not 
receive VC investments. What is more, the R&D intensity of VC-backed enterprises is 
much stronger, which has exerted a profound influence on the high-tech sector. It infers 
that VC-backed firms expand and growth more rapidly. These results also illustrate that 
VC’s monitoring functions have expanded beyond the IPO process. Lahr and Mina (2012) 
support this view and claim that VC is an effective market-based solution for investment 
in high-risk and opaque projects because it combines financial resources with substantive 
knowledge of markets and technologies. 
The certification role by VCs is essential in reducing the conflicts of interest between 
agents (Jain and Kini, 1995). They find that VC-backed IPOs significantly perform better 
than the matched non-VC-backed IPOs, although they both underperform compared to the 
pre-IPO levels. Gompers (1995) confirms the agency theory predictions that VCs are able 
to reduce the information asymmetry within the VC-backed firms because they can 
generate valuable information. VCs are more likely to make early stage investments 
especially in the high-tech industries. This further confirms the monitoring role. VCs infuse 
multiple rounds and huge amounts of money into those firms which have a high probability 
to go public and those finally go public.  
The certification role by VCs can also help to reduce information asymmetry 
((Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lin, 1996; Doukas and Gonenc, 2005). The ‘Certification’ 
role of VC, indicating that VC-backed IPOs not only exhibit lower initial returns and better 
long-run performance, but also cooperate with more prestigious underwriters, auditors and 
lawyers (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). This is because VCs can certify the true value of 
IPO firms and the quality of information issued at IPO. Hence, the presence of VCs reduces 
the information asymmetry between the issued firm and public investors. Moreover, the 
involvement of VCs reduces the cost of IPOs and maximizes the returns of issued firms. In 
addition, by holding the equities of IPO firms, VCs become an implicit guarantee and 
certification of the future performance. Numerous in-depth studies done and support this 
theory. Doukas and Gonenc (2005) agree that the involvement of VC can help to overcome 
the Moral Hazard problem and reduce information asymmetry. Amit et al. (1998) propose 
that VCs are capable of reducing the cost of information asymmetries. The basic rationale 
behind the Certification role is to eliminate information asymmetries in a way that 
effectively match the supply and demand of capital, as well as making deals smoothly in 
the short period owing to their gradually formed reputation.  
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(2) Value-adding Role 
VCs not only have the potential to enhance the financial value but also increase the 
managerial value of invested firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Except from Monitoring, 
VCs are known for their value-adding ability, as documented in Lerner (1999); Kortum and 
Lerner (2000); Gompers et al. (2008); Sorensen, 2007; Meuleman et al. (2009). VCs 
usually have a rich experience and provide a unique advantage in supporting and guiding 
venture firms to success. They also have many resources which are very difficult to acquire 
for the non-VC-backed firms. These are especially valuable to the start-up/early stage and 
high-tech firms (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). 
VCs’ supervision is a key factor to venture firms’ success and this action starts 
immediately after the investment. Through the intensive observation, VC become familiar 
with the venture firm’s situation. Hence, they put forward critical suggestions on, such 
things as development strategies and major business operating decisions. Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2003) indicate that VCs strive for control rights at the time of investment and 
tend to provide valuable wide-ranging guidance and advice subsequently. During the 
holding period, VCs get involved in the management of invested firms via exhaustive 
activities (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008), e.g. recruit high level staff 
(managers and CEOs), improve the compensation systems, access to their networks (attract 
reputable underwriters, investors, high  quality suppliers, and more potential customers), 
communicate regularly with the invested firms, and participate in operational planning 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Hellman and Puri, 2002; Bottazzi et al., 2008).  
Besides, VCs also add value to invested firms through extensive corporate governance 
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Suchard (2009) confirms this proposition and proposes that 
VCs tend to display better corporate governance through a more independent board. A more 
independent board structure can better protect shareholders’ interests via monitoring of 
management. At the same time, taking advantage of VCs’ networks, firms are able to recruit 
more experienced investors within their industry. Hochberg (2011) specifically conducts 
an empirical study on the corporate governance effects of VCs at the time of going public. 
This study starts with the assumption that all the firms establish government structures at 
the time of IPO to overcome the troubles inherent in the new financial environment, i.e. the 
agency cost and shifts of ownership. Based on this, this study proposes that the corporate 
governance structures VCs built, and the value-added service VCs provided have 
significant ex post impact, but are not limited to the pre-IPO stage. VC-backed IPOs are 
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found to enjoy higher abnormal returns and less earnings management relative to the non-
VC-backed IPOs. More importantly, VCs are conducive to more independent board 
structure, i.e. the proportion of outsiders on board is relatively higher. 
It is obvious that the post-investment period is the most vital time for VCs to engage. 
Receiving intensive and precious value-added services allows VC-backed firms to grow 
and expand speedily (Shepherd et al., 2000). VCs always keep nurturing firms until they 
promote them to IPO or sell them via M&A. The pre-IPO and initial performance of VC-
backed IPOs are expected to be better than the non-VC-backed firms. However, it is very 
common that VCs still hold a large proportion of equity stakes after the IPO process, mostly 
due to the lock-up period regulations which usually last 90 to 180 days. In this case, VC-
backed firms can consistently enjoy the post-IPO benefits that generated from VCs, which 
could contribute to improved post-IPO performance. Hence, the resource-based view adds 
to the agency perspective by recognizing that access to resources and capabilities is an 
important driver of firm performance. Croce et al. (2013) suggest that VCs have long-
lasting effects on invested firms even after they exit, since early decisions and operation 
structures characterize firms’ future development (Barringer et al., 2005). VCs have 
already influenced the management style and strategy planning patterns when they exit 
firms. As suggested in many studies, the value-added effects of VCs can notably improve 
firms’ growth of productivity, e.g. the sales growth and employment growth (Davila et al., 
2003; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Chemmanur et al., 2011).    
 
2.4.4 The Explanations of Negative Impact  
The explanations of negative impact of VC on the long-run performance include adverse 
selection and the Grandstanding Theory. 
(1) Adverse Selection  
Plenty of studies stress that VC-backed IPOs could underperform the non-VC-backed IPOs 
as a result of the adverse selection problem. This theory can be explained from two aspects. 
Firstly, not all the VC-backed firms are the top firms. If a firm is good enough to operate 
their own development, manage capital and raise funds, theoretically it does not need to 
seek for external investors (like VCs) to spread risks or enhance the management. It could 
be that, only the less capable firms prefer to solicit VCs to assist them to achieve better 
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future development. Hence, lower quality firms have more incentives to go public if the 
market valuation exceeds expectations, especially in hot markets (Ritter, 1984; Coakley et 
al., 2007; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). As an insider, VCs will try to stimulate the firms to IPO 
even if the timing is not ideal, which is in accordance with the ‘Windows of Opportunities 
and Fads’ hypothesis discussed previous sections.  
Deriving from the conflicting augments about the effects of VCs on firms’ performance, 
Rosenbusch et al. (2013) carefully detect whether and how VCs add value to the invested 
firms under uncertainty. They find VCs are associated with slightly improved growth but 
limited impact on firms’ profitability. However, the positive effects vanish once intra-
industry selection effects are controlled. The results suggest that VCs have the ability to 
select and invest in more promising industries, rather than select the most promising firms. 
Besides, the positive effects of VCs are only significant on particular types of performance 
and for firms in particular categories. The lack of significance of VCs when controlled for 
the selection within industries point to the fact that the advantages of VCs might be offset 
by some shortcomings. More specifically, they find that VCs only show the best value-
added ability when they step in venture firms at the right stage. It is because young firms 
are rife with serious information asymmetry, risk, and uncertainty which might mislead 
VCs selection decisions, while in long-established firms where information is accurate and 
adequate there is not too much scope for VCs to display their risk-reducing abilities. 
Likewise, the impact of VCs are not striking on the performance of IPOs as uncertainty and 
risk are much lower, the value VCs generated is largely discounted. Overall, this research 
concludes that one should caution the industry selection effect of VC investments, and 
whether VCs exert the value-added function is largely dependent on the age of invested 
firms.  
(2) Grandstanding Theory 
Grandstanding theory implies that the essential incentive of young VCs to grandstand is to 
gain more reputation by gaining more IPO numbers. For example, Gompers (1996) 
develops the research of VC-backed IPOs performance by separating VCs in to two groups 
by age: older VCs and younger VCs. He finds that the underpricing levels of IPOs backed 
by younger VCs are significantly higher, compared to those IPOs funded by established 
VCs (18.5% vs 7.8%). What is more, younger VCs also spend less time on the board of 
directors and the average age of IPOs backed by younger VCs is less than those IPOs 
backed by older VCs. He claims this result fits with the Grandstanding theory.  
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2.5 VC Reputation 
2.5.1 Measurements of VC Reputation 
VC reputation is often analysed from two aspects. The first is related to abilities or skills, 
e.g. the management skills, capital under management, age, and previous successful IPO 
numbers. The other aspect is related to experience, such as the industry investment 
experience, involvement as board members, network centralization, etc. As VCs accrue 
more investment experience, they build up and accumulate stronger competence within the 
industry. VC reputation is a crucial dimension to the IPO research methodology but as yet, 
there is no single agreed measure. Indeed, various studies exploring a wide range of proxies. 
This section summarises the prior studies which attempted to capture the attributes of VC 
reputation, and emphasises the development of VC reputation measurements.  
Through observing the roles underwriters playing during the process of IPO, many 
reputation related topics have been developed, e.g. the measurements of underwriter 
reputation, the formation of underwriter reputation, and the effects of underwriter 
reputation on post-IPO performance, etc. Carter and Manaster (1990) adopt the rankings of 
underwriters to measure the reputation and prove that high reputation underwriters are 
related to reduced IPO underpricing. Carter et al. (1998) adopt 3 proxies to measure 
underwriter reputation, including (1) ranking (the same methods as Carter and Manaster); 
(2) underwriter reputation is only assorted into 4 groups which is a simpler method than 
CM’s (same as Johnson and Miller, 1988); (3) the market share of underwriters (same as 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991). This study finds that the explanatory power varies with the 
reputation proxy. The first proxy (ranking) demonstrates the most significant influence on 
IPO initial returns and 3-year’s post-IPO performance.  
 (1) Single-item Indicator 
In early studies, VC reputation is measured by single-item variables. The most common of 
these used variables is the age of VC firms, since the lasting duration of firms at least 
embody their survival capacity, i.e. competitiveness, profitability, and operation capacity. 
For example, Shu et al. (2011) and Cho and Lee (2013) use VC’s age. Barry et al. (1990) 
use age as one of the proxies for VCs’ skills in guiding the portfolio companies. They 
suggest that the longer the VCs engage in this industry, the more experience they have in 
monitoring the portfolio companies and guiding them to a healthy course. Gompers (1996) 
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also uses the age of VC as the proxy for reputation and splits them into two groups by the 
average age of VCs in the sample. VC firms that are older than 6 years are defined as high 
reputation, while the rest are low reputation VCs. The age of VC has also been widely used 
as a proxy for reputation in studies such as Espenlaub et al. (1999), Lee and Wahal (2004), 
Arthurs and Busenitz (2006), and Cho and Lee (2013).  
VC’s past performance is another single-item measurement for reputation, which is 
usually calculated by counting VCs’ accomplished investment rounds or deals in the past. 
These numbers directly and effectively demonstrate VCs’ degree of involvement in the 
capital market as well as their market activity level. A frequently appearing VC can 
establish their visibility in a shorter time period, thus it is much easier to be distinctive from 
the competitors. Hence, the more investments VCs conducted the more reputation they 
accumulate. The past performance of VCs are generally refined from the indicators like: 
the number of IPOs VC supported; the number of rounds/firms VC invested; the amount of 
capital VC raised; and the amount of capital VC invested, etc. (for example, Barry et al. 
(1990); Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Hsu, 2004; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Kaplan and Scholar, 
2005; Chahine and Georgen, 2011; Krishnan et al., 2011; Atanasov et al., 2012).  
The frequency that VC has served on the boards of IPO firms has also been considered 
as a measure of reputation. For example, Arthurs and Busenitz (2006) use the total number 
of boards VC has stayed on as a proxy for VC reputation. In the research of Hsu (2004), 
VC’s industry investment experience, measured via the number of deals VC has conducted 
in the start-up’s industrial sector, is used as the main reputation measurement since it 
symbolizes VC’s “domain expertise”. Two alternative measurements for reputation are also 
employed the amount of funds VC raised per year and industry reputation rank constructing 
based on the sample data. Another popular way to value the quality/reputation of VC is 
looking at its capital under management. To survive, VCs must keep seeking capital funders 
who trust their profitability and abilities. Gompers and Lerner (1999) measure reputation 
by using the ratio of total capital VC raised in the ten calendar years before it expires to the 
total amount it raised during the lifetime. Gompers and Lerner (1998) and Chemmanur and 
Loutskina (2006) also adopt the total amount of capital VC firm raised in the previous to 
proxy for reputation. There are some modified versions of VC investment size, and they 
can also effectively capture effects of VC reputation, such as the pre-IPO equity holdings 
of lead VC in the IPO firm (Barry et al., 1990); VC total investment amount (Dimov, et al., 
2007; Lee et al., 2011); and the ratio of VC total investment amount relative to the 
aggregate investment amount (Cho and Lee, 2013). Nahata (2008) uses the percentage of 
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VC’s aggregate investment amount in the VC industry. These measurements are 
constructed based on an identical rationale which is that the aggregate investment amounts 
are a reflection of VC’s active ability in the IPO market. The larger the investment amount 
VCs offered, the stronger the incentives for them to monitor and screen the portfolio firms. 
Additionally, the more capital the VCs invested, the higher the financial strength, which is 
essential for VCs to become successful.  
However, not all the studies agree with the feasibility of these indicators in predicting 
VC reputation. In the research of Gompers et al. (2008) which examining how does public 
market movements, for example the IPO activities, affect VC activity. VC past investment 
deals is applied as a proxy for VC experience. However, it does not show any significant 
impact on either the Tobin’s Q, or the IPO activity when the VC industry specialization is 
controlled. They thus suggest that the network of industry between VCs is important when 
VCs are sorting investment. Such outcome reveals the viewpoint that using single-item 
variables to measure VC reputation/experience is incomplete. Croce et al. (2013) adopt two 
measurements to quantify VC reputation: (1) the total assets under management of VC; (2) 
the cumulative number of investment deals before VC invest the underlying firm. 
Nevertheless, they conclude that VCs display accordant screening function, regardless of 
the level of VC reputation. Bulter and Goktan (2013) suggest that less experienced VCs 
exert unique advantages when transferring private start-ups to public. They distinguish high 
from low experience by VC age and the total amount of investments prior to the year VC 
invested into the start-ups, respectively. Less-experienced VCs trend to provide more soft 
information especially to younger and smaller firms and the benefits are stronger when they 
are located closer to each other.  
The lack of validity of the above indicators might be due to the discordance of reputation 
level when using VC age and VC’s past performance. Some older and prestigious VCs 
might not be an active investor in the IPO market during a certain time period because they 
aim at achieving substantially returns via the steady progress and development of the 
invested firms. In many circumstances, the experienced VCs prefer to nurture only a few 
early-stage firms at the same period but for many years, and also provide a large amount of 
capital though several rounds of financing. In contrast, less reputable VCs prefer to 
participate into many late-stage investment deals, but without spending much time or 
money in each firms. These VCs have the incentive to augment their reputation by gaining 
more successful IPO numbers. As a result, the performance of less reputable VC-backed 
firms might not be substantially improved. If reputation is measured by the IPO frequency, 
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the actually high quality VCs will be classified as low reputation VCs as they only have 
very few successful IPOs in the past, whereas less qualified VC turns out to be regarded as 
reputable VCs.  
Having this issue in mind, Nahata (2008) develops a new reputation measurement and 
explores the reputation effects of VCs on the performance of private firms. The IPO 
capitalization share of VC is adopted, which is originated from the measurement for 
underwriter reputation (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). It not only includes the size of VC’s 
investment (IPO size), but also the number of IPO deals VC conducted (IPO frequency). 
VC’s market share in each calendar year is not suggested to be used here because it only 
reflects the fund arising ability of VC in each single year in which they have taken firms to 
IPO. Therefore, this study uses the cumulative IPO market capitalization share of VC across 
the sample years to proxy for reputation. In the longer period, VC’s long-lasting and 
comprehensive impact on IPO firms can be more satisfactorily captured from its average 
performance.  
In line with Nahata (2008) and Krishnan et al. (2011), Lee and Masulis (2011) and Shu 
et al. (2011) use VC’s IPO market share as the reputation measurement. Chou et al. (2013) 
also use VC’s cumulative IPO market share (but based on the IPO market capitalization) 
as reputation proxy. This study suggests that cumulative IPO market share is a more robust 
measurement for reputation. The same reputation measurement is also used in Celikyurt et 
al. (2014) and Barry and Mihov (2015). Of all the measurements, VC’s IPO market share 
has the most significant impact on all the long-run performance proxies, and it is the only 
one that could demonstrate the significant effects of VC reputation. VCs with higher 
cumulative IPO market share not only benefit their funded IPO firms with better post-IPO 
long-run performance, but also better corporate governance. Both studies suggest that VC’s 
IPO market share could be a reasonable measurement of VC reputation. From then on, 
several studies have been conducted to test the validity of this measurement. 
 (2) Multi-item indicator  
Although indictors above can significantly interpret the reputation effect, there remains the 
concerns that single-item variables might not capture the VC reputation perfectly since 
reputation is constructed based on a variety of factors. Consequently, one must be very 
cautious when selecting the proxies. 
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A natural way to construct multi-item indicator is to use several single-item indictors. 
For example, Tian (2012) VC reputation is measured by various indicators: (1) VC age; (2) 
the money funds VC raised in the past 5 years; (3) the total money amount VC raised; (4) 
the total money amount VC invested; and (5) the number of financing rounds VC has 
involved in. Atanasov et al. (2012) measure VC reputation by using four indicators: VC 
age; the frequency of VC investment; capital under management; and the network 
syndication. Alternatively, Hochberg (2011) The reputation of VC contributes to an 
important portion of VC’s positive identity, and it is measured by three indictors: VC age; 
number of funds VC have raised; and the VC’s IPO frequency. Fernhaber and McDougall-
Covin (2009) In this study, VC reputation is measured by five variables: VC age; the total 
money amount of investment; total number of firms under investment; and successful IPO 
rate. Apart from these four traditional measurements, the “media visibility” is also been 
used to proxy for reputation, measured as the number of articles published in The Wall 
Street Journal mentioning the VC in the year of IPO. 
Some other studies try to construct an index with several variable to measure reputation. 
For example, Lin and Smith (1998) create a reputation index of VCs which combines VC 
age and the identity of lead VC. An above average value of the index is classified as high 
reputable VCs, while the others are less reputable VCs. VC reputation exhibits the 
certification role and works effectively in reducing the information asymmetry during the 
IPO process. Besides, for the sake of long-lasting reputation, more reputable VCs are more 
likely to keep staying in IPO firms which are less underpriced, instead of selling the 
shareholdings before IPO. Similarly, Coakley et al. (2007) construct a complex index to 
measure the VC reputation. The VC reputation index consists of two variables: VC age and 
the number of times VC acts as lead VC across the sample period. A VC whose index is 
above the mean is classified as a high reputation VC, while the rest are classified as low 
reputation VCs.  
A more comprehensive VC reputation index by taking 5 indicators of VC into 
consideration at the same time (Lee et al., 2011: (1) the total number of start-ups VC 
invested in; (2) total amount of money VC injected into the start-ups; (3) the money amount 
of funds the VC raised; (4) VC’s IPO frequency in the past five years; (5) VC age. The first 
two measurements disclose the intensity of VC investment activities. They suggest that a 
highly visible VC is more likely to be accepted by venture firms and thereby dominating 
the market much easier. Moreover, a modified version of this reputation index is adopted 
by Pollock et al. (2015) which includes five different: (1) average amount of funds under 
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management; (2) average number of funds the VC managed; (3) total number of start-ups 
VC invested; (4) total amount of funds VC invested in the start-ups; (5) VC’s IPO 
frequency. Removing VC age from the index and using it as a control variable, this research 
finds that VC reputation is positively correlated with the VC status and it becomes stronger 
when VC grows older. Besides, IPO frequency plays a more important role to those VCs 
who are labelled as low reputation.    
From the discussion above, the development of the VC reputation measurements and 
the effectiveness of these proxies in interpreting VC reputation can be seen. Earlier studies 
usually chose only one indicator, but this has developed over time so that now multi-
variable indicators are preferred. These studies have provided great insight into the future 
VC reputation and the long-term post-IPO performance studies. Among them, two pieces 
of representative research are explicitly presented below, due to the methodological 
importance in this field. 
 
2.5.2 VC Reputation and Long-run Performance 
The studies of VC reputation are primarily developed on the basis of underwriter reputation 
studies. Also working as financial intermediaries, investment banks are an indispensable 
part of the IPO process, and they basically act as the insurance for IPO firms. A large 
number of studies concentrate on the influence of underwriter reputation on new issued 
firms’ performance (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Cater and Manaster, 1990; Johnson and Miller, 
1988). One is that they both are financial intermediaries which provide a service to the IPO 
firms. The other similar feature is that the presence of them can convey a signal of quality 
of the IPO firm to the public, which might influence the investors’ judgement and the 
subsequent behaviour. Firms underwritten by more reputable investment banks are found 
to demonstrate lower underpricing level. For the roles of VCs, VCs pass on their influence 
by enhancing funded firms’ capabilities in resource allocation and opportunities 
identification. Such abilities are crucial for new IPO firms to survive from the threats and 
competition existing in post-IPO environment (Jelic et al. 2005; Arthurs and Busenitz, 
2006). 
In the context of loads of information asymmetry between IPO firms and outside 
investors, VCs could also play identical “Certification” role as the underwriters. Moreover, 
fearing the loss of reputation, VCs try to avoid the false certification of IPO firms through 
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disclosing accuracy and complete information of the IPOs. For example, Espenlaub et al. 
(1999) report a strong positive relationship between IPOs long-run performance, measured 
by 3-year BHARs, and the VC reputation. Meanwhile, VC-backed IPOs underwritten by 
VC-affiliated banks or the other financial institutions exhibit better long-run performance 
than the other IPOs. They therefore conclude that more reputable VCs have stronger 
Certification function, and they further conclude that VC reputation is positively correlated 
to the Screening function. Doukas and Gonenc (2003) obtain similar results showing that 
VC reputation has positive effects on IPOs 3-year BHARs. Meanwhile, the positive impact 
of underwriter reputation on the long-run performance disappear when VC is associated 
with the IPO firms. Hsu (2004) points out that high reputation VCs have Certification and 
Value-added functions. The financing offering from more reputable VCs are three times 
more likely to be accepted by entrepreneurs than less reputable VCs. Furthermore, more 
reputable VCs are able to acquire portfolio firms’ equity stakes with a 10% to 14% discount. 
This indicates that the excess value of VCs might be more exceptional than their 
fundamental financing role, since these additional services could bring extra financial 
incomes. What is more, the additional benefits brought by more reputable VCs are higher; 
otherwise venture enterprisers will not sell their equities with discount. 
Screening and monitoring role of VC have also guided some studies of the impact VC 
reputation on the long-run performance. Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) support the 
screening and monitoring role of VC, by observing that IPOs funded by more reputable VC 
display significantly higher profitability and margins, higher R&D expenditures, and sales 
growth rates in the long-term after issue than the non-VC-backed IPOs. Nahata (2008) adds 
evidence to screening and monitoring functions. By using a new measurement, VC 
reputation is found to have a strong link to stand for the positive effects of VCs. This study 
is based on a sample of private firms, but it is much easier for more reputable VC-backed 
private firms to get listed successfully, and more reputable VCs can accelerate the process. 
Barry and Mihov (2015) demonstrate that IPOs backed by the high reputation VCs always 
enjoy significantly positive abnormal returns, whether they are associated with banks or 
not. By contrast, IPOs backed by low reputation VCs still suffer from negative abnormal 
returns.        
Value-adding role of VC has also been as the explanations of the positive impact of VC 
reputation on long-run performance. For example, Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin (2009) 
validate the Value-adding effects of VCs and point out that the positive effects are owing 
to VCs’ knowledge and reputation. VC-backed firms are found to make better strategic 
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decisions, and thus more quickly to achieve internationalization, and this positive 
relationship is stronger if the firms are invested by more reputable VCs. Instead, VCs’ 
ability in corporate governance is picked out by Krishnan et al. (2011) when explaining the 
positive effects of VC reputation. More reputable VCs tend to exert more extensive 
corporate governance during the post-IPO holding period. Similarly, on a sample of Taiwan 
IPOs, Shu et al. (2011) conclude that IPOs funded by more established VCs enjoy better 
post-IPO operating performance and R&D expenditures than the IPOs funded by lower 
reputation VCs. 
VC reputation’s impact is also affected by some factors. For example, Lee et al. (2011) 
examine the effects of VC reputation on IPOs performance from a variety of aspects. The 
results are consistent with the above studies – VC reputation can effectively increase the 
post-IPO operating performance. VC industry specialization and the early-stage investment 
magnify the positive relationship between VC reputation and operating performance. 
Another highly debated factor is the geographical distance between VC firms and IPO firms. 
The distance weakens VC reputation effects on long-run operating performance if the 
endogeneity problem is controlled.  
Furthermore, among the research about the impact of VC reputation on the IPO long-
run performance, a great deal justifies the positive relationship between them. More 
reputable VCs are supposed to improve invested firms’ IPO performance due to their 
additional abilities in Screening, Monitoring and Value-adding. There is little doubt 
regarding the influence of reputation on long-run performance. In the spirit of the Screening 
function, more reputable VCs usually have more experience in selecting high quality 
projects/investments, so they should be able to support for a better long-run performance. 
Similarly, the “Monitoring” function of VC should also be stronger as VC becomes more 
reputable because they can offer more experience in monitoring the operation of the firm.  
During the post-IPO period, the reduced ownership could cause more serious 
information asymmetries between the IPO firms and outsiders, which might lead to the 
performance decreasing. While Jain and Kini (1995) suggest that the Certification function 
of VCs can efficiently mitigate this problem and they report that VC-backed IPOs 
significantly outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs in the long-run. Findings of Gompers 
and Lerner (1997) are consistent with Certification function. Meanwhile, they reject the 
Conflict of interest hypothesis since IPOs funded by bank-afflicted VCs do not exhibit 
higher underpricing or lower long-term performance. By contrast, Hamao et al. (1998) find 
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evidence to support the Conflict of interest hypothesis, as well as rejecting the Certification 
function.  They observe that the VC-backed IPOs do not exhibit any significant 
performance compared to the other IPOs in the long-run. 
Hence, as documented in the prior studies, VC reputation has been proved to have 
significant influence on the post-IPO long-run performance. Therefore, it is plausible to 
suggest that VCs work hard to earn more reputation in order to be distinctive from their 
peers. However, the excessive pursuit of reputation might bring adverse effects. Gompers 
(1996) claims that, for the purpose of building up reputation as soon as possible, young 
VCs have intentions to grandstand. Less-established and younger VCs are inclined to push 
the private firms to go public earlier than they ought to. Gaining the reputation by the means 
of accumulating more IPOs ensures that VCs will raise funds in next rounds and keep 
surviving. However, going public when not well-prepared will place those firms in an 
arduous situation that could interfere the further development. The unqualified IPOs have 
insufficient ability to overcome the difficulties and competition in the IPO market. In the 
long-run, the post-IPO performance might show a continuous decline. In this case, it can 
be concluded that VC reputation exerts a two-side influence. On the one hand, as widely 
suggested, more reputable VCs have positive impact on IPO firm performance; on the other 
hand, the less reputable VCs seem to exert negative impact. 
Nevertheless, the effects of less reputable VCs have also been doubted. Butler and 
Goktan (2013) explore the role of less-experienced VCs on IPO long-run performance, and 
find that less-experienced VCs show some comparative advantages in generating “soft 
information” when compared with the new start-ups who are not able to provide “hard 
information” about the operating status (e.g. financial reports). Usually less-experienced 
VCs are less reputable. Hence, in order to build specific personal distinctions, less-
experienced VCs might focus on the creation of soft information. This study further 
underlines that the geographical distance between VCs and start-up firms strongly 
determines the scale of the benefits associated with the soft information. The underpricing 
of closer located VCs and IPOs is significantly much lower than farther located VC and 
IPOs, i.e. 12% vs. 35%. 
In summary, the impact of VC reputation on IPO performance have been widely 
examined though the findings are mixed. More reputable VCs are always older and more 
experienced, and they can effectively improve IPOs’ productivity, growth rate, and 
performance, etc. On the contrary, less reputable VCs do not seem to exert a profound 
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influence on IPOs: in most of the studies, low reputation VC-backed IPOs show no 
significant performance difference than the non-VC-backed IPOs. In many cases, low 
reputation VCs even exert negative impact on IPO firms’ performance. Given that VCs are 
playing a more and more important role in the IPO market, the reputation of VC and its 
impact need to be examined as a matter of urgency. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This Chapter reviews prior studies that are related to VC reputation and post-IPO long-run 
performance. Firstly, this chapter reviews the studies that document the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs. In particular, the long-run underperformance of China’s IPOs 
is summarized. Then the chapter reviews the explanations of long-run underperformance. 
Moreover, the chapter reviews the studies of the impact of VC on long-run performance 
and the explanations of positive and negative impacts. Finally, the measurement and VC 
reputation and the impact of VC reputation are summarized.  
From the review of prior studies, there are some gaps in the literature. Firstly, the 
measurement of VC reputation and consequent its impact on the long-run performance are 
not well studied. This thesis uses a real-world and market-based ranking measure for VC 
reputation created by the Zero2IPO Research Group for the China market, which is more 
multifaceted than many of the traditional proxies for reputation used in earlier studies. As 
a result, the impact of VC reputation is more reliable. Secondly, this thesis examines both 
the post-IPO long-term stock market performance and operating performance in the context 
of China and sheds light on the different roles of VC-backing/VC reputation when investors 
are forward-looking and backward looking. Thirdly, the measurement of BHARs is 
sensitive to the matched portfolio. For example, some of the literature divides the sample 
of IPOs to 9 groups by two variables and each group will be the matched portfolio of all 
IPO firms in the group. However, this thesis makes improvement on the measurement of 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns by constructing IPO-specific portfolio as the bench mark to 
each IPO firms. Last but not least, the literature on the roles of China-specific ChiNext 
board in the impact of VC/VC reputation on the long-run performance is very limited.  This 
thesis fills this gap. 
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Chapter 3 
Hypotheses, Data, and Methodology 
The previous chapter presents prevailing conjectures over the impact of VC-backing and 
VC reputation on IPO performance.  Based on the critical assessment of the methodology 
used in previous studies, this Chapter develops several specific research hypotheses related 
to the impact of VC-backing and VC reputation on China IPOs’ long-run performance. 
Then, this chapter illustrates the data of this thesis. After that, this chapter further 
emphasizes the methodologies on how to measure long-run performance and VC reputation. 
Finally, the empirical models are constructed corresponding to the research questions that 
have been put forward. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses Development 
Previous studies have recognized the universal but puzzling phenomenon of new-issued 
firms: their unusual high initial performance and low long-run performance. VCs are found 
to have some positive effects on firms’ performance (e.g., Barry et al., 1990; Ritter, 1991; 
Jain and Kini, 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Tian, 2012; 
Barry and Mihov, 2015). The certification function of VC can effectively reduce 
underpricing through reducing the uncertainty at IPO owing to the severing information 
asymmetry between issuing firms and public investors. VC’s experience in managing and 
operating funded firms, especially in their dominant industries, is found to improve 
monitoring and value-added functions to the funded IPO firm. 
Therefore, IPO firms who receive the VC investments may be expected to perform 
differently to the other IPOs. Within the China context, this thesis explores whether VC-
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backing and VC reputation have significant effects on the long-term performance of China 
IPOs. 
In addition, previous research informs us that empirical results are very sensitive to the 
measurement metrics for long-run performance. Previous studies usually mark the three 
years after IPO as the long-term period, and frequently employ stock market abnormal 
returns (e.g. CARs, BHARs) and operating performance (e.g. return on asset, return on 
equity) as the main proxies for performance. However, there is still no consensus on the 
impact of VC-backing and VC reputation. This thesis will examine both the IPO firms’ 
stock market performance and operating performance. Based on the research results, 
conclusions can be drawn about the impact of VC-backing and VC reputation in the context 
of China. There is also the question of whether VC-backing/VC reputation are playing an 
equal role on different kinds of performance. In total, five hypotheses are developed 
regarding to the influence of VC on the new-issued firms’ long-run performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis stems from the concerns about long-term performance differences 
between VC-backed IPOs and the non-VC-backed IPOs. The dominant conclusion from 
previous studies suggests that VC can effectively reduce the IPO long-run 
underperformance by virtue of VC’s Monitoring and Value-adding functions. The 
Monitoring function emphasises VC’s roles in promoting growth and innovation and 
improving the corporate governance within the portfolio firms (Inderst and Mueller, 2009). 
The advisory role states that VCs provide advice to the management process of the funded 
firms (Chen and Liang, 2016). 
Then, the Value-adding services provided by VC are extraordinarily beneficial to the 
IPO firms, e.g., assisting firms to make long-term development and marketing strategies, 
introducing potential supplier and clients, building new distribution channels, 
recommending suitable candidates for key positions, and attracting new investors. (Baker 
and Gompers, 2003; Hochberg, 2012). The long-term investments of VC can nurture IPO 
firms greatly. In addition, several studies also have suggested that VC can effectively 
reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard problems (e.g. Amit et al., 1998; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2001; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). Hypothesis 1 is that: "#: The VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly superior long-run performance 
than the non-VC-backed IPOs in China. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 1 enables the understanding of the general role that VC is playing in China. The 
second hypothesis is developed to examine whether the reputation of VC contributes to any 
significant impact of VC. In other words, does VC reputation exert a significant impact on 
IPO long-term performance? Reputation, an abstract concept, is depicted as a reflection of 
VC firm’s quality and strength through the public’s impression and evaluation. The 
importance of VC reputation has become a hot research issue since VCs successfully earned 
themselves an important place in the capital market. 
Proposition here is that if a positive function of VC (Monitoring and Value-added) exits, 
then it is magnified when VCs are more reputable, due to enhanced productivity and 
innovation (Jain and Kini, 1995; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Nahata, 2008). More prestigious 
VC investors are expected to have particular experience and expertise in managing and 
operating portfolio firms, whereupon they are able to provide forward-looking suggestions 
and monitoring services to IPO firms. Hence, Hypothesis 2 of this study is: "$ : VC reputation exhibits significantly positive impact on the long-run 
performance of IPOs in China.    
VC reputation has been measured using many proxy variables in past studies. Findings 
about the impact of VC reputation are highly dependent on the measurements adopted. 
Currently, there is no consensus about the optimal proxy for reputation. In order to obtain 
credible results, this thesis will develop a set of proxies for VC reputation. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 is a development of Hypothesis 2. As discussed above, high reputation VCs 
have more experience and abilities, therefore they are able to provide more benefits to IPO 
firms. Hence, IPOs funded by more reputable VCs may be expected to outperform the non-
VC-backed IPOs. However, the impact of less reputable VCs should not be neglected as 
well. The third hypothesis put forward here also emphasises the impact of less reputable 
VCs and it is expressed as: "%: High (Low) VC reputation exhibits a positive (negative) impact on the long-
run performance relative to the non-VC-backed IPO in China. 
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This hypothesis derives from the Grandstanding theory proposed by Gompers (1996), 
which points out that less reputable VCs are responsible for the negative impact of VC, 
where VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly inferior performance to the non-VC-backed 
IPOs. More specifically, it indicates that less qualified VCs who are keen to gain more 
reputation may have an incentive to push firms to IPO prematurely, given the fact that the 
number of IPOs has been treated as an important standard to evaluate VC’s reputation. A 
renowned reputation is so vital for the next round of fund raising that VC firms will spare 
no effort to increase their IPO numbers. However, in the long-term, those less reputable 
VC-backed firms which undertook IPOs prematurely will face more challenges and 
difficulties. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
Another unique characteristic of China stock market is the establishment of the ChiNext 
board in 2009. This Nasdaq-type board market serves as a supplement to the main board, 
and it is specifically designed to provide financing opportunities for enterprises that 
temporarily have difficulties to list on the mainboard but are in need of funding and 
developments (e.g. the entrepreneurial enterprises, middle- and small-sized enterprises, and 
especially high-tech enterprises). 
For VC investors, the most noteworthy meaning of the ChiNext board is that it provides 
an ideal exit channel, due to the high criterion of the Main board. This board also works 
significantly to decentralize the risk of VC investments, accelerate the velocity of high-tech 
investment resources, and improve efficiency. As shown in Chapter 3, VCs appear much 
more frequently on the ChiNext board than they do on the Main board, i.e. around two 
thirds of listed companies on the ChiNext board are VC/PE-backed. As a result, this thesis 
will examine the performance of IPOs listed on the various boards and the relationship with 
VC investment. The impact of VC on different boards will be examined separately. The 
fourth hypothesis is: "&:VC exerts significant impacts on post-IPO long-run performance for firms 
listed on the ChiNext board market and/or Main board market in China. 
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Hypothesis 5 
Due to the unique contribution VC contributed to the IPO firms, long-term performance of 
VC-backed IPOs are supposed to perform differently to the non-VC-backed IPOs. Building 
on Hypothesis 4, the next question is whether VC reputation impact differently across 
different boards. The fifth hypothesis is then: "' : VC reputation exerts a significant impact on post-IPO long-run 
performance for firms listed on the ChiNext board market and/or Main board 
market in China. 
 
 
3.2 Data  
3.2.1 Data Resource 
This study focuses on the A-share IPOs listed on China’s Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (SZSE) from the period 2004 to 2012. A-shares are 
common stocks issued by Chinese-based companies which operating in mainland China 
and they are only quoted in Chinese Renminbi (RMB). Before 2003, A share IPOs can only 
be purchased by citizens from the mainland China. Since then, A shares also can be traded 
by specified foreign investors through the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor program. 
The first A share VC-backed firm got listed on the Main Board in 2002. However, it was 
not until 2004, the second and subsequent VC-backed IPOs emerged frequently on the 
China stock market. Besides, the Chinese government began to enforce the “Split-share 
Reform” in 2004, striving to transfer the government-oriented stock market to a market-
oriented one. Starting in 2004 allows the avoid of the potential effects (i.e. structural break) 
caused by the reform.  
The sample terminates in November 2012 because the CSRC had frozen all IPOs since 
December 2012. Chinese equity indexes had manifested to be some of the world’s worst 
performers since 2009 and had worsened in 2012. In order to stabilize the fragile equity 
market and redeem investors' confidence, the suspension was not resumed until January 
2014. During this period, the regulator had conducted the tightest financial supervision on 
the companies that are queued to list. In addition, the CSRC was in preparation for the 
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market reforms on the stock listing system, transferring from the approval-based system to 
the registration-based system which applied in the developed markets. 
Moreover, IPOs listed since 2014 are not involved here was also due to the definition of 
long-term: the 36-month is the main measure for long-term. Therefore, IPOs should have 
been floated for at least three years before the long-run post-IPO performance could be 
estimated. Initially, only 800 IPOs listed between 2004 and 2009 were included in the 
sample when the data collection commenced in 2013. Later, the sample enlarged to 1,095 
in 2016, including the latest available IPOs listed between 2010-2012. Consequently, even 
though a portion of IPOs listed in 2014 become available in 2017, we have finished the 
draft and prepared for submission at that moment. Nonetheless, the subsequent IPOs (listed 
after 2014) will be added up in the most recent future research. Taken the above factors 
together, the time span of this research starts from 2004 and terminates in 2012. 
 
Data for IPOs is obtained from four databases. The first database is Datastream, which 
provides the monthly stock prices, the book to market (B/M) ratio, market capitalization, 
and the accounting numbers for each IPO firm. The second database is CSMAR (China 
Stock Market & Accounting Research). This database provides a variety of information for 
China listed companies, such as the offering information, established date, book to market 
(B/M) ratio, funds raised during IPO (IPO proceeds), and ownership structures. The third 
database is the official website of the SHSE from which the IPO prospectus for all the IPO 
firms is collected. The IPO prospectuses provide very detailed ownership structures of the 
IPO firms from the time of establishment to the time of IPO. In this study, if one or more 
shareholders disclosed from the IPO firm’s prospectus is/are VC investor(s), the IPO firm 
will be identified as VC-backed IPO. 
11The fourth resource is the database published by the Zero2IPO Research Group . This 
institution was founded in 1999 and it is a leading integrated service provider for China’s 
VC and PE industry which includes a great deal of data for the VCs that have participated 
investment activities in China capital market. Each VC is identified by reference to the 
‘Annual Directory of 400 domestic and foreign VC firms’ published by this service 
provider. The most remarkable data obtain from this institution is the ‘Annual Ranking of 
VC & PE Institutions’ published every year since 2004, which can be used to construct a 
VC reputation measurement that is crucial in this research. Then, the detailed data for VC 
                                                             
11 See the website of Zero2IPO research group: http://www.pedaily.cn/ .  
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firms is hand-collected from each VC-backed IPO’s prospectus, including VC’s 
establishment date, register capitals, ownership, board membership, and equity holdings.  
The industry to which the IPO belongs has also been treated as an observed factor that 
could affect firms’ returns. It is argued that VC-backed firms tend to cluster in the high-
tech industry, so that returns of VC-backed IPOs could be varied across industries. 
Generally, all the IPOs from the sample are divided into two sub-groups according to their 
industry. The high-tech industry is defined following the industry classification standard 
used by Loughran and Ritter (2004), i.e. the International Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
(the 2003 edition). However, three years later, the new ICB 2007 edition made some 
adjustments in some industries. So, these classifications were following Chou et al.’s (2013) 
work, using the 2007 standard. Firms belong to an industry that is in accordance with the 
ICB standard of high-tech industry will then be defined as a high-tech firm. 
  
 
3.2.2 Data Description 
The initial sample of IPOs accessed from Datastream consisted of 1,446 IPOs from Jan 1st 
2004 to Dec 31th 2012. After calculating the BHARs based on portfolios matched by market 
capitalization and B/M ratio, 1,138 IPOs remained12. After merging the sample with the 
data set obtained from CSMAR, the sample reduced to 1,119 IPOs. The sample was then 
reduced by dropping IPOs that have BHARs larger or smaller than the mean value by the 
more than three times of standard deviation of BHARs to limit the effects of outliers. This 
leaves 1,095 IPOs in the final sample. 
Table 3.1 reports the distribution of the 1,095 IPOs during the nine years from Jan 1st 
2004 to Dec 31th 2012. The IPO frequency and proceeds are presented by stock exchanges, 
and whether they are VC-backed. Across all years, the 1,095 IPOs had raised 1,320.57 
Billion Yuan. In year 2010 there was the largest number of IPOs, and the 320 IPOs 
contributed to the largest amount of proceeds among the sample years, which is around 432 
Billion Yuan. The second largest number of IPOs happened in year 2011 with 256 IPOs 
raising over 263 Billion Yuan. 
                                                             
2 308 IPOs are missing because, after the matching process, no satisfactory matched group could be found for them. The 
matching process is explicitly interpreted in Section 3.3.1. 
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Analysing the sample by the exchanges, the table illustrates that only 14.5% of the IPOs 
(159 out of 1,095) are listed on the SHSE, while the remaining 85% (936 IPOs) were all 
listed on SZSE. Such an uneven distribution is primarily due to the difficulty of getting 
listed on the Main Board which basically located on the SHSE. With respect to the SZSE, 
it is mainly dominated by the SME and ChiNext Boards. These two boards are designed 
for the small- and medium-sized enterprises and the listings requirements are much looser 
than the Main board. In particular, a large number of firms, especially those high-tech firms 
who have great potential and high-growth rates, take advantage of the ChiNext Board and 
get listed successfully. From 2009 to 2012, as many as 701 IPOs were listed on the SZSE, 
more than 8 times of the number of IPOs (84) listed on the SHSZ. 
The VC industry has been experiencing a rapid development in the last decade and is 
playing an increasing important role in the Chinese stock market. Across 2004 to 2012, 
there are 456 VC-backed IPOs and 639 non-VC-backed IPOs. Meanwhile, the total 
proceeds of VC-backed IPOs are 534 Billion Yuan, which accounts for over 40% of the 
total amount of proceeds from the entire market. From Table 3.1, it can be seen that VC-
backed IPOs exhibits a sudden increase in 2010, and slightly decreases in the next two 
years. Between 2010 and 2012, 351 VC-backed firms successfully went public in China. 
This is about three times the total number of VC-backed IPOs (107) over the previous 6 
years. Nevertheless, the ratio of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs was also increasing 
through the sample years. In 2006, the number of non-VC-backed IPOs was 7 times as the 
number of VC-backed IPOs, and then in 2007 the multiple decreased to 2.3 times. By 2011 
and 2012, the number of VC-backed IPOs had exceeded the number of non-VC-backed 
IPOs. This pattern of VC-backed IPO activity is similar to the case that was seen in some 
of the advanced stock markets, such as the US. 
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Table 3.1 Distribution of IPOs from 2004-2012 
 Full  SHSE SZSE  VC NVC 
 N. Proceeds  N. Proceeds N. Proceeds  N. Proceeds N. Proceeds 
2004 87 31.15  52 20.55 35 10.59  7 1.43 80 29.72 
2005 13 3.35  1 0.44 12 2.91  4 1.14 9 2.21 
2006 40 38.84  5 26.48 35 12.36  5 1.27 35 37.57 
2007 96 205.68  13 174.03 83 31.65  29 139.87 67 65.81 
2008 74 80.55  4 51.11 70 29.44  23 9.23 51 71.32 
2009 73 159.06  6 109.62 67 49.45  37 27.12 36 131.94 
2010 318 432.05  21 21.00 297 297.00  137 155.26 181 276.79 
2011 256 263.54  36 95.03 220 168.51  130 143.29 126 120.25 
2012 138 88.35  21 25.57 117 62.79  84 55.43 54 32.92 
Total 1,095 1,302.57  159 523.82 936 664.71  456 534.04 639 768.53 
Table 3.1 illustrates the distribution of 1,095 A share IPOs listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) from Jan 2nd 2004 to Dec 31th 2012. Proceeds of IPO are presented on the unit of Billion yuan.  
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Table 3.2 Industry Classification by ICB (2007) 
Industry Supersector Sector High-Tech 
0001 Oil & Gas 0500 Oil & Gas 0530 Oil & Gas Producers 
0570 Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 
0580 Alternative Energy 
NO 
NO 
NO 
1000 Basic Materials 1300 Chemicals 1350 Chemicals Ö 
 1700 Basic 
Resources 
1730 Forestry & Paper 
1750 Industrial Metals & Mining 
1770 Mining 
NO 
NO 
NO 
2000 Industrials 2300 Construction 
& Materials 
2350 Construction & Materials NO 
 2700 Industrial 
Goods & Services 
2710 Aerospace & Defense 
2720 General Industrials 
2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
2750 Industrial Engineering 
2770 Industrial Transportation 
2790 Support Services 
NO 
NO 
Ö 
NO 
NO 
NO 
3000 Consumer Goods 3300 Automobiles 
& Parts 
3350 Automobiles& Parts NO 
 3500 Food & 
Beverage 
3530 Beverage 
3570 Food Producers 
NO 
NO 
 3700 Personal & 
Household Goods 
3720 Household Goods & Home Construction 
3740 Leisure Goods 
3760 Personal Goods 
NO 
NO 
NO 
4000 Health Care 4500 Health Care 4530 Health Care Equipment & Services 
4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
NO 
Ö 
5000 Consumer 
Services 
5300 Retail 5330 Food & Drug Retailers 
5370 General Retailers 
NO 
NO 
 5500 Media 5550 Media NO 
 5700 Travel & 
Leisure 
5750 Travel & Leisure NO 
6000 
Telecommunications 
6500 
Telecommunications 
6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 
6570 Mobile Telecommunications 
NO 
Ö 
7000 Utilities 7500 Utilities 7530 Electricity 
7570 Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
NO 
NO 
8000 Financials 8300 Banks 8350 Banks NO 
 8600 Real Estate 8630 Real Estate Investment & Services NO 
 8700 Financial 
Services 
8770 Financial Services NO 
9000 Technology 9500 Technology 9530 Software & Computer Services 
9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 
Ö 
Ö 
Table 3.2 lists the 3-digit ICB industry classification released in 2007. There are totally 10 industries and 
each industry have one or more super sectors. The high technology industries are defined according to the 
3rd digit. These six industries: 1350 Chemicals; 2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment; 4570 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology; 6570 Mobile Telecommunications; 9530 Software & Computer Services; 
9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment are defined as high-tech industries. 
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Table 3.2 provides the industry classification for companies according to the 2007 
edition of Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). The ICB allocates companies to 
subsectors and labels each subsector with a unique code. A company is defined as a high-
tech company if its industry lies in one of the 6 industries with the three-digital ICB codes: 
1350, 2730, 4570, 6570, 9530 and 9570.  
Table 3.3 reports the distributions of IPOs according to the listed board, industry and 
ownership. Of the 159 main board IPOs, only 50 are VC-backed. In comparison, among all 
the 936 IPOs listed on the other two boards, 406 (nearly 45%) are funded by VCs. This 
indicates that VC-backed IPOs are relatively smaller, hence the SME and ChiNext boards 
are much more suitable for high-tech firms to get listed than the main board.  
Table 3.3 Distribution of IPOs by Boards, Industry, and Ownership 
  VC NVC Total 
Board 
Main 50 109 159 
ChiNext/SME 406 530 936 
 Total 456 639 1,095 
Industry 
High-Tech 215 257 472 
Non-High-Tech 241 382 623 
 Total 456 639 1,095 
Ownership 
SOE 130 163 293 
Non-SOE 323 474 797 
 Total 453 637 1,090 
Table 3.3 reports the distribution of IPO firms by boards, industries, and ownerships 
during the year 2004-2012.  
 
Furthermore, IPOs are also classified by high-tech industry and non-high-tech industry. 
The numbers are 472 and 623 respectively, and nearly half of the high-tech IPOs are VC-
backed (215). Such numbers fit with the background of the China stock market in which 
high-tech firms experienced noticeable expansions in recent years, and the contribution of 
VCs is non-trivial. However, since more than half of the VC-backed IPOs are non-high-
tech firms, this shows that VCs do not confine their investments solely in high-tech projects. 
For example, some non-high-tech industries such as electric commerce, communications 
media, mobile internet and catering have made swift and dramatic progress since 2010 and 
a majority of them have drawn their investments from VCs. In line with Table 3.10 (from 
Chapter 3), it confirms that VCs have shifted their attention to a broader range of industries. 
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Long-term Market Performance 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
This research uses the 3 years BHARs to represent for the long-run post-IPO performance. 
This metric has been popular in prior studies (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 2003; Levis, 1993; 
Liu et al., 2012; Ritter, 1991). Gompers and Lerner (1997) suggest that the performance 
differential between VC- and non-VC-backed IPOs is sensitive to both estimation periods 
and methodologies. Although the longer interval of event period might lead to a greater 
underperformance, the variability of returns can be better captured by the BHARs 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Another advantage of BHARs is that, unlike CARs, it contains 
the effects of compounding whereas the CARs does not. In this case, CARs are usually 
larger than BHARs if the individual stock returns are more volatile than the market index 
(Conrad and Kaul, 1993). Besides, Loughran and Ritter (2000) find out that BHARs capture 
approximately 80–90% of the actual abnormal returns. Moreover, according to Brav (2000) 
and Liu et al. (2012), BHARs is an appropriate long-term performance measurement for 
China IPO firms as it can precisely capture the investor experience. 
Specifically, the 3-year Buy and Hold Returns (BHRs) are calculated according to the 
event study method which treats the date of IPO as the starting point of the underlying event 
and the next three years as the event window. BHARs is then the difference between the 
three-year’s BHRs of an IPO firm and the three-year’s BHRs of its benchmark. The 
benchmark of sample IPOs could be chosen in various ways. A widely used one benchmark 
is the market index which reflects the aggregate value of the stock market. The difference 
between BHRs illustrates the abnormal returns of the IPO firm against the market index. 
However, the disadvantage of the market index is that it cannot capture the distinct 
characteristics of each IPO. To calculate the BHARs of every IPO, it is important to select 
a comparable portfolio. Hence, another benchmark will be employed: a unique portfolio 
matched to each IPO, following the method used by Fama and French (1993), Loughran 
and Ritter (1995), and Brav and Gompers (1997). 
To construct the matched portfolio, firstly data is collected for all A share listed firms 
listed on both the SHSE and SZSE from 1993 to 2004. The matching method used in this 
thesis is to assign each IPO in the sample a specific (matched) portfolio consists of those 
listed firms with similar values of both the size and M/B ratio. For IPOs in our sample, size 
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is represented by the ‘market capitalization’ of the firm at the end of the IPO year. Size of 
the listed firms to construct the matching portfolio will be used as the market capitalization 
of each listed firms at the end of each fiscal year. The M/B ratio used here is the M/B ratio 
at the end of each fiscal year13.  
The matching process is as follows. Given an IPO i listed in year t, its matched portfolio 
includes the listed firms with the size and M/B ratio that are no more than 25% higher than 
its own size and M/B ratio respectively and no less than 25% lower than its own size and 
M/B ratio respectively as well in year t. Then, firms listed two years before year t will be 
selected to construct the final matched portfolio. Finally, each IPO from the sample is 
matched with a specific portfolio which has the same level of size and M/B ratio. 
The calculation of BHARs (Ritter, 1991) is presented as following: the first step is the 
calculation of BHRs of each sample IPO at time T: 
!"#$% = '((* + #$%) − *.%/* 0 × *22% 
Where #$% is the monthly return of IPOi at month t; The equally-weighted BHR for the 
corresponding matching portfolio	(!"#5%) that consists of n IPOs at month t is  
!"#5% = *67'((* + #6%) − *.%/* 06* × *22% 
Where #6% is the monthly return of IPOn at month t. Therefore, the BHARs for each sample 
IPO is the difference between BHR of IPO firm and its matched portfolio: 
!"8#$% = 	((* + #$%).%/* − *67'((* + #6%).%/* 06*  
According to previous studies, e.g. Boissin and Sentis, 2014, Michel et al., 2014, Mauer et 
al., 2015, Otchere and Vong, 2016, and Hoechle et al., 2018, in the main analysis, we use 
3-year, i.e. 36-month BHARs.14 
                                                             
13 Brav and Gompers (1997) assert that there should not have too much bias in the book value “because the increment in 
book value due to retained earnings in the first year is likely to be very small”.  
14 see Kim et al. (1995), Jain and Kini (1995), Espenlaub et al. (1999), Chen et al. (2000), Doukas and Gonenc (2003), 
Chen et al. (2004), Cai et al. (2008), Chang et al. (2010), Gregory et Al. (2010), Moshirian et al. (2010),Krishnan et al. 
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3.3.2 Long-term Operating Performance 
Relative to the stock market performance of an IPO firm, the operating performance is 
equally important. The operating performance of a company is mostly acknowledged as the 
performance measured by accounting data, or the returns obtained from the operating 
activities. It is very different from the stock market performance. The stock market 
performance is forward-looking, which mostly reflects the expectations or predictions 
about the firms’ value in the future. By contrast, the operating performance are more likely 
to be backward-looking since it is built on the real past accounting-based performance 
appearing on the financial sheets. Consequently, it is possible that the stock performance 
and operating performance of a firm may be weakly correlated (if at all) during short time 
intervals. Investing large amounts of capital into the project may exhibit low or even 
negative operating returns. However, as long as the investors and the public hold 
confidence with its projects, a firm’s stock prices will not necessarily decrease.   
The operating performance of a firm can be measured and analysed from several 
different aspects, for instance, the profitability, solvency, efficiency, operation capacity, 
and growth capacity, etc. These ratios give users insight into the firm’s performance and 
management. VC-backing has been widely shown to generate mixed impact on the 
operating performance of firms. Return on equity and return on assets are the most 
commonly used measurement for operating performance. This thesis adopts the return on 
equity as an example to measure the operating performance, following Jain and Kini (1994), 
Loughran and Ritter (1997), Coakley et al. (2007). There are two versions for the return on 
equity. 
 
Return on equity (ROE) 
ROE is an enduring indicator that reflects firm’s profitability and measures the 
returns/profits distributed to shareholders relative to the capital they provided. Generally, 
it is calculated by using the net income divided by the shareholders’ equity, but with several 
different versions. In this study, ROE is calculated based on the average shareholders’ 
equity, which is the average of shareholders’ equity between the beginning of and the end 
of the fiscal year. If VCs work efficiently in fostering firms, the VC-backed companies 
                                                             
(2011), Su et al. (2011), Su and Bangassa (2011), Bessler and Seim (2012), Brau, et al. (2012), Liu et al. (2012), Tian 
(2012), Agathee et al. (2014). 
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should be associated with higher ROE. What is more, the effects will be magnified if the 
VC is more reputable.  
However, sometimes high ROE does not necessarily mean high profitability and some 
high-quality firms might exhibit low ROE. In some industries where large capital 
investments are not required, they usually exhibit high ROE level. On the contrary, some 
industries require enormous inputs at the early stage of development and might wait for 
years before those input converted to returns. Hence, they might show very low or even 
negative ROE in certain periods. 
ROE after reduction non-recurring profit and loss 
This is the ROE after deducting non-recurring profit and loss from the profit, e.g. the 
windfall profits, and the unexpected losses. Paying attention to this item is helpful to 
restrain profit manipulation by listed firms. It also facilitates the investors to have a better 
understanding about the true operation and management condition of listed firms. This item 
is calculated by using the net profit distract the non-recurring profit and loss and then 
dividing the results by the average shareholders’ equity. For a well-operated listed firm 
with strong profitability, its ROE after reduction non-recurring profit and loss should show 
a similar trend with the ROE.  
In line with the previous studies, the abnormal IPO operating performance is calculated 
by using the median change as the basic measure (see the studies, Jain and Kini, 1994; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Chi and Padgett, 2006; and Coakley et 
al., 2007). It is because operating performance usually does not follow a normal distribution 
and it can be seriously skewed. To measure the post-IPO long-run operating performance, 
the median changes in these indicators are calculated during the one fiscal years before 
listing and three fiscal years after listing. Thus, the long-term changes of ROE after IPO 
relative to pre-IPO level can be expressed as: ROE (+3) – ROE (-1). 
 
3.3.3 VC reputation 
In this research, the primary objective is to examine the impact of VCs on IPO performance 
and whether the reputation of VCs exerts any significant influence on the performance of 
IPOs. Therefore, the main variables of interest should be relevant to the characteristics of 
VC and, of course especially, the VC reputation. Impact of VC reputation on firms’ 
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performance have been discussed extensively. However, due to the nature of reputation, 
there is still no agreed measurement. What is more important, the effects of VC reputation 
are very sensitive to the measurement used. As a result, for the sake of more comprehensive 
research results, this thesis will employ multiple indicators to proxy for the VC reputation. 
Inspired by the methods suggested from the previous studies five types of measurements 
will proxy for VC reputation. However, before the introduction of the measurements, it is 
very necessary to define the Lead VC. When a firm had syndicated VCs, this thesis 
emphasis the reputation of Lead VC.  
For those IPO firms that funded by more than one VC investors, the lead VC’s reputation 
will be used to stand for the integrated impact of all the VCs. Lin and Smith (1998), 
Hochberg et al. (2007), and Krishnan et al. (2011) define a ‘lead VC’ as investing the 
largest amount of capital in the funded firm at the time of IPO. The lead VCs are likely to 
hold more shares and board seats in the IPO firms, and even in the post-IPO period lead 
VCs still tend to engage a lot. As a result, focusing on lead VCs allow to capture the greater 
guidance that IPOs received from VCs. Due to the data availability, the exact amounts VCs 
invested in each IPO are not known, hence the ‘lead VC’ is defined as holding the largest 
equity stake in the issue firm before the IPO. An alternative measure is to define the lead 
VC as the one who holds the largest post-IPO equity stakes. It may be noted that there does 
not seem to be too much difference between these two ways to define lead VC because the 
VC who holds the largest equity stakes before IPO mostly is the one who holds the largest 
equity stakes after IPO, so the second way to define the ‘lead VC’ will only be used in some 
additional tests as robustness checks. 
The five types of measures for VC reputation is listed as follows: 
(1) VC Ranking 
The first measurement of VC reputation is the ranking of VCs based on the Annual 
Ranking of VC/PE Institutions (thereafter, short for “VC Ranking”) issued by the Zero2IPO 
Research Group. It is a compositional ranking of all the VCs that had investment activities 
in the China capital market and the ranking is renewed every year according to the current 
year’s performance of VC investors. As explained by the Zero2IPO research Group, the 
evaluation of VC ranking is based on five main aspects, including the Capital under 
Management, the Amount of Capital Raised, Investment, Exits, and the Comprehensive 
Returns. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that use this ranking as a proxy 
for VC reputation.  
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Table 3.4 lists the explicit weights of each indicator to construct the VC ranking every 
year from 2006 to 2012. Unfortunately, in 2004 and 2005, although the specific factors they 
adopted are notified to the public, the exact weights are not given. A notable change is that 
from 2007, the percentage of “Exit Amount” was removed from the “Exit” section, and 
then added to the “Comprehensive Returns” section. Since then the “Comprehensive 
Returns” section has become the most important evaluation standard accounting for the 
highest weights when they rank the VCs. The explicit instructions of the indicators are 
listed as following: 
Table 3.4 VC Ranking Standards Across 2004 to 2012. 
 
Capital 
under 
Management 
Capital 
Raised 
Investment Exit 
Comprehensive 
Return Levels N. Capital Amount N. Amount 
2004 Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
2005 Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
2006 10% 15% 20% 20% 15% 10% 10% 
2007 5% 15% 15% 20% 15% - 30% 
2008 10% 10% 15% 20% 10% - 35% 
2009 15% 15% 20% 20% 5% - 25% 
2010 15% 10% 15% 20% 10% - 30% 
2011 10% 10% 15% 20% 10% - 35% 
2012 5% 20% 15% 15% 10% - 35% 
Resources: the Annual rankings for VC/PE institutions in China provided by the Zero2IPO research 
group from the year 2004 to 2012. 
 
Capital under Management measures the capital managed by VC institution that could be 
used to invest in China by the end of each current year. Financing Amounts measures the 
total amount of capital raised by the VC institution during the current year that can be used 
to invest in China. Investment is divided into: Number of deals invested, i.e. total number 
of deals that have been funded by VC during the current year; and Investment Amount, i.e. 
total amount of capital that have been used to invest in the funded deals during the current 
year. Exit is the number of successful exit cases in the current year of VC, including IPO 
and M&A, etc.  Comprehensive Returns. This is a comprehensive score based on all the 
exit cases of each VC in the current year. The important characteristics that must be 
considered for each exit project are: the way of exit, exit amount, Return of Capital Multiple 
(ROC) (the return of book value multiple), capital raised by the entrepreneurial company 
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(applied to IPO exit), VC’s shareholding before IPO (applied to IPO exit), subsequent 
financing of the entrepreneurial company, and whether VC is a lead investor. 
According to the reported data of these indicators and the corresponding weights, each 
VC will be allocated a comprehensive score that is calculated as the sum value of each 
indicator multiplied by its weight. Thereafter, the ranking of VCs in each year is generated 
by following the descending order of the scores. If two or more VCs end up with the same 
score, they are ranked by the score they get first in the Comprehensive Returns, then 
Investments, Capital raised, and then the Capital under Management. Hence, the VC which 
obtains the highest score will become the best VC institution in China in the underlying 
year. For some other examples, the highest 20 scores become the Top 20 VCs, and the 
highest 50 scores are the Top 50 VCs. 
The advantage of using the VC ranking as a proxy for reputation is twofold. Firstly, this 
integrative index captures the all-round performance of VCs. Secondly, it places an 
emphasis on the importance of profitability to VC’s reputation since the returns of VC, as 
the dominance factor, accounts for the largest proportion. In this study, the ranking of each 
VC at the year is recorded, and then two dummy variables are constructed according to the 
recorded ranking: 
The first is Top20. This variable equals to 1 if the IPO is backed by one of the top 20 
VCs and equals to 0 if IPOs are backed by the latter ranking VCs.  The other is Top50. This 
variable equals to 1 if the IPO is backed by one of the top 50 VCs and equals to 0 if IPOs 
are backed by the latter ranking VCs. The two variables will be separately used in the 
regressions to examine the impact of VC reputation on the IPO long-run performance.  
Although the VC Ranking may have great advantages compared to the single-indicator 
measurements used in prior studies, it is still flawed because it neglects the time factor. 
Given the fact that the building of reputation needs a long-term accumulation and 
continuous efforts, it is necessary to take the VC’s previous performance into consideration. 
However, the VC ranking only evaluates the comprehensive performance of VC in each 
single year. This study designs four additional variables which take the time factor into 
account when measuring the VC reputation.  
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(2) VC IPO Market share. In the spirit of Nahata (2008) and Krishnan et al. (2011), this 
study will use the VC’s cumulative IPO market share during the sample period as a second 
proxy for reputation. IPO market share is a multi-factor measurement that evaluates VC’s 
comprehensive strength in supporting the IPO companies because the frequency and quality 
of VC’s investment could reflect VC’s reputation simultaneously. The VC cumulative IPO 
market share is calculated starting from the year 2004 because before 2004 there was nearly 
no VC-backed A share IPOs. Specifically, two approaches will be used to calculate VC’s 
IPO market share: one is based on the IPO proceeds, the other is based on IPO market 
capitalization. The first IPO market share of VC i in year t is calculated as:  
9:	;<=>?%	@A<=?$* = 			 ∑ CD	EFGHIIJKLMNM/OPPQ∑ RSFTIU	EFGHIIJKMNM/OPPQ  
Where ∑ CD	EFGHIIJKLMNM/OPPQ  is the total proceeds of all IPOs the VC i has invested from 
2004 until the current year t; RSFTIU	EFGHIIJKM is the total proceeds of all A share IPOs 
backed by VC in the market at the year j. ∑ RSFTIU	EFGHIIJKMNM/OPPQ  is the cumulative 
proceeds of all IPOs from 2004 to current year t. proceeds is obtained by using the issue 
(shares) number times the issue price. The second approach is based on the market 
capitalization, which is obtained by using the number of all shares times the issue price. 
Substituting proceeds by the market capitalization generates a second metric for market 
share of VC i in year t: 
9:	;<=>?%	@A<=?$V = 			 ∑ CD	DSWXUSYXZSUXG[LMNM/OPPQ∑ RSFTIU	CapitalizationMNM/OPPQ  
where ∑ CD	DSWXUSYXZSUXG[LMNM/OPPQ  is the total market capitalization of all IPOs the VC i 
has invested from 2004 until the current year t; RSFTIU	CapitalizationM  is the total 
capitalization of all A share IPOs backed by VC in the market at the year j. ∑ RSFTIU	CapitalizationMNM/OPPQ  is the cumulative market capitalization of all IPOs from 
2004 to current year t. More reputable VCs ought to occupy a larger proportion of the 
market share in the IPO market and this indicator could capture VC Screening and 
Monitoring function.  
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(3) VC IPO Number  
The third measurement of reputation is VC’s cumulative IPO number. This single-factor 
variable is a traditional measurement and is widely used. It could efficiently capture VC’s 
market activeness during a long-term period (Lerner, 1994; Wahal, 2004). The number of 
IPOs has been treated as one of the most important standards to evaluate a VC. Given that 
IPO is not only the most successful way to gain huge returns, but also the most significant 
way to build its awareness and enhance its visibility, VCs are willing to pay great efforts to 
support the venture firms to IPO (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Meanwhile, this parameter 
also shows the experience and expertise of VC in investing companies and in supporting 
private companies to IPO. The variable is calculated by counting the total number of 
successful IPOs a VC has participated from the sample period 2004 to the year of IPO. This 
way captures the continuous ability of VCs by using the cumulative method. The 
expectation here is that the greater the number of IPOs VCs achieved in the past, the more 
the reputation they accumulated.  
(4) VC Age 
The age of VC is one of the very earliest measurements for VC reputation, and it is the 
most direct indicator that reflects the time factor (Wahal, 2004; Hochberg et al., 2007; 
Sorenson, 2007). Being able to keep operating for a long period, not only reflects VC’s 
ability to raise the subsequent financing, but also stands for VC’s adaptability to the 
changing environment. The longer the VC has existed, the more widely known it is, 
especially to venture firms who are seeking for investments. Hence this indicator is the 
fourth proxy of VC reputation. In this study, the age of VC is calculated by using the nature 
log of the time length (measured in days) between VC’s established date and list date of 
IPO it invested. It may be expected that the older the VC is, the greater is the reputation. 
However, there is one problem of using the VC age as reputation measurement: age cannot 
appropriately distinguish between active and inactive investors (Nahata, 2008). 
 
 (5) VC Size 
Apart from the previous four proxies, another indicator is adopted to predict the 
reputation of VC. This indictor focuses on a VC’s scale and financial strength, which are 
not considered in the other metrics. Therefore, the fifth measurement is the size of VC 
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which reflects a VC’s financial background.  Capital holdings of a VC determines whether 
the VC runs a large project or is able to provide the subsequent rounds of investment. This 
study uses the registered capital to measure the financial strength of VCs. This variable is 
calculated by using the natural log of the register capital when the VC firm was established. 
It may be expected that VCs with stronger financial backgrounds will exhibit higher 
reputation. 
Table 3.5 reports the characteristics of lead VC’s reputation metric for the 456 VC-backed 
IPOs. The first two rows show the distribution of the VC rankings. Among the 456 VC-
backed IPOs, 161 are funded by Top 20 VCs and 193 are funded by Top 50 VCs. For each 
VC-backed IPO, the average equity stake held by VC before issue is 9.7%, which reduces 
to 7.15% after issue. The average age of VC investors is 2372 days (around 6.5 years) with 
the registered capital of about 744 Million Yuan. 
Table 3.5 Lead VC reputation. 
Rankings N. 1 0 
Top 20 456 161 295 
Top 50 456 193 263 
 
Alternative Measurements N. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
Total VC Shareholding (Pre-IPO), % 455 9.70 7.32 0.07 46.87 
Total VC Shareholding (After-IPO), % 455 7.15 5.55 0.05 35.11 
VC Age 452 2,372.07 2,144.17 336 18,723 
VC Size 440 774.32 2,066.71 0 35,000 
VC IPO Number 456 4.07 7.16 1 48 
VC IPO Market Share1, % 455 2.62 6.20 0.07 65.48 
VC IPO Market Share2, % 455 2.46 6.60 0.02 82.11 
Table 3.5 is based on the 456 VC-backed IPOs sample. Lead VC is the VC who holds the largest 
equity stakes before IPO. High reputation is defined as the largest 25% of each VC reputation 
variable. VC Age is measured by days between VC’s establishment date and the IPO date; VC IPO# 
is the cumulative number of IPOs VC has funded prior; VC MS1 is VC’s cumulative IPO maker share 
calculated by using the IPO proceeds and it is measured by %; VC MS2 is VC’s cumulative IPO 
maker share calculated by using the IPO market capitalization and it is measured by %; VC size is 
measured by Million yuan. 
The average VC’s cumulative market shares are 2.62% and 2.46%, calculated by IPO 
proceeds and IPO market capitalization respectively. It is notable that they both exhibit a 
wide range, the former ranging from 0.07% to 65.48% and the latter from 0.02% to 82.11%. 
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In addition, the average IPO number of each VC is 4, but the maximum is 48. Such data 
reveals that there are a few lead VCs which are frequently participating in the IPO market. 
An example is the Shenzhen Capital Group Co. Ltd. (SCGC), one of the most influential 
and largest venture capital investment companies in China, which has funded 48 IPOs in 
this sample. Also, from 1999 to 2016, it has invested in 703 projects with a cumulative 
investment amount of over 260 billion yuan. 
Table 3.6 records the Pearson correlation matrix of the 7 reputation measurements of the 
lead VCs. First of all, there are strong positive correlations between Top 20 and Top 50 
(nearly 90%), and the VC MS1 and VC MS2 (nearly 95%), which are not surprising. While 
correlations of the other variables are all positive but much weaker, all being less than 0.40. 
Among them, cumulative IPO number exhibits relatively stronger correlations with the 
other reputation measurements, including VC ranking and VC cumulative market share. It 
may be that the number of IPOs a VC funded previously might be an important parameter 
when evaluating the VC’s capacity and reputation. 
Table 3.6 Lead VC Reputation Correlation Matrix 
 Top 20 Top 50 VC Age VC IPO# VC MS1 VC MS2 VC Size 
Top 20 1       
Top 50 0.8624* 1      
VC Age 0.1150* 0.1716* 1     
VC IPO# 0.3675* 0.3354* 0.1847* 1    
VC MS1 0.2376* 0.2302* 0.2805* 0.3278* 1   
VC MS2 0.1999* 0.1937* 0.2609* 0.2338* 0.9405* 1  
VC Size 0.2327* 0.2118* 0.0052 0.1591* 0.0953* 0.1041* 1 
Table 3.6 reports the Pearson correlation matrix of the seven VC reputation measurements based 
on the lead VC of the 456 VC-backed IPOs. * denotes the significance at least 5% level.  
 
Another finding is that the registered capital of VC and the age of VC have no significant 
correlation, given the correlation is nearly zero (0.0052). This indicates the registered 
capital of VCs has no link with the length of its lifespan. Registered capital of VCs also has 
a very weak correlation with VC’s cumulative market shares, implying the size of registered 
capital of VCs might reflect diverse impact of VC reputation compared to the other proxies. 
Additionally, there also shows relatively low correlations between the ranking of VC (Top 
20/50) and the conventional VC reputation proxies.  
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Taken together, none of the correlations between those reputation proxies is especially 
strong. This leads to an interesting conjecture: impacts of VC reputation might be diverse, 
depending on the proxies used. It also raises another interesting issue - that of how the 
conventional reputation measurements used in previous studies are related to the ranking 
of VC released by the Zero2IPO research group. Analysis in a later chapter will address 
this issue. 
 
3.3.4 High and Low Reputation 
In order to distinguish the effect of different levels of reputation, variables are created to 
separate the high reputation VCs from low reputation VC. For the ranking of VCs, IPOs 
backed by Top 20 VCs are defined as the high reputation VC-backed IPOs, while the rest 
are classed as low reputation VC-backed IPOs. 
For the sake of empirical analysis of this thesis, a dummy variable Top-20 is created, which 
is equal to 1 if IPOs are backed by the top 20 VCs, and zero otherwise (i.e. for the low 
reputation VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs). A second dummy variable Non-
Top-20  is equal to 1 if IPOs are backed by the VCs whose ranking are after 20, and 0 for 
the rest, including IPOs backed by Top 20 VCs, and the non-VC-backed IPOs.  
For the other four types of reputation proxies, two dummy variables are also created for 
each of them. For example, for the VC IPO market share, the dummy variables are Highms 
and Lowms. The VCs with the value of market share in the highest quantile (top 25%) will 
be defined as the ‘high reputation VCs’, while the others are classified as ‘low reputation 
VCs’. Accordingly, Highms will be equal to 1 for the IPOs funded by ‘high reputation VCs’, 
and 0 for the other VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. In contrast, Lowms will be 
equal to 1 for the IPOs funded by ‘low reputation VCs’, and 0 for the other VC-backed 
IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. By analogy, dummy variables to separate IPOs backed by 
reputable and less reputable VCs are constructed, including HighNum, HighAge and HighSize, 
and LowNum, LowAge and LowSize.  
Table 3.7 illustrates the characteristics of lead VCs’ reputation of the 456 VC-backed A 
share IPOs are divided into two groups: high reputation VC backed and low reputation VC 
backed. Around 110 IPOs are funded by reputable VCs, and the remaining 340 IPOs are 
funded by less reputable ones. The characteristics of the high reputation group are all 
significantly higher than the low reputation group, as would be expected. On average, more 
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reputable VCs are 4 times older in age than and as high as 13 times larger in size than less 
reputable VCs. The number of VC-backed IPOs and the market shares occupied are all 
about 8 times higher than the latter ranking VCs.  
Table 3.7 High and Low reputation 
 High  Low  Difference 
 N. Mean Median  N. Mean Median  t-test wilco. 
VC Age 113 5,228 4,234  339 1,420 1,247  -25.60*** -15.93*** 
VC IPO# 112 11.9 7.0  344 1.5 1.0  -17.06*** -16.88*** 
VC MS1, % 113 8.70 6.00  342 0.62 0.48  -14.44*** -15.95*** 
VC MS2, % 113 8.35 5.12  342 0.51 0.41  -12.75*** -15.95*** 
VC Size 107 2,573.91 1,868.00  333 196.07 100.00  -11.90*** -15.58*** 
Table 3.7 is based on the 455 VC-backed IPOs sample. Lead VC is the VC who holds the largest equity 
stakes before IPO. High reputation is defined as the largest 25% of each VC reputation variable. VC Age 
is measured by days between VC’s establishment date and the IPO date; VC IPO# is the cumulative 
number of IPOs VC has funded prior; VC MS1 is VC’s cumulative IPO maker share calculated by using 
the IPO proceeds and it is measured by %; VC MS2 is VC’s cumulative IPO maker share calculated by 
using the IPO market capitalization and it is measured by %; and the VC size is measured by Million 
yuan. The values in the brackets are p-values. *** denote the significance at 1% levels. 
 
3.3.5 Variables of IPO Firms 
This study controls for observable IPO characteristics that might potentially have influence 
on the issuer’s performance in the long-run. The logic of inclusion of independent variables 
in the equation is as follows: 
VC-backed. This variable is used to distinguish VC-backed IPOs from the non-VC-backed 
IPOs. It is a dummy variable which equals to 1 for VC-backed IPOs and 0 for the non-VC-
backed ones. 
Underpricing. This is the variable which controls for the potential impact of the initial 
returns of IPO firms on long-run performance. As suggested by the literature, VC 
investments are found to have a significant impact on reducing the underpricing through 
their Certification function (Megginsion and Weiss, 1991). Due to the problem of 
information asymmetry during IPO process, outsiders are nearly blind about the 
actual situation of the issuing firms (Sahlman, 1990). To become more attractive, some IPO 
firms have strong incentives to abate the offering price, thereby providing high initial 
returns to their potential investors as compensation. However, as informed investors, VCs’ 
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purpose is to obtain high returns in a long-term period through assisting the invested firms 
to acquire the maximum profits. Hence, VC investors would initially select better quality 
firms to invest. The appearance of VC could not only reduce the uncertainty of outside 
investors during IPO, but also symbolize the IPO firm’s high quality. This means that VC-
backed IPOs do not necessarily have to lower the offering price to make themselves more 
attractive. Accordingly, VC-backed IPOs may be associated with low underpricing. More 
importantly, since they are more qualified, VC-backed IPOs should further exhibit superior 
post-IPO performance in the long-run.  
By contrast, Welch (1989) proposes that if VCs can bring higher quality firms to public, 
then VC-backed IPOs should present higher underpricing than the less qualified firms. 
Later, the signalling hypothesis suggested by Jain and Kini (1994) further proposes that 
firms with signal of high initial returns have superior post-IPO operating performance. As 
commonly known, VCs prefer to invest in well-performed firms, public investors are easily 
attracted by the signals conveyed by VC-backed IPOs. Investor sentiment could push the 
first day share price to a high level, leading VC-backed IPOs to exhibit high underpricing. 
In this case, the high underpricing of VC-backed IPOs is associated with better long-run 
performance.   
Consequently, to control the initial performance is required for the underpricing of IPO 
firms. Particularly, in China the underpricing is much more serious than in Western stock 
markets. In order to explore whether VCs exert a significant function on China IPOs, the 
first stage is to examine whether VCs could explain the variations of the underpricing, and 
then examine the association between underpricing and the IPO long-run performance. The 
underpricing of each IPO firm is calculated as the return of the first day relative to its 
offering price. Hence the underpricing of the IPOi can be expressed by: 
e6f?=g=$h$6i$ = 	j$* −	j$2j$2  
Where the Pi1 is the closing price of the first trading day; and the Pi0 is the offering price 
of the IPO firm. 
Table 3.4 illustrates the underpricing of the sample IPOs from 2004 to 2012. The average 
underpricing level of China A share IPOs is 60%. Both the T-test and Wilcoxon Rank-sum 
test show that VC-backed IPOs enjoy significantly lower underpricing than the non-VC-
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backed IPOs at 1% level. This is consistent with the Certification role of VCs15, which is 
in line with the findings of Megginson and Weiss (1991), Lerner (1994), Coakley et al. 
(2009), and etc. Since the long-run performance measures calculated in this study have 
excluded the first day returns, this study can correctly explore the relationship between 
underpricing and the long-run performance.  
IPO Proceeds. In the empirical models, the natural log of IPO proceeds, IPO Proceeds, is 
one of the control variables. It is a control variable that has been applied in the numerous 
studies. The size of IPOs is measured by the proceeds each IPO raised at the time of offering. 
It is calculated by using the offering price multiplied by the total number of shares issued. 
The proceeds raised at IPO first demonstrate the scale of the IPO firm, since large and high-
quality firms are able to issue larger number of shares, thereby raising larger volume of 
money (Carter et al., 1998). Besides, the amount of capital successfully raised can be used 
as a primarily basis when predicting the growth capacity of IPO firms. Furthermore, it also 
reveals the degree of market awareness to the intensive investors. Hence, it is reasonable 
that the size of IPO would exhibit some impact on the long-term performance of the IPOs.  
Age. The age of IPO firm is a very intuitive measure of the company’s ability to survive 
the changing environment, which is another commonly considered characteristic (Barry et 
al., 1990; Krishnan et al., 2011, etc.). An older company might have more experience in 
operating firms and can occupy larger market shares. Also, they are easier to become high-
profile. Therefore, it is likely that the older the IPO firm is, the easier is for them to adapt 
the post-IPO markets. Hence, they seem to have a larger possibility to perform better in the 
post-IPO period. In the research, IPO firm’s age is calculated by using the natural log of 
the number of days between the IPO date and the firm’s establishment date, expressed as 
IPO Age. 
SOE. The most significant and unique characteristic of the Chinese stock market is that it 
is tightly government-dominated. The interference from government exists even during the 
IPO examination process. It is found that applicants with government background are able 
to proceed to IPO more smoothly and efficiently (Piotroski and Zhang, 2014; Long and 
                                                             
15  We further carry out the empirical regressions regarding the impact of VC/VC reputation on underpricing. The 
regression results remain unchanged as the difference tests, i.e. VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly lower underpricing 
than non-VC-backed IPOs. In addition, IPOs backed by more reputable VCs enjoy significantly lower underpricing than 
IPOs backed by more reputable VCs, as well as the non-VC-backed IPOs. The empirical results are shown in Appendix 
1.2.  
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Zhang, 2014), and the state-owned firms manipulate their performance as a result of close 
connections with government (Fan et al., 2007).  
After listing on the stock market, there are various issues with the state-owned IPO firms. 
For example, they will face a less efficient structure of corporate governance because the 
control rights of the firm will be transferred from the operator/manager to the state-owned 
shareholders. Governments will undertake the decision-making process on behalf of 
managers and other shareholders, which critically weakens other shareholders’ control 
rights. In fact, it is very common that the government will undertake some activities which 
only meet their own objectives but are not appropriate or even detrimental to IPO firms. 
For instance, they may lead to the over-investment of IPO firm. Aiming at high economic 
growth (e.g. stimulating the GDP growth rate, employment rate), government usually 
encourages the IPO firm to enlarge the scale of investment. The IPO firms will receive 
subsidies from government, even if they fail the investment. Therefore, IPO firms will put 
their money into all kinds of new projects without considering the potential returns or the 
relevance to their main business.  Such behaviour not only causes serious deficits to the 
state-owned IPOs, but also leads to the wasting of capital resources. What is more, since it 
is the government who is actually in charge of the operation of IPO firm, it is very hard to 
for the supervision team to carry out an effective supervising mechanism.   
Similarly, in VC-backed state-owned IPOs, the government will also affect the impact 
VCs may exert. It is predicted that the government-backed IPO firms will exhibit inferior 
long-run performance than the non-government backed IPOs (Chen et al., 2004; Wang, 
2005; Wu et al., 2012, etc.). Furthermore, it is also suggested that VC-backed state-owned 
IPOs will also underperform the VC-backed privately-owned IPO firms. To distinguish the 
effect of state-ownership, a dummy variable is created which is assigned the value of 1 if 
any shares of the IPO firm are held by the government, and 0 otherwise. 
High-Tech. Performance of firms is closely related to the industries they belong to, and it 
can be explained from several angles. Optimal ownership structure may differ according to 
the industry. Defond and Park (1999) point out that the CEO turnover rate is significantly 
and positively related to the competitiveness of the industry, which means that the relative 
performance evaluation within the same industry is conducive for the board to recognize 
unqualified CEOs, while the competitiveness positively improves this impact. The high-
tech industry is known to be highly competitive, and the mangers of the firm need to adopt 
different developing strategies compared to the traditional industries. Besides, high-tech 
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firms usually exhibit high growth rates and high returns. Hence, there are reasons to control 
for the industry’s impact on firms’ performance.     
Additionally, the impact of VCs might also be biased if the industry’s effects are ignored, 
given the fact that VCs are more likely to focus on high-tech projects with high growth 
potential. Also, VCs tend to develop expertise in a relatively narrow set of industries. Their 
specialized in industry knowledge, combined with their privileged position as corporate 
insiders, facilitated their monitoring role (Barry et al., 1990). This gives us insights that 
VC’s impact might be closely related to the industry of the project/firm. Lee and Wahal 
(2004) report that VC-backed IPOs are found to be clustered in the high technology industry 
such as software and biological research and located in the area/states close to VCs’ 
headquarters (geographic concentrations). Lee et al. (2011) find that VC industry 
specialization and the early-stage investment magnify the positive impact of VC reputation. 
Rosenbusch et al. (2013) further confirm that VCs have the ability to select and invest in 
the more promising industries, rather than selecting the most promising firms.  
It can also be noted that, outcomes of VC investments may differ according to industries. 
Hsu (2013) proposes that when undergoing big technology changes within an industry, VCs 
tend to shorten the investment periods and push firms to public earlier, which means that 
they lessen the pre-IPO preparation period for VC-backed venture firms. Due to the 
specificity of high-tech industries, the sample is divided into two major groups: the high-
tech industry IPOs and traditional industry IPOs. Consequently, a dummy variable is 
created which equals to 1 for high-tech industries, and 0 for the rest. 
ChiNext. A potential concern in examining the performance of newly public firms is the 
effect from the boards. The properties of IPO firms on the ChiNext board are quite distinct 
from those listed on the Main Board. Firstly, their size is much smaller, and the listing 
requirements are much looser. Secondly, a majority of firms get listed on the ChiNext board 
at their growing stage, while listed firms on the Main Board are usually mature enterprises. 
As a result, the quality difference between the IPOs across the different boards might lead 
to diverse patterns of the aftermarket performance. Apart from this reason, there is another 
factor that might influence the impact of VCs. Since one of the primary objectives of this 
board is to provide an exit channel for VC capital, a large proportion of firms on ChiNext 
board have a background of VC investment. Hence, there might be some variation in 
performance for the VC-backed IPOs from ChiNext board. A dummy variable is 
constructed to specify the influence of the board on IPO’s long-run performance. Since the 
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property of SME board is similar to the ChiNext board, the SME board is classified in the 
same group as ChiNext board. Hence, this variable equal to 1 for IPOs listed on the Main 
Board, and zero for IPOs listed on ChiNext and SME boards. 
Table 3.8 demonstrates the summary statistics of the control variables of the 1,095 IPOs 
in the sample and the comparison between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. Overall, 
across the IPO companies, the average waiting time to get listed since offering is 12 days. 
The shortest waiting length is only 6 days, whereas the longest can be 50 days. Then the 
average underpricing level of all the IPOs is 60%, which is lower compared to the many 
studies, such as Chi and Padgett (2005), Yu and Tse (2006), Chang et al. (2008), Song et 
al. (2008). However, there are also some IPOs that exhibit extremely high initial returns 
and the maximum could be as high as 627%. Such high values mean that underpricing is 
still a severe problem in the China IPO market. Both the T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
show that VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly shorter gaps and lower underpricing levels 
than the non-VC-backed IPOs at 1% level. This indicates that VC-backed IPOs enjoy lower 
costs in terms of time and capital, thereby less uncertainty during the IPO process.  
What is more, the average age of IPO firms is 2,828 days (around 7.7 years). VC-backed 
IPOs (3,012 days) are significantly older than the non-VC-backed IPOs (2,698 days) at the 
1% level. This is the reverse of Gompers and Lerner (2000), Lee and Wahal (2004), and 
Krishnan et al. (2011), where VC-backed IPO firms are found to be significantly younger. 
While the average proceeds of all IPOs are 1.2 Billion Yuan. It seems that the average 
proceeds of VC-backed IPOs are only slightly lower than the non-VC-backed IPOs. The 
test statistics are mixed with the Wilcoxon rank-sum test being significant at the 1% level 
while the t-test being insignificant. It indicates that most of VC-backed firms raise a large 
amount of proceeds at IPO, but the average proceeds are pulled down by some small-sized 
issues.  
For the full sample, the average state-owned shareholdings prior and post-IPO are 13.15% 
and 9.57%, respectively. For both prior-IPO and post-IPO, the mean state-owned 
shareholdings of VC-backed IPOs are about half that for the non-VC-backed IPOs, with 
this difference being significant at 1% level. In contrast, there is no significant difference 
between the median values. Therefore, it may be that VCs might have invested into several 
firms that have large state-owned shareholders, but the state-owned shares of the majority 
of IPO firms are small.  
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Table 3.8 Descriptive of IPO Characteristics 
Panel A:  Characteristics of the full sample IPO Firm 
  N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Gap (Days) 1,094 12.06 3.85 6 50 
Underpricing 1,090 0.6 0.77 -0.26 6.27 
IPO firm Age (Days) 1,094 2,828.66 1,746.71 70 10,004 
Proceeds 1,090 1.2 3.62 0.04 59.59 
State-owned pre-IPO, % 1,090 13.15 28.95 0 100 
State-owned post-IPO, % 1,090 9.57 21.09 0 92.39 
Panel B: Comparison between VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs 
 VC-backed  Non-VC-backed  Diff. Test 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  t-stat. wilco. 
Gap (Days) 455 11.61 11  639 12.39 12  3.33*** 5.34*** 
Underpricing 452 0.51 0.31  638 0.66 0.42  3.18*** 4.34*** 
IPO firm Age (Days) 455 3,012 2,917  639 2,698 2,499  -2.95*** -3.18*** 
Proceeds 452 1.18 0.64  638 1.20 0.53  0.1 -4.09*** 
State-owned pre-IPO, % 453 8.28 0  637 16.60 0  4.72*** 0.3 
State-owned post-IPO, % 453 6.28 0  637 11.92 0  4.39*** 0.14 
In Table 3.8, the Gaps and IPO firms’ age is measured by days; the IPO proceeds, is measured by Billon Yuan; the underpricing and state-owned 
equity stakes are measured by the percentage (%). *** denote the significance at the 1% level.  
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To sum up, the Table 3.8 reveals that VC-backed IPOs exhibit shorter waiting times, 
lower underpricing, larger proceeds and are older than the non-VC-backed IPOs. In 
addition, the stated-owned equity stakes in the VC-backed IPOs are lower compared with 
the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
 
3.3.6 A Summary of Variables 
In this subsection, we provide a table 3.9 to summarize all variables that have been 
discussed and will be used in our regression.  
Table 3.9. A summary of variables 
Variable Definition 
Long-run performance:  
    BHARs Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
    ROE1 Return on equity 
ROE2 
Return on equity after reduction non-recurring profit and 
loss 
VC reputation:  
    Top-20 One if the VC is ranked top 20, zero otherwise 
Top-50 One if the VC is ranked top 50, zero otherwise 
VC Age The age of VC 
VC IPO# The number of IPOs VCs achieved in the past 
VC MS1, % VC IPO Market share based on the IPO proceeds 
VC MS2, % VC IPO Market share based on the IPO market capitalization 
VC Size Capital holdings of a VC 
Other variables  
VC-backed One if the IPO is backed by VC, zero otherwise 
   Underpricing The the return of the first day relative to its offering price 
IPO Proceeds The proceeds each IPO raised at the time of offering 
Age The number of days between the IPO date and the firm’s establishment date 
SOE One if the IPO is state-owned, zero otherwise 
High-tech One if the IPO is in high-tech industries, zero otherwise 
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3.4 Models 
3.4.1 Difference Tests 
To compare the performance difference between VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed 
IPOs, the t-test is used to test whether there are significant differences between the means 
of the two groups. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is adopted an alternative method to test 
performance difference. It is a non-parametric statistical test whose main principle is to 
assess whether the sample’s population mean ranks are different and it does not require a 
distribution.  
Wilcoxon signed-rank test has been widely used in the studies regarding IPO performance 
between different groups, e.g. Coakley, et al., 2007, and Gangi and Lombardo, 2008. 
Assuming that two samples are independent, this test can be applied to compare the 
performance between the VC-backed group and non-VC backed group. The null hypothesis 
in this context is that the difference between the median of VC-backed group and non-VC-
backed group is zero. As mentioned above, the W value can be calculated from the standard 
way, and subsequently the Z-statistic will be calculated. 
 
3.4.2 Regression Models 
Our research aim is to investigate the impact of VC-backing and VC reputation on the IPO 
performance. However, it is worth noting that our study is similar to the “event study”, in 
which the event is “IPO”. This thesis asks whether the returns from IPO are impacted by 
VC-backing and VC reputation. Therefore, we calculate the BHAR 3 years after the time 
of IPO as the dependent variable. For each IPO firm, there is one “event”, i.e. one chance 
to get listed. Therefore, for each IPO firm, there is only one observation in our sample. As 
a result, the methodology related to ‘time’ is not able to be applied, including random/fixed 
effects, GMM and etc. Instead, this thesis does the analysis with cross-sectional data and 
OLS is the main method.  
To correct for the heteroscedasticity, the White’s robust standard errors are used when 
estimating the coefficients of variables in the regressions. The primary objective of the 
models is to examine the impact of VC and/or VC reputation on IPO firm’s long-run 
performance, therefore the models only exhibit slightly difference for each hypothesis. 
- 77 - 
 
(1) Model 1 − VC and IPO long-term Performance 
The first model is to examine the Hypothesis 1 which highlights VC’s Monitoring and 
Value-adding function. Empirically, the model will try to identify the impact of VC on the 
IPO long-run performance. The dependent variable LR Perf.i represents the long-run 
performance of IPOi, measured by 36-month BHARs ("#$%&'), ROE1 and ROE2. In this 
regression, the main explanatory variable of interest is VC backed. In addition to this 
variable, 5 control variables measuring IPO firms’ characteristics are also included. The 
coefficient of VC backed will reveal the impact of VC on IPO’s long-run performance. 
Then the regression model is expressed as following: ()	+,-./ = 	12 + 1456	789:;</ 		+ 	1=	>?<;@A@B9B?C/ 	+	 	1& ln	(G@H9;;<I)/											       +		1K		ln	(LGM_	$C;)/ + 		1O		PQRS/ 	+ 	1'	PT/UVWXYZV/ + 	[/                  (3.1) 
 
(2) Model 2 − VC reputation and IPO Long-term performance 
This model is derived from Model 1, aiming to examine the impact of VC reputation on 
IPO firms’ long-term performance. Using this model also enables an examination of the 
Hypothesis 2. Therefore, compared to Model 1, the main independent variable here is the 
proxy for VC reputation (VC Rep), while the other variables remain unchanged. The 
regression model will be repeated by regressing the various VC reputation measurements 
on both stock market performance and operating performance respectively.  
Firstly, this model is implemented only on VC-backed IPOs as the data for VC Rep of non-
backed IPOs is missing values. Under this circumstance, coefficient of VC Rep indicates 
whether VC reputation can differentiate the performance of IPOs which are all funded by 
VCs. Secondly, in the spirit of Coakley et al. (2007) and Nahata (2008), this model is re-
examined but on the basis of full sample of IPOs. Value for VC Rep of all the non-backed 
IPOs are marked as zero. Therefore, the coefficient of VC Rep reveals whether VC 
reputation differentiates the performance of all the IPOs no matter they have received VC 
funding or not. ()	+,-./ 		= 	12 	+	14	56	%;A/ 		+ 		1=	>?<;@A@B9B?C/ 	+ 	 	1& ln	(G@H9;;<I)/										 	+		1K		ln	(LGM_	$C;)/ + 		1O		PQRS/ 	+ 	1'	PT/UVWXYZV/ + 	[/                (3.2) 
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(3) Model 3 – High/Low VC reputation  
Model 2 emphasises the general impact of VC reputation on IPO long-term performance. 
However, it does not distinguish whether such impact vary across different levels of 
reputation as proposed in Hypothesis 3. Hence, Model 3 examines this issue. Two variables 
represent IPOs funded by more reputable VCs and IPOs funded by less reputable VCs, i.e. 
HighRep and LowRep. For each proxy of reputation, the regression includes dummy variables 
HighRep and aLowRep. Model 3 is expressed as: 
 ()	+,-./ = 12 +	14	#BCℎ/ + 1=	^H_/ + 1&>?<;@A@B9B?C/ 	+ 	1K ln	(G@H9;;<I)/	 +		1O	ln	(LGM_	$C;)/ + 	1'	PQRS/ 	+ 	1`	PT/UVWXYZV/ + 	[/                (3.3) 
 abcdb. is a dummy variable equals to 1 for IPOs funded by more reputable VCs and equals 
to 0 for the rest of VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. It is applied to each 
reputation measurements, High20, High50, HighMS1, HighMS2, HighNum, HighAge and 
HighSize.  (fg),h. is the dummy variable that equals to 1 for IPOs funded by less reputable VCs and 
equals to 0 for the other VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The corresponding 
dummy variables for low reputation are Low20, Low50, LowMS(1), LowMS(2),  LowNum, LowAge 
and LowSize. 
Using this model, it is possible to detect whether the high-reputation and/or the low-
reputation VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly different performance, compared with 
non-VC-backed IPOs. The coefficients of HighRep indicate whether the high reputation VC-
backed IPOs significantly outperform or underperform the non-VC-backed IPOs, while the 
coefficients of LowRep will then predict whether the low reputation VC-backed IPOs 
significantly outperform or underperform the non-VC-backed IPOs as well. 
 
(4) Model 4 – VC and Boards 
Testing the Hypothesis 4 requires the analysis by boards. IPOs are divided into two groups: 
IPOs listed on the Main board, and IPOs listed on the ChiNext board and SME board. In 
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this way, it is possible to examine VC’s effects across different boards, and whether the 
effects are distinctive. Hence, Model 4 is the same as Model 1 in terms of its form. Unlike 
Model 1 (regressed on full sample), Model 4 is regressed using IPOs from each group. 
(5) Model 5 – VC Reputation and Boards 
This study also aims to test the impact of different levels of VC reputation across different 
boards. Model 5 is designed for testing Hypothesis 5. Model 5 is the same as Model 3 in 
terms of its from, but it is regressed separately on the two groups of IPOs (i.e. IPOs in Main 
board and IPOs in ChiNext/SME board). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we develop five hypotheses related to the impact of VC-backing and VC 
reputation on China’s IPOs’ long-run performance and the influence of boards where the 
IPO is listed on the impact. Then the chapter explains how to construct the data. In 
particularly, the information on the VC of each IPO firm is manually collected from IPO 
prospectus. The abnormal returns are calculated for each IPO by constructing a benchmark 
for each IPO. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the methodology to study the research 
questions. It should be noted that our analysis is similar to the ‘event study’, where the IPO 
is the ‘event’. Therefore, the abnormal returns after the IPO are used to measure the 
performance and each IPO will only have one observation in our sample. That is, our data 
is cross-sectional. As a result, the methodology of panel data or GMM cannot be applied in 
our analysis.  
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Chapter 4 
Results and Findings 
This chapter presents the empirical results on our research questions, i.e. the association 
between VC-backing/VC reputation and IPO post-issue long-run performance in China and 
how the boards where the IPOs are listed affect the association. The 36-month post-issue 
BHARs suggest that China IPOs significantly underperform their matched portfolios, 
whereas VC-backed IPOs significantly outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs by 14%. A 
higher reputation does not affect the long-run stock performance within VC-backed IPOs. 
When compared to non-VC-backed IPOs reputable VCs exert a positive impact on share 
price performance. Furthermore, this significant impact is driven mainly by the IPOs listed 
on the SME and ChiNext boards, rather than IPOs listed on the main board. Finally, it is 
found that neither VC-backing nor VC reputation have a significant influence on the long-
run post-IPO operating performance, measured using ROE. 
 
4.1 Long-run Post-IPO Stock Performance 
Table 4.1 reports the average 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month BHARs of IPOs 
calculated with different benchmark portfolios during the years 2004-2012. In Panel A, the 
BHARs are calculated based on portfolios matched by both market capitalization and M/B 
ratio. The underperformance of the sample IPOs reduces as time lapses. For example, the 
12-month abnormal returns are 11.49% lower than the matched portfolios, but this 
difference shrinks to 5.72% 24 months after IPO and shrinks further to 3.25% 36 months 
after IPO. Such findings are similar to Aggarawal and Rivoli (1990) who find that one year 
after IPO, returns are 13.73% lower than the benchmark. Meanwhile, it is also consistent 
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with Chan et al. (2004) who propose that the three-year’s BHARs of China A share IPOs 
only slightly underperform the matched firms by using size and M/B ratio. 
The last four columns demonstrate the distribution of IPOs by two separated groups: the 
out-performing (BHARs above 0) and the underperforming (BHARs below 0) groups. 
After one-year of listing, there are 356 over-performing IPOs with an average BHAR12 of 
28.19%, and the 739 underperforming IPOs have an average BHAR12 of -30.61%. Over 
time the post-IPO periods reveal that the outperformed IPOs perform better and better; in 
contrast, the underperforming IPOs perform worse and worse. The negative abnormal 
returns of the full sample are primarily due to the large proportion of underperforming IPOs. 
There are significant differences between the under-performed and out-performed IPOs. 
Take BHAR36 as an example, the number of under-performed IPOs is 1.5 times more than 
the number of out-performed IPOs. Moreover, the average BHAR36 of out-performing IPOs 
and the underperforming IPOs becomes 70.90% and -54.01%, respectively.  
Panel B of Table 4.1 reports the BHARs of sample IPOs based on the benchmark 
portfolios that matched only by market capitalization coving the period from 2004 to 2012. 
First of all, after the matching process, there are 1,259 IPOs. Then, 23 IPOs cannot be found 
in the CSMAR database are eliminated. Lastly, there are 1,211 IPOs left after winsorizing 
the sample by three times the standard deviation of BHAR36 to avoid the interference from 
extreme values (outliers). Although the average BHARs calculated in this way are slightly 
lower than (around 2%) the average of BHARs in Panel A, they show a similar trend. The 
12-month BHARs is -13.04%, which becomes less negative in the next two years. 
Panel C of Table 4.1 reports the BHARs of sample IPOs based on the benchmark 
portfolios matched only by M/B ratio coving the period from 2004 to 2012. Firstly, after 
the matching process there are 1,265 IPOs, but a further 24 IPOs are not shown in the 
CSMAR database. Finally, 1,215 IPOs remain after winsorizing the sample by three times 
the standard deviation of BHAR36 to avoid the interference from extreme values (outliers). 
The average BHARs calculated following this matching approach are much lower than the 
previous two approaches, e.g. average BHAR36 is -9.44%, which is 3 times lower than Panel 
A and 2 times lower than Panel B.  
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Table 4.1 BHARs of IPOs from 2004 to 2012 
 N. Mean S.D. Min Max  
Outperformed Underperformed 
N. Mean N. Mean 
Panel A: Matched by Market cap and M/B ratio, BHAR (%) 
BHAR12 1,095 -11.49*** 45.51 -385.26 295.85  356 28.19 739 -30.61 
BHAR24 1,095 -5.72*** 53.44 -303.26 403.13  394 43.05 701 -33.14 
BHAR36 1,095 -3.25*** 87.00 -301.61 390.51  445 70.90 650 -54.01 
Panel B: Matched by Market Capitalization, BHAR (%) 
BHAR12 1,211 -13.04*** 44.17 -279.43 306.38  355 29.98 856 -30.88 
BHAR24 1,211 -7.27*** 50.89 -269.63 403.72  404 42.97 807 -32.42 
BHAR36 1,211 -4.71*** 82.55 -254.15 353.10  455 71.60 756 -50.63 
Panel C: Matched by M/B ratio, BHAR (%) 
BHAR12 1,215 -16.70*** 50.44 -326.57 396.43  329 30.39 886 -34.19 
BHAR24 1,215 -10.09*** 52.52 -279.96 398.67  394 43.94 821 -36.01 
BHAR36 1,215 -9.44*** 87.86 -282.06 355.27  443 75.88 772 -58.41 
Table 4.1 reports the 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month BHARs of IPOs from the period 2004 to 2012. In Panel A, the BHARs are 
calculated by the benchmark portfolio groups matched by market capitalization and M/B ratio; In Panel B, the BHARs are calculated by 
the benchmark portfolio groups matched by market capitalization; In Panel C, the BHARs are calculated by the benchmark portfolio groups 
matched by and M/B ratio. *** denote the significance at 1% level. 
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Overall, according to the different matching approaches shown in Table 4.1, the 
underperformance of the sample IPOs is robust to different benchmarks. Generally, the 
long-run post-IPO stock market performance of new issuers is inferior to firms that have 
traded for years, but the underperformance seems to alleviate when the post-IPO time 
increases. What is more, as post-IPO time increases the over-performing IPOs exhibit even 
higher positive abnormal returns, while the underperforming IPOs exhibit even more 
negative abnormal returns. Such results disagree with the explanation put forward by Fama 
(1998) who argues that the long-run underperformance of IPOs is caused by the “bad model 
problem”. In contrast, results in this thesis suggest that the decline in stock returns is a 
genuine reflection of decreasing market performance, which is consistent with numerous 
previous studies, e.g.,  Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Espenlaub 
et al. (1999), Ljungqvist et al. (2006), Coakley et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2008), Chahine and 
Filatotchev (2007), Chang et al. (2010), Gao (2010), Su et al. (2011) and Tian (2012), Chen 
et al. (2014), etc. 
 
4.2 VC and Long-run Stock Performance (H1) 
Table 4.2 reports the average 12-month, 24-month, 36-month BHARs of 1,095 IPOs 
calculated based on the benchmark portfolios matched by market capitalization and M/B 
ratio. The table also presents the comparison of BHARs between the VC-backed and non-
VC-backed IPOs by cohort year from 2004 to 2012. Two tests are used to examine the 
statistical difference between these two groups: (1) t-test that tests the difference in means; 
and (2) Wilcoxon rank-sum test that tests the difference in medians. 
First of all, on average both VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs underperform the 
benchmarks during the 12 months and 24 months after IPO. VC-backed IPOs exhibit less 
negative post-IPO BHARs compared to the non-VC-backed IPOs, and this advantage 
extends over time. At the 12th month after IPO, the two groups show very close BHAR12 (-
11.27% vs. -11.71%), and the difference widens over the next 12 months with the BHAR24 
of -2.84% to -8.60%, but the differences between them are not significant. However, in a 
longer period, both the difference tests prove that VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly 
larger BHAR36 than the non-VC-backed IPOs at the 1% level. Furthermore, VC-backed 
IPOs enjoy positive BHAR36 (7.04%), whereas the non-VC-backed IPOs are still 
underperforming, with the BHAR36 of -10.59%. 
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Table 4.2 BHARs of VC-backed and Non-VC-backed IPOs 
 Total  VC NVC  Diff. Test 
Year N. BHAR36  N. BHAR36 N. BHAR36  t-test. wilco. 
2004-2012 1,095 -3.25  456 7.04 639 -10.59  -3.32*** -2.53** 
2004 87 -35.95  7 -6.86 80 -38.5  -0.68 -1.39 
2005 13 -179.05  4 -98.20 9 -214.99  -1.96** -1.39 
2006 40 -67.91  5 -82.40 35 -65.84  0.28 -0.27 
2007 96 -19.70  29 -6.11 67 -25.58  -1.38 -1.60 
2008 74 14.70  23 37.63 51 4.36  -1.40 -1.34 
2009 73 1.31  37 11.39 36 -9.05  -2.02** -1.63 
2010 318 -3.73  137 -7.94 181 -0.55  1.29 2.10** 
2011 256 26.77  130 26.32 126 27.22  0.10 0.34 
2012 138 -2.46  84 7.37 54 -17.76  -1.16 -0.63 
 N. BHAR24  N. BHAR24 N. BHAR24  t-stat. wilco. 
2004-2012 1,095 -5.72  456 -2.84 639 -8.60  -1.51 -0.79 
2004 87 4.29  7 5.18 80 -5.12  -0.62 -1.30 
2005 13 -152.13  4 -91.96 9 -178.87  -1.41 -0.93 
2006 40 -63.09  5 -55.61 35 -64.16  -0.29 -0.23 
2007 96 -15.10  29 -13.71 67 -15.70  -0.24 -0.73 
2008 74 13.76  23 14.78 51 13.30  -0.07 0.04 
2009 73 0.28  37 9.97 36 -9.67  -1.72* -2.00** 
2010 318 -10.38  137 -19.66 181 -10.39  2.87*** 3.18*** 
2011 256 9.55  130 5.62 126 13.60  1.23 1.75* 
2012 138 8.30  84 11.47 54 3.38  -0.84 -0.58 
 N. BHAR12  N. BHAR12 N. BHAR12  t-stat. wilco. 
2004-2012 1,095 -11.49  456 -11.27 639 -11.71  -0.13 1.31 
2004 87 2.94  7 7.57 80 2.54  -0.48 -0.97 
2005 13 -15.91  4 43.49 9 -42.31  -2.94*** -1.85* 
2006 40 -99.00  5 -76.38 35 -102.23  -0.37 -0.26 
2007 96 -21.83  29 -20.44 67 -22.44  -0.25 -0.10 
2008 74 0.64  23 -7.91 51 4.50  1.26 1.24 
2009 73 -0.17  37 2.34 36 -2.74  -0.51 -0.73 
2010 318 -18.84  137 -25.62 181 -13.72  3.70*** 3.58*** 
2011 256 -0.22  130 -4.66 126 0.29  1.74 1.71* 
2012 138 0.36  84 -2.16 54 2.45  0.78 0.35 
In Table 4.2, BHAR12, BHAR24 and BHAR36 are measured in terms of %; The BHARs are calculated on 
the portfolios matched by market capitalization and M/B ratio; *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Given the average BHAR36 for the full sample of IPOs is still negative (-3.25%), it may 
be concluded that the long-run underperformance of China IPOs is driven by the non-VC-
backed IPOs. These results add evidence to the VC’s Certification and the Monitoring roles. 
VCs can mitigate the information asymmetries, reduce costs, and bring more benefits to the 
portfolio firms, thereby increasing the post-IPO performance. Decomposing the sample by 
years, VC-backed IPOs generally outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Regarding the average BHARs of the total 1,095 IPOs, Table 4.2 reveals that the 13 
IPOs listed in 2005 experienced the most serious underperformance in the following three 
years, i.e. the BHAR24 is -152.13% and the BHAR36 is -179.05%. Firms listed in 2006 
exhibited the second largest underperformance, implying that the dramatic stock prices fall 
was a market-wide phenomenon between 2006 and 2008. It is true that during this period, 
China’s stock market plunged by nearly 70%, although the GDP was increasing at a steady 
pace. Conversely, in the following years, IPOs exhibited less underperformance and in 
some years even possessed positive abnormal returns. For instance, the BHAR36 of IPOs 
issued in 2011 is as high as 26.77%. In general, Table 4.2 shows that China’s new issuers 
generally experience underperformance during the three years after IPO, while the VC-
backed IPOs are more likely to exhibit superior performance compared with the non-VC-
backed IPOs. 
To examine whether VC-backed IPOs significantly outperform the non-VC-backed 
IPOs as proposed in H1, Model 4.1 is used. In order to obtain robust empirical results, 
various measurements for long-run stock market performance calculated by various 
matched portfolios (as shown in Table 4.1) are used. Table 4.3 reports the results of the 
three cross-sectional regressions, which are very consistent. For example, in Column (1), 
when the BHAR36 is calculated based on the portfolios matched by market capitalization 
and M/B ratio, VC-backed IPOs significantly outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs by 14 
percent. Using the BHAR36 calculated by alternative matched portfolios, identical results 
pertain: VC-backed IPOs significantly outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
The control variables in the three regressions provide some evidence in detecting why 
VC-backed IPOs outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs. Overall, the five variables show a 
significant association with BHARs to varying degrees. Firstly, the age of VC is positively 
associated with the 36-month BHARs16, indicating the older firms are more likely to enjoy 
                                                             
16 In Column (1), the VC age will be significantly positive at 10% level if we go for a one-tail test; in Column (2), it is 
significantly positive at 5% level by two-tail test; and in Column (3), it is significantly positive at 1% level by two-tail 
test as well.  
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higher BHARs in the long run. Secondly, the underpricing is negatively associated with the 
36-month BHARs, which means that the lower underpricing would predict higher long-run 
performance. It may be noted that the state-owned IPOs are found to have poorer 36-month 
BHARs than the privately-owned IPOs. 
 
Table 4.3 Impact of VC on Long-run Stock Market Performance 
 
BHAR36 
(1) (2) (3) 
VC-backed 0.140 0.111 0.167 
 (0.009)*** (0.021)** (0.001)*** 
    
IPO Age 0.055 0.072 0.089 
 (0.120) (0.023)** (0.007)*** 
Underpricing -0.078 -0.086 -0.171 
 (0.038)** (0.011)** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds 0.049 0.053 -0.064 
 (0.141) (0.065)* (0.028)** 
SOE -0.164 -0.147 -0.227 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech 0.225 0.206 0.241 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
    
_cons -1.061 -1.232 -0.078 
 (0.029)** (0.004)*** (0.859) 
Adj-R2 0.0426 0.0448 0.0852 
N. 1,086 1,200 1,203 
Table 4.3 reports the OLS cross-sectional regressions of VC against the 36-month 
BHARs of China A share IPOs. In Column (1), the BHAR36 are calculated based 
on the benchmark portfolios matched by market capitalization and M/B ratio; In 
Column (2), the BHAR36 are calculated based on the portfolios matched by the 
market capitalization; In Column (3), the BHAR36 are calculated based on the 
portfolios matched by the M/B ratio. The values in the brackets are p-values. *, **, 
*** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 4.4, VC-backed IPOs have significantly greater age, lower 
underpricing and less state-owned equity stakes than the non-VC-backed IPOs. Such 
findings are consistent with VC’s screening and certification functions, which have also 
been found by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Brown (2003) and 
Hochberg (2011). 
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Furthermore, from Table 4.3, the high-tech IPOs perform significantly better than the 
IPOs in the traditional industry at the 1% level in the long run. This means that the positive 
role of VCs still holds after the potential effects of high-tech industry are controlled. In 
addition, the IPO proceeds exhibit different results across the three regressions17. However, 
as illustrated in Table 4.4, the average proceeds of VC-backed IPOs are not significantly 
different from non-VC-backed IPOs, though the median is significantly larger. 
Overall, the results support Hypothesis 1, suggesting that VCs appear to improve IPO 
firms’ long-run performance significantly through their screening, monitoring, and value-
adding functions. However, these findings run contrary to the findings of Wang et al. 
(2003), Coakley et al. (2007), and Chen and Liang (2016). In these studies, VC-backed 
IPOs are found to perform significantly worse than the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
 
4.3 VC Reputation and Long-Run Stock Performance 
4.3.1 VC Reputation and BHARs (H2) 
This part explores the impact of VC reputation on IPO firms’ long-term market 
performance as proposed in Hypothesis 2, and Model 4.2 will be applied to empirically test 
the relationship. In Model 4.2, the long-run stock market performance (dependent variable) 
is measured by the 36-month BHARs based on the benchmark portfolios matched by 
market capitalization and M/B ratio18. The main variable of interest is the lead VC’s 
reputation, and it is measured by seven proxies. It is important to note that Model 4.2 is 
estimated with the sample of VC-backed IPOs only. Coefficients of VC reputation therefore 
indicate whether the reputation of the lead VC significantly impacts the long-run 
performance within the sub-sample of VC-backed IPOs. 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the regressions on various reputation proxies. The results 
are unanimous, while none of the coefficients are significant. Such results mean that VC 
reputation, in fact, cannot explain differences in the long-run performance of IPOs that have 
been funded by venture capitalists, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 2 conditional on 
the sample of IPOs that are backed by IPOs. These findings are contrary to a variety of 
                                                             
17 In Column (1), the Proceeds is not significant by two-tail test, but it is significantly positive at 10% level if going for 
a one-tail test; in Column (2), Proceeds is significantly positive; and in Regression (3), Proceeds is significant negative.    
18 In the following regressions regarding the long-run stock market performance, if not particularly mentioned they are 
all measured by the BHAR36 calculated based on the benchmark portfolios matched by market capitalization and M/B 
ratio.  
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studies in which VC reputation is found to have a significant positive association with the 
post-IPO long-run stock market performance, such as, Megginson and Weiss (1991), Brav 
and Gompers (1997), Gompers and Lerner (2003) and Krishnan et al. (2011). Krishnan et 
al. (2011) insist that the VC’s IPO market share is the only robust measurement that 
captures reputation’s positive impact across all the performance measurements they used. 
Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in VC’s IPO market share is associated 
with a 24 percent increase in stock returns. Their alternative reputation measurements 
(VC’s capital under management, the cumulative IPO market share, VC age and VC past 
IPO number) are also positively correlated with stock returns at the 5% significant level. 
However, not all of them are significantly associated with other performance measurements, 
e.g., ROA, M/B and survival rate.  
The inconsistency between the findings of this study and those of previous studies is 
likely due to the IPO sample used, i.e. the VC-backed IPOs only. This suggests that 
conditional on the VC investments, the VC reputation may not be significant. Admittedly, 
this result suffers from potential selection bias because non-VC-backed IPOs are excluded. 
In a later section, this thesis will include non-VC-backed IPOs with the construction of 
dummy variables on VC reputation. Earlier studies included non-VC-backed IPOs in their 
samples. These studies included both a VC reputation variable and a VC-backed dummy 
in their regression models. 
However, their inclusion of non-VC-backed IPOs introduce a potential bias. The studies 
mentioned above use zero to replace the reputation variable for the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
However, in the absence of any VC investors, it will make more sense if VC reputation 
variables are recorded by missing values. This is because the value ‘zero’ implies that the 
degree of VC reputation is very low, but this is not equivalent to the nonexistence of VC 
reputation. The large proportion of ‘zeros’ in the non-binary dependent variable (VC 
reputation) might create a strong trend in the observations, thereby making the VC 
reputation much easier to become significant. Therefore, it is unclear whether the 
significant coefficients for VC reputation in previous studies are the result of an artificial 
trend only. 
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Table 4.4 VC Reputation and BHAR36 on the VC-backed IPOs 
 BHAR36 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Top-20 0.053       
 (0.534)       
Top-50  0.027      
  (0.738)      
VC Age   -0.012     
   (0.836)     
VC IPO#    0.003    
    (0.541)    
VC MS1     -0.734   
     (0.260)   
VC MS2      -0.771  
      (0.208)  
VC Size       -0.012 
       (0.595) 
IPO Age 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.038 
 (0.559) (0.556) (0.545) (0.572) (0.595) (0.616) (0.521) 
Underpricing -0.113 -0.113 -0.112 -0.110 -0.108 -0.108 -0.105 
 (0.070)* (0.069)* (0.074)* (0.078)* (0.084)* (0.083)* (0.105) 
Proceeds -0.090 -0.086 -0.085 -0.082 -0.083 -0.080 -0.085 
 (0.098)* (0.110) (0.118) (0.123) (0.121) (0.137) (0.174) 
SOE -0.128 -0.129 -0.125 -0.127 -0.119 -0.118 -0.130 
 (0.164) (0.160) (0.186) (0.116) (0.197) (0.200) (0.173) 
High-tech 0.192 0.193 0.196 0.192 0.191 0.191 0.198 
 (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.019)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)** 
        
_cons 0.800 0.766 0.848 0.732 0.782 0.759 0.837 
 (0.298) (0.318) (0.311) (0.340) (0.308) (0.322) (0.341) 
Adj-R2 0.0221 0.0215 0.0219 0.0221 0.0244 0.0251 0.0185 
N. 450 450 446 450 449 449 418 
Table 4.4 reports the cross-sectional OLS regressions of the 7 VC reputation proxies against the BHAR36 
of 450 VC-backed IPOs. The BHAR36 is calculated based on the benchmark portfolios matched by market 
capitalization and M/B ratio. Numbers in the brackets are p-values. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In addition to the treatment of zero as the reputation of VC for the non-VC-backed IPOs, 
prior studies also add the dummy variable for VC-backed IPOs. According to Krishnan et 
al. (2011), this is to capture the marginal effect of VC reputation over the average impact 
of VC backing. However, whether this method gives unbiased results is not clear, because 
the variations of VC reputation within the non-VC-backed IPOs are still recorded as ‘zero’. 
A potential solution to this issue is to apply the Heckman two-step method to control for 
the selection bias of VCs. Namely, in the first step, the selection of VC is controlled and 
then in the second step the sample of VC-backed IPOs are used to estimate the effects of 
VC reputation. This method will be applied in next section as the additional analysis.  
To compare with previous research studies, the Model 4.2 is re-examined using all IPOs 
and recording VC reputation of non-VC-backed IPOs as zero. However, for the Zero2IPO 
measurement of reputation, it is not appropriate to make such an adjustment because zero 
is not ranking. Therefore, this thesis only runs the regressions using the other five 
measurements of reputation.  
Table 4.5 reports the results using all 1,095 IPOs. The analysis finds that VC reputation, 
measured by VC Age, VC’s cumulative IPO quantities and VC size, appears to play a 
positive role in improving IPOs’ long-run performance at various significance levels19. This 
exercise appears to be consistent with the Krishnan et al. (2011), where VC reputation is 
positively associated with the IPO market returns. However, the VC reputation measured 
by two market share metrics exhibits no significant effects on long-run performance, 
indicating that the IPO market shares of VC as a measurement of VC reputation in China 
may be potentially problematic. Such findings are in opposition to Nahata (2008) and Shu 
et al. (2011), who insist that market share is the only measurement that could reveal the 
significant impact of VC reputation. Taken together, the results from the full sample 
regression reveal that VC reputation exhibits a positive impact, measured by VC age and 
size, on the long-term market performance of IPO firms, suggesting the acceptation of 
Hypothesis 2 when measuring VC reputation with VC age and size. However, combine this 
with the findings from Table 4.4, it seems that the positive impact of VC reputation is only 
statistically significant when comparing to the non-VC-backed IPOs. Conditional on the 
VC-backing, reputation has no significant impact on long-run performance. 
 
                                                             
19 The p-value of VC IPO# shown in the bracket is 0.103, this could be roughly treated as a weak significant at 10% level.   
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Table 4.5 VC reputation and BHAR36 on Full sample IPOs 
 
BHAR36 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VC Age 0.018     
 (0.010)***     
VC IPO#  0.008    
  (0.103)†    
VC MS1   -0.147   
   (0.813)   
VC MS2    -0.338  
    (0.567)  
VC Size     0.013 
     (0.015)** 
      
IPO Age 0.056 0.060 0.063 0.063 0.058 
 (0.117) (0.090)* (0.076)* (0.077)* (0.109)** 
Underpricing -0.079 -0.079 -0.083 -0.083 -0.070 
 (0.035)** (0.037)** (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.068)* 
Proceeds 0.048 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.062 
 (0.152) (0.098)* (0.097)* (0.092)* (0.076)* 
SOE -0.168 -0.158 -0.155 -0.154 -0.167 
 (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.006)*** 
High-tech 0.223 0.231 0.237 0.237 0.224 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -1.050 -1.128 -1.137 -1.143 -1.229 
 (0.031)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.016)** 
Adj-R2 0.0425 0.0389 0.0366 0.0369 0.0421 
N. 1,082 1,086 1,085 1,085 1,054 
Table 4.5 reports the cross-sectional OLS regression of five VC reputation proxies against 
the BHAR36 of the 1,095 VC-backed IPOs. The BHAR36 is calculated based on the 
benchmark portfolios matched by market capitalization and M/B ratio. Numbers in the 
brackets are p-values. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; 
† denote significance very close to 10%.  
 
4.3.2 High vs. Low VC reputation (H3) 
This section examines Hypothesis 3, i.e. whether the impact of VC reputation would differ 
with the level of reputation. Lead VCs in the sample are separated into two groups: 
- 93 - 
 
reputable VCs and less reputable VCs20. Then the relevant VC-backed IPOs are divided 
into IPOs backed by reputable VCs and IPOs backed by less reputable VCs, represented by 
two dummy variables, i.e. High and Low. The dependent variable is the long-term IPO 
market performance. The empirical analysis will investigate the effects of VC reputation 
measured by the Zero2IPO ranking firstly and then this section will also report the results 
with standard VC reputation measurements used in prior studies. 
(1) VC Rankings  
The Ranking of VCs is regarded as the main reputation measurement in this research. The 
first set of reputation variables is based on the ranking of top 20 VCs, and the second set 
on the ranking of top 50 VCs.  
Table 4.6 demonstrates the results of testing the relationship between the VC ranking 
and BHAR36. The first column shows the basic effects of the high and low reputation 
without taken any other factors into consideration. Both the Top-20 and the Non-Top-20 
are positively and significantly related to the BHAR36 at the 1% level. Specifically, the 
result indicates that the Top 20 Ranking VC-backed IPOs outperform the non-VC-backed 
IPOs by 20.4 percentage points and the IPOs backed by the non-Top-20 VCs outperform 
the non-VC-backed IPOs by 16.3 percentage points. Given all the coefficients for Top-20 
are larger than for Non-Top-20, this could be viewed as evidence that the more reputable 
VC-backed IPOs perform better than the less reputable VC-backed IPOs compared with 
the non-VC-backed IPOs, although the result is not conclusive on its own. 
Columns (2) to (6) show the effects of high and low VC reputation when different 
control variables are added separately once at a time.  Then in Column (7), three continuous 
variables are controlled together in the regression; while in the last column, the other three 
dummy variables are further added. All columns show similar results to the prior 
regressions, while the only difference is that coefficients of the Top-20 and Non-Top-20 
reduce as more control variables are added. For example, compared with Column (1), Top-
20 falls from 20.4 to 14.9 and Non-Top-20 falls from 16.3 to 13.7 in Column (8), but they 
are all significant at 1% level.  
The results indicate that IPOs funded by more reputable VCs enjoy superior post-IPO 
stock market returns than the non-VC-backed IPOs in the long run, consistent with the 
                                                             
20 In the regression, VC reputation for the VC-backed IPOs are represented by the lead VC’s reputation if there are two 
or more VC shareholders in an IPO firm. The VC who holds the largest percentage of equities before IPO will be defined 
as lead VC. 
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findings of Jain and Kini (1995), Gompers and Lerner (1997), Espenlaub et al. (1999), 
Doukas and Gonenc (2003), Hochberg et al. (2007) and Krishnan et al. (2011). These 
studies report that VC reputation plays a certification role for IPO firms, since more 
reputable VCs significantly reduce the information asymmetry that is caused by the 
reduction in managerial ownership in the aftermarket period. Additionally, more reputable 
VCs have more experience so that they can provide more monitoring in the operation and 
offer more value-adding services to the invested IPOs firms.  
The results for the control variables are consistent with the prior expectations. For most 
cases, the coefficient of each variable shows consistent value and significance across 
different regressions. Being individually tested in the regression as shown in Column (2), 
the IPO Age is found to have a significant and positive association with long-term 
performance. It implies that older firms are more capable to overcome the challenges after 
listing, thereby having better long-term performance. The significance of the impact 
reduces as more control variables are included. The variable Proceeds exhibits no 
significant correlation with the BHAR36 across the various regressions. Barry et al. (1990) 
find that the IPO proceeds have a significant positive relationship with the initial returns. 
However, Espenlaub et al. (1999) find that the proceeds of IPO do not have a significant 
impact on IPO long-term CARs.  
The Underpricing and SOE variables are both negatively associated with BHAR36, 
indicating that the lower under-priced IPOs enjoy a better long-term post-IPO performance. 
This finding is similar to Krugman (1999) who explains this relationship via investor 
sentiments. The author’s conjecture is the investor sentiment which drives up the initial 
returns of IPO firms. However, in the long-term, all the prices of firms will converge to 
their true value. Hence, in the long-term IPO firms will display a decreasing stock market 
performance. The significantly negative coefficient of SOE is consistent with prior 
expectations that connections with government actually do more harm than good to IPO 
firms. For instance, having a state-owned shareholder will reduce the efficiency of 
corporate governance. Consequently, the results support Cai et al. (2008) that the 
connection with governments is negatively correlated with IPO performance, but disagree 
with findings of Sun (2003), Wang (2005), Chang et al. (2010), and Su et al. (2011).    
Lastly, the industry dummy High-tech is significantly and positively associated with 
BHAR36. The abnormal returns of IPOs in high-tech industry are around 20 percentage 
points higher than the abnormal returns of IPOs in the traditional industry. As widely 
acknowledged, the most notable feature of the high-tech industry is its extraordinary growth 
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rate. This finding is consistent with Su et al. (2011) but runs contrary to Chen et al. (2000). 
Many studies have found that VC investment is very sensitive to the industry it invested 
(Gompers et al., 2008). Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Rosenbusch et al. (2013) both report 
that after controlling for the effects of industry, the positive impact of VCs vanishes.  
Overall, the regression results suggest that VC reputation may exert a positive impact 
on IPO performance. However, it is worth noting that the adjusted R2 is relatively small in 
our results. The low value of adjusted R2 suggests that the BHAR is also affected by other 
significant factors, despite it has been significantly affected by VC reputation and other 
control variables. These factors could be stock-market-related factors. For example, the 
expectation of the investors in the IPOs is different for different IPOs, which may explain 
the variations of the BHAR across IPOs. The effects of the Zero2IPO ranking will now be 
further-examined through loosening the criteria to separate high reputation from low 
reputation VCs. The IPOs funded by VCs ranked in the top 50 are now defined as IPOs 
backed by high reputation VCs (Top-50), and the remaining IPOs backed by VCs are 
defined as low reputation VC-backed IPOs (Non-Top-50). Table 4.7 reports the regression 
results examining the impact of these two variables on the BHAR36. The results presented 
in this table are very consistent with the results presented in Table 4.6.  
Across the regressions, all the coefficients of Top-50 and Non-Top-50 are positively and 
significantly associated with the BHAR36. Nevertheless, the coefficients of both variables 
decrease as more control variables are added to the regression. In Column (1), it shows that 
compared with the 36-month BHARs of non-VC-backed IPOs, the BHARs of IPOs backed 
by VCs with high reputation are higher by 18.8 percentage points, while the BHARs of 
IPOs backed by VCs with low reputation are higher by 17 percentage points. 
The positive impact of VCs with high reputation seems to be slightly stronger only. As 
a matter of fact, the difference between them decreases as more factors are controlled. In 
Column (8), coefficients of Non-Top-50 and Top-50 are virtually identical. This trend 
informs us that the performance of IPOs backed by VCs with high reputation and the 
performance of IPOs backed by VCs with low reputation converge as the criterion to define 
high and low reputation loosens. In Table 4.7, the regression results of the control variables 
are very similar to the results of Table 4.5, implying that their impact on the IPO long-term 
performance remains unchanged. 
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Table 4.6 Top-20 VC and BHAR36 
 
BHAR36 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top-20 0.204 0.189 0.175 0.187 0.207 0.187 0.165 0.149 
 (0.008)*** (0.014)** (0.023)** (0.016)** (0.007)*** (0.014)** (0.033)** (0.054)* 
Non-Top-20 0.163 0.153 0.151 0.161 0.170 0.148 0.143 0.137 
 (0.008)*** (0.012)** (0.014)** (0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.024)** 
IPO Age  0.0771     0.064 0.055 
  (0.029)**     (0.074)* (0.121) 
Underpricing   -0.119    -0.107 -0.078 
   (0.001)***    (0.004)*** (0.038)** 
Proceeds    0.0427   0.0094 0.048 
    (0.160)   (0.773) (0.148) 
SOE     -0.211   -0.164 
     (0.000)***   (0.006)*** 
High-tech      0.228  0.224 
      (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
         
_cons -0.106 -0.697 -0.0277 -0.574 -0.0509 -0.198 -0.628 -1.055 
 (0.002)*** (0.011)** (0.498) (0.086)* (0.173) (0.000)*** (0.193) (0.031)** 
Adj-R2 0.0085 0.0117 0.0185 0.0093 0.0189 0.0244 0.0196 0.0418 
N. 1,095 1,094 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,095 1,090 1,086 
In Table 4.6, Ranking of Top 20 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year. BHAR36 is calculated based on the portfolio matched 
by M/B ratio and market capitalization. Numbers in the brackets are p-values. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.7 Top-50 VC and BHAR36 
 
BHAR36 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top-50 0.188 0.175 0.163 0.174 0.197 0.167 0.155 0.142 
 (0.009)*** (0.014)** (0.023)** (0.016)** (0.006)*** (0.018)** (0.031)** (0.048)** 
Non-Top-50 0.170 0.159 0.156 0.167 0.172 0.158 0.148 0.141 
 (0.008)*** (0.013)** (0.014)** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)** (0.021)** (0.027)** 
IPO Age  0.077     0.064 0.055 
  (0.029)**     (0.074)* (0.121) 
Underpricing   -0.119    -0.107 -0.078 
   (0.000)***    (0.004)*** (0.038)** 
Proceeds    0.044   0.010 0.049 
    (0.150)   (0.757) (0.144) 
SOE     -0.212   0.225 
     (0.000)***   (0.000)*** 
High-tech      0.228  0.208 
      (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
         
_cons -0.106 -0.698 -0.0274 -0.583 -0.051 -0.198 -0.636 -1.06 
 (0.002)*** (0.011)** (0.502) (0.080)* (0.175) (0.000)*** (0.186) (0.029)** 
Adj-R2 0.0083 0.0116 0.0184 0.0092 0.0188 0.0242 0.0195 0.0418 
N. 1,095 1,094 1,090 1,090 1,090 1,095 1,090 1,086 
In Table 4.7, Ranking of Top 50 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year. The BHAR36 is calculated using the portfolios matched 
by the M/B ratio and Market Capitalization; Numbers in the brackets are p-values.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.8 presents a set of supplementary tests based on alternative long-term BHARs 
measurements. The first two regressions show the impact of Top 20 ranking, and the last 
two are based on Top 50 ranking. Models in Columns (1) and (3) are regressed on the 36-
month BHARs calculated based on the benchmark matched only by market capitalization. 
The models in Columns (2) and (4) are regressed on the 36-month BHARs that matched by 
M/B ratio only. 
In Table 4.9, the 36-month BHARs based on the portfolio matched by market 
capitalization and M/B ratio, but a different definition of lead VC is adopted. The lead VC 
is identified here as that VC which holds the largest amount of post-IPO equity. 
Consequently, the variables Top-20 and Non-Top-20 correspond to the post-IPO lead VC’s 
ranking.  
Overall, the results of supplementary regressions (illustrated in Tables 4.8 and 4.9) are 
in accordance with the main regressions (illustrated in Tables 4.6 and 4.7). The apparent 
positive impact of VC reputation is robust regardless of which measurements of VC 
reputation or what kind of long-run performance calculation are used, although it is not 
statistically tested within these regressions. Consequently, these findings iterate the 
conclusion that, IPOs backed by higher reputation VCs and lower reputation VCs both 
exhibit significantly better performance than the non-VC-backed IPO21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
21 Further analysis (un-tabulated) reveals that the difference between high and low reputation VCs to be insignificant at 
the 0.1 level.  
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Table 4.8 VC Ranking and alternative BHARs 
 
Matched by 
Market Cap 
Matched by 
M/B  
Matched by 
Market Cap 
Matched by 
M/B 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Top-20 0.127 0.178    
 (0.074)* (0.016)**    
Non-Top-20 0.106 0.163    
 (0.053)* (0.004)***    
Top-50    0.129 0.177 
    (0.051)* (0.010)*** 
Non-Top-50    0.102 0.162 
    (0.072)* (0.006)*** 
      
IPO Age 0.072 0.089  0.073 0.089 
 (0.023)** (0.007)***  (0.023)** (0.007)*** 
Underpricing -0.085 -0.171  -0.085 -0.171 
 (0.012)** (0.000)***  (0.012)** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds 0.052 -0.064  0.053 -0.064 
 (0.071)* (0.027)**  (0.069)* (0.028)** 
SOE -0.147 -0.227  -0.148 -0.228 
 (0.007)*** (0.000)***  (0.006)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech 0.206 0.241  0.205 0.241 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -1.225 -0.072  -1.227 -0.075 
 (0.005)*** (0.869)  (0.005)*** (0.8615) 
Adj-R2 0.0442 0.0846  0.0442 0.0846 
N. 1,200 1,203  1,200 1,203 
In Table 4.8, Ranking of Top 20/50 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year. 
BHAR36 is calculated based on the portfolio matched by M/B ratio or matched by market 
capitalization. Numbers in the brackets are p-values of each coefficient.  *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.9 Alternative Lead VCs and BHAR36  
 
Market Cap and M/B Market Cap and M/B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Top-20 0.160 0.144   
 (0.040)** (0.063)*   
Non-Top-20 0.146 0.140   
 (0.017)** (0.022)**   
Top-50   0.153 0.142 
   (0.034)** (0.049)** 
Non-Top-50   0.149 0.141 
   (0.020)** (0.026)** 
     
IPO Age 0.064 0.055 0.064 0.055 
 (0.075)* (0.121) (0.074)* (0.121) 
Underpricing -0.107 -0.078 -0.107 -0.078 
 (0.004)*** (0.038)** (0.004)*** (0.038)** 
Proceeds 0.010 0.049 0.010 0.049 
 (0.765) (0.146) (0.755) (0.143) 
SOE  -0.164  -0.164 
  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
High-tech  0.225  0.225 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
     
_cons -0.632 -1.058 -0.637 -1.06 
 (0.191) (0.030)** (0.186) (0.030)** 
N. 1,090 1,086 1,090 1,086 
In Table 4.9, lead VC is defined as the one who is holding largest number of post-IPO equity 
stakes. Ranking of Top 20/50 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year. BHAR36 is 
calculated based on the portfolio matched by M/B ratio and market capitalization. Numbers 
in the brackets are p-values of each coefficient. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. 
 
(2) Alternative VC Reputation Measurements 
Table 4.10 reports the impact of alternative VC reputation measures on IPO long-run 
performance. The alternative measurements are VC IPO market share (proceeds; market 
capitalization), VC age, VC IPO number, and VC size. The dependent variable used in 
these regressions is still the BHAR36 matched by market capitalization and M/B ratio. 
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Generally, for VC reputation measured by VC market share, VC age and VC IPO number, 
the IPOs funded by more reputable VCs exhibit significantly superior BHAR36 than the 
non-VC-backed IPOs. Table 4.10 shows that the coefficients for High are higher than for 
Low, although the IPOs funded by less reputable VCs also outperform the non-VC-backed 
IPOs. The results obtained here are in line with the regressions based on VC rankings 
conducted previously and are also consistent with many previous studies.  
The positive impact of IPO market share reaffirms the findings of Nahata (2008), 
Krishnan et al. (2011), Lee and Masulis (2011), Shu et al. (2011) and Chou et al. (2013), 
although the findings of a positive impact of VC age and VC IPO number are not identical. 
These studies all suggest that VC’s market share is a more (the only) robust measurement 
to predict reputation’s impact, rather than the VC age or VC past performance. However, 
the findings here are consistent with Lerner (1994), Hochberg et al. (2007) and Sorenson 
(2007), who all conclude that more experienced VCs (i.e., older VCs and VCs that have 
better past performance) are more capable of supporting firms to go public than the less 
experienced VCs. They also conclude that more experienced VCs or more reputable VCs 
may improve the post-IPO long-term performance through better corporate governance, 
reduced earnings management, enhanced quality and competitiveness in IPO firms.  
The results shown in Column (5) present the effects of VC size on the IPO long-run 
performance. Such results contradict the results with other measurements of reputation. 
IPOs funded by VCs with higher registered capital do not show significantly different 
performance with the non-VC-backed IPOs, but IPOs funded by VCs with lower registered 
capital significantly outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs. Such findings indicate that it is 
less reputable VCs rather than the more reputable VCs that exert significant influence on 
IPOs’ long-term performance. This is inconsistent with the findings of previous studies 
which also use VC size as the reputation measurements. However, in these studies, they 
use VC’s capital under management, a totally different concept to VC’s registered capital, 
to proxy VC size. 
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Table 4.10 Alternative Reputation Measurements and BHAR36 
 VC IPO MS1 VC IPO MS2 VC Age VC IPO# VC Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High 0.161 0.157 0.169 0.171 0.064 
 (0.068)* (0.075)* (0.059)* (0.054)* (0.481) 
Low 0.134 0.136 0.134 0.130 0.179 
 (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.025)** (0.002)*** 
      
IPO Age 0.056 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.058 
 (0.116) (0.118) (0.119) (0.123) (0.104) 
Underpricing -0.079 -0.078 -0.078 -0.077 -0.077 
 (0.037)** (0.038)** (0.039)** (0.040)** (0.041)** 
Proceeds 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.054 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.147) (0.140) (0.104) 
SOE -0.166 -0.166 -0.168 -0.164 -0.162 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
High-tech 0.225 0.225 0.222 0.224 0.222 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -1.066 -1.063 -1.055 -1.061 -1.139 
 (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.029)** (0.019)** 
Adj-R2 0.0419 0.0419 0.0421 0.0419 0.0440 
N. 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 
Table 4.10 Lead VC is defined as the one who is holding the largest pre-IPO equity stakes. The 
highest quartile (25%) of each measurement are defined as the high reputation, and the rest 75% 
are low reputation. The five reputation measurements are explained as: VC IPO MS1: cumulative 
market share at IPO year calculated based on the proceeds; VC IPO MS2: cumulative market share 
at IPO year calculated based on the market capitalization; VC IPO Number: cumulative number of 
IPOs by VC up to the IPO year; VC size: registered capital. Numbers in the brackets are p-values. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
It is a more accurate measurement because the capital under management of VCs is time-
varying which might differ from year to year. Therefore it catches the up-to-date VCs’ 
capacity to manage fund, while registered capital is just the amount of money the founder 
of VCs provided at the very beginning, and does not reflect VCs’ ability and development 
of reputation in the later years. Consequently, a significant note of caution is required about 
the reliability of using VC’s registered capital as a measurement of VC reputation.  
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In summary, in this section, the general conclusion is that VC reputation may exert a 
positive impact on IPO’s long-term market performance. The IPOs backed by more 
reputable VCs appear to perform better than the IPOs backed by less reputable VCs 
compared with non-VC-backed IPOs, but this conclusion remains to be tested statistically22. 
 
4.3.3 The Impact of Boards (H4 and H5) 
Given the special role of China’s ChiNext Board in the development of the VC industry, as 
well as its notable distinction with the Main board, a further step is to explore the impact 
of VCs across different boards. In order to examine this issue, the full sample is divided 
into two groups: one is the group of IPOs listed on the main board, the other group is the 
IPOs listed on the ChiNext board and the SME board. In later case, two boards are brought 
together for the reason that they are both designed for small and medium sized firms with 
high growth potential. Firstly, Table 4.11 reports the regressions which include the lead VC 
reputation measured by Top 20/Top 50 ranking. 
The Top 20 and Top 50 variables both yield similar patterns of results, but VCs seem to 
exert mixed influences across different boards. On the one hand, on the main board neither 
the coefficients of Top-20/50 nor the Non-Top-20/50 are significant. On the other hand, 
VCs exert a significant positive impact on the IPOs listed on the ChiNext and SME boards, 
and the impact is greater from more reputable VCs. This is consistent with the results on 
the full sample of IPOs (see Table 4.6 and Table 4.7). 
Considering these results by boards and on the full sample, the apparent positive impact 
of VC reputation on the overall China IPO market is driven largely by the impact on IPOs 
listed on the ChiNext and SME boards. This finding if verified by statistical testing, would 
indicate that VC reputation plays a greater role (i.e. the Monitoring and Value-adding 
function) in relatively small-sized and growing start-ups. In contrast, VCs add little to the 
performance of the IPOs that qualify for a listing on the main board. It might be because 
the IPOs listed on the main board are large and mature enough to build a healthy operating 
system and corporate governance structure. As a result, their managers might have enough 
experience to regulate their business quite well without too much help from VCs. What is 
                                                             
22 Further analysis (un-tabulated) reveals that the difference between high and low reputation VCs to be insignificant at 
the 0.1 level. 
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more, the insignificant impact of VC-backing might also be the results of conflicts of 
interests or the moral hazard problem between firm managers. 
 
Table 4.11 VC Ranking and BHAR36 by Boards 
 
BHAR36 BHAR36 
Main Other Main Other 
Top-20 -0.113 0.192   
 (0.580) (0.023)**   
Non-Top-20 0.020 0.144   
 (0.916) (0.028)**   
Top-50   -0.113 0.176 
   (0.580) (0.024)** 
Non-Top -50   0.020 0.149 
   (0.916) (0.029)** 
     
IPO Age 0.076 0.071 0.076 0.071 
 (0.397) (0.070)* (0.397) (0.071)* 
Underpricing -0.295 -0.074 -0.295 -0.074 
 (0.048)** (0.063)* (0.048)** (0.063)* 
Proceeds 0.112 0.026 0.112 0.027 
 (0.052)* (0.598) (0.052)* (0.583) 
SOE 0.181 -0.199 0.181 -0.200 
 (0.235) (0.006)*** (0.235) (0.005)*** 
High-tech 0.298 0.202 0.298 0.203 
 (0.087)* (0.000)*** (0.087)* (0.000)*** 
     
_cons -2.162 -0.901 -2.162 -0.911 
 (0.055)* (0.145) (0.055)* (0.140) 
Adj- R2 0.0534 0.0387 0.0534 0.0386 
N. 155 931 155 931 
In Table 4.11, Ranking of Top 20/50 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year. 
BHAR36 is calculated by using the portfolio matched by market capitalization and M/B ratio. 
“Other” stand for the IPOs listed on the SME board and the ChiNext boards; Numbers in the 
brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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With respect to the control variables, the relationship between both underpricing and the 
high-tech industry and the long-term market performance on different boards is in line with 
results shown on the full sample. Moreover, the age of IPO firms exhibits no significant 
impact on the full sample, while it has a significant and positive association with the 36-
month BHARs of IPOs listed on ChiNext and SME boards. The older the small and medium 
sized growing start-up firms, the better the stock performance they have in the long run 
post-IPO. Although the capital raised at IPO (proceeds) cannot predict the performance 
across the full sample of IPOs, it works significantly and positively for those IPOs listed 
on the Main board. In contrast, the IPO proceeds do not have significantly explanatory 
power for IPO performance on the ChiNext and SME boards. Last but not least, the state-
owned equity stakes exhibit different impact with the full sample. The SOE variable is 
significantly and negatively associated with performance across the full sample and 
ChiNext IPOs, while being not associated with performance on the Main board IPOs. Such 
finding reveals that the state-owned shareholders would undermine the performance of 
start-up IPOs, while having no significant influence on the mature and large size IPOs. 
In addition to the results in Table 4.11, Table 4.12 also reports the relationship between 
VC reputation and the 36-month BHARs on different boards, where the reputation of VCs 
is measured by five alternative measurements. Results shown in the table are consistent 
with the results with VC reputation measured by VC rankings (Table 4.9), including the 
impact of control variables. In summary, VC reputation only exerts an apparent impact on 
long-run performance on the ChiNext and SME boards and the impact is greater where VC 
reputation is high (e.g. the older VCs, or VCs with higher market share or more past IPO 
number)23.  
 
                                                             
23 Further analysis (un-tabulated) reveals that the difference between high and low reputation VCs to be insignificant at 
the 0.1 level. 
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Table 4.12 Alternative Reputation Measurements and BHAR36 by Boards 
 
VC MS1 VC MS2 IPO Quantity Age VC Size 
Main Other Main Other Main Other Main Other Main Other 
High -0.085 0.205 -0.045 0.189 0.038 0.184 -0.130 0.182 -0.217 0.116 
 (0.695) (0.037)** (0.837) (0.054)* (0.887) (0.054)* (0.693) (0.057)* (0.327) (0.246) 
Low -0.013 0.146 -0.038 0.151 -0.065 0.150 -0.041 0.157 0.160 0.180 
 (0.946) (0.020)** (0.836) (0.016)** (0.706) (0.017)** (0.804) (0.013)** (0.394) (0.004)*** 
           
IPO Age 0.075 0.074 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.070 0.077 0.071 0.066 0.072 
 (0.408) (0.063)* (0.425) (0.067)* (0.424) (0.073)* (0.394) (0.071)* (0.454) (0.065)* 
Underpricing -0.300 -0.075 -0.301 -0.075 -0.288 -0.075 -0.293 -0.074 -0.310 -0.075 
 (0.044)** (0.060)* (0.043)** (0.061)* (0.060)* (0.062)* (0.055)* (0.063)* (0.038)** (0.062)* 
Proceeds 0.109 0.029 0.107 0.028 0.111 0.027 0.113 0.026 0.101 0.029 
 (0.057)* (0.547) (0.060)* (0.561) (0.055)* (0.575) (0.059)* (0.588) (0.062)* (0.551) 
SOE 0.186 -0.202 0.181 -0.201 0.178 -0.198 0.184 -0.202 0.205 -0.199 
 (0.225) (0.005)*** (0.239) (0.005)*** (0.243) (0.006)*** (0.228) (0.005)*** (0.176) (0.006)*** 
High-tech 0.300 0.203 0.303 0.203 0.300 0.203 0.303 0.202 0.278 0.202 
 (0.085)* (0.000)*** (0.082)* (0.000)*** (0.085)* (0.000)*** (0.082)* (0.000)*** (0.109) (0.000)*** 
           
_cons -2.114 -0.958 -2.074 -0.937 -2.119 -0.913 -2.187 -0.908 -1.973 -0.946 
 (0.061)* (0.123) (0.065)* (0.130) (0.060)* (0.139) (0.061)* (0.142) (0.065)* (0.125) 
Adj-R2 0.0519 0.0388 0.0513 0.0386 0.0522 0.0384 0.0521 0.0388 0.0648 0.0394 
N. 155 931 155 931 155 931 155 931 155 931 
In Table 4.12, Lead VC is defined as the VC who holds the largest pre-IPO shareholdings in the IPO firm. BHAR36 is calculated by using the portfolio matched by 
market capitalization and M/B ratio. VC MS1 is the VC’s IPO market share calculated by the IPO proceeds; VC MS2 is the VC’s IPO market share calculated by IPO 
market capitalization; “Other” stands for the IPOs listed on the SME board and the ChiNext boards. Numbers in the brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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4.4 Long-run Post-IPO Operating Performance 
Having examined the stock market performance of IPO firms, this section focuses on the 
operating performance. The operating performance of a company is most frequently 
measured by accounting data and is very different from the stock market performance. The 
stock market performance is forward-looking, mostly reflecting the expectations or 
predictions about the firms’ value in the future. By contrast, operating performance 
measures are more likely to be backward-looking since they are built on accounting data 
reported in annual accounts. Consequently, it is possible that the stock performance and 
operating performance of a firm could move in different directions for a number of years. 
An IPO firm may exhibit low or even negative operating returns at the initial post-IPO 
stage. However, as long as the investors and the public hold positive attitudes and have 
confidence in the company’s future success, its stock price might still be high. 
Table 4.13 illustrates the summary of the operating performance of the China A share 
IPOs listed from 2007 to 2012, covering a 7-year window from three years prior IPO to 
three years post IPO. Due to the data availability, IPOs listed in 2004 and 2005 are excluded. 
As there are only 5 available IPOs in 2006, the year 2006 is also excluded from the sample. 
Hence, the sample starts from 2007 to 2012, and includes a total of 1,084 IPOs. In the spirit 
of the previous studies24, the median values of the operating performance measurements 
(ROE and ROE after reduction non-recurring profit and loss, thereafter ROE1 and ROE2) 
are reported for the full sample as well as the IPOs listed in each year. 
The first three rows of Table 4.13 show the median of the ROE1 and ROE2 of the 1,084 
IPOs from 2007 to 2012. Correspondingly, Figure 4.1 illustrates the moving trend of these 
two variables using two-line chats: figure (a) is the trend of the median, and figure (b) is 
the trend of the mean25. Comparison between figure (a) and figure (b) shows that the 
medians of both indicators are about 5 percentage points lower than their means, but they 
exhibit nearly identical moving trends. Both ROEs exhibit a substantial decline as firms get 
listed, and they keep decreasing to even lower levels in the next three years. The trend of 
red line (ROE2) is exactly the same with the blue line (ROE1), so the description here will 
focus on ROE1. The median of ROE1 at year -3, i.e. three years before IPO, is 31.13%, 
however it halves to 14.64% at the IPO year, i.e. year 0. Then the ROE1 further reduces by 
half again in the following year (year +1) and maintains this level in the next two years, 
                                                             
24 See the studies, Jain and Kini (1994); Mikkelson et al. (1997); Loughran and Ritter (1997); Chi and Padgett (2006); 
and Coakley et al. (2007).  
25 We also calculate the mean value of the operating performance, as it is very close to the median the table. 
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ending up with 7.71% at year +3, i.e. three years after IPO. The data indicates that, in 
general, China A share IPOs experience a significant deterioration in profitability in the 
long run. 
Table 4.13 also reports the operating performance of the 1,084 IPOs by listing years and 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the corresponding moving tendency. The yearly tendency of the 
medians of ROE1 and ROE2 are generally consistent with the declining tendency of the full 
time period. For instance, IPOs listed in 2007 and 2008 exhibit smaller ROE1 reductions 
(about 2.5 times lower) than in other years, while IPOs listed in 2010 exhibit the largest 
ROE1 declines, dropping by almost 6 times at year +3 compared with year -3, i.e. from 
35.85 to 6.31. For 2011 and 2012, the ROE1 has decreased by around 4 times. Overall, by 
analysing the operating performance for both full period and each year, it appears that 
China A share IPOs show long-run underperformance in post-issue period. In particular, 
performance of IPOs listed in 2010 and 2011 exhibit greater declines than their counterparts 
listed in other years. 
Table 4.14 illustrates the mean and median changes of operating performance during the 
window from one-year prior IPO to three years after IPO (-1 to +3), one year prior IPO to 
two years after IPO (-1 to +2) and one year before to one year after IPO (-1 to +1). The 
median and mean ROE1 of IPOs reduce substantially compared with the value in the pre-
IPO period, falling off by 21.78 and 24.23 percentage points after trading for 3 years 
respectively. These reductions in profitability are even more serious than those reported by 
Chi and Padgett (2006), which suggest that the median change in ROE from year -2 to 3 is 
-16.46% for the China IPOs. 
The last four columns of Table 4.14 report the distribution of IPOs by performance, i.e. 
returns above zero and below zero. Surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of IPOs 
underperform, whether measured by ROE1 or ROE2. As many as 1,021 IPOs show negative 
ROE1 from year -1 to +3, with a median of -22.04. In contrast, only 21 out of the total 1,042 
IPOs have positive ROE1.  
This serious deterioration in profitability is consistent with Jain and Kini (1994) who 
find that the five-year post issue operating performance of IPOs (measured by ROA and 
operating cash flow deflated by total asset) drops substantially relative to pre-IPO level. 
Furthermore, the results are also consistent with the studies of Levis (1993), Cai and Wei 
(1997), Loughran and Ritter (1997), Pagano et al. (1998), Wang et al. (2003), Chan et al. 
(2004), and Chi and Padgett (2006). Such operating performance behaviour might be 
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inflated by the windows of opportunity theory, where the pre-IPO accounting numbers 
might be manipulated to ‘window-dress’ a firm’s profitability (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
 
Table 4.13   ROEs of IPOs from 2007 to 2012 
 Time 
  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Full N. 1,075 1,076 1,059 1,083 1,083 1,084 1,084 
 ROE1 31.13 30.10 28.99 14.64 8.28 7.77 7.71 
 ROE2 28.72 28.42 27.44 13.54 7.56 6.98 6.71 
         
2007 N. 120 121 103 121 121 121 121 
 ROE1 25.76 24.23 26.07 18.45 9.62 9.30 11.39 
 ROE2 25.04 22.46 25.66 17.10 8.93 8.62 10.44 
         
2008 N. 72 72 72 77 77 77 77 
 ROE1 26.48 31.51 31.70 15.13 11.98 12.34 11.61 
 ROE2 26.42 28.04 30.01 13.69 11.30 12.00 10.24 
         
2009 N. 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
 ROE1 33.21 37.45 28.98 22.76 9.74 9.53 8.04 
 ROE2 29.02 33.98 28.59 21.36 8.98 9.05 6.68 
         
2010 N. 346 346 348 347 347 347 347 
 ROE1 35.85 28.97 28.27 13.33 7.54 6.33 6.31 
 ROE2 31.19 27.53 26.59 12.68 6.76 5.83 5.41 
         
2011 N. 276 276 275 277 277 278 278 
 ROE1 29.67 30.62 31.61 13.39 7.27 6.57 6.92 
 ROE2 27.97 29.42 29.00 11.81 6.76 5.66 6.13 
         
2012 N. 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
 ROE1 28.60 32.71 28.72 13.14 8.78 8.37 7.82 
 ROE2 27.30 31.74 27.44 11.92 7.63 7.58 6.58 
In Table 4.13, the ROE1 and ROE2 are expressed by means of %. 
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                                                     (a) Median                                                                                                                (b) Mean 
Figure 4.1 Operating Performance of IPOs. Line charts of operating performance of A share China IPO listed between 2006-2012 in the window 
3-years prior IPO to the 3-years post IPO. Three variables are used to proxy for operating performance: ROE (blue line); ROE after reduction of 
non-recurring profit and loss, short for ROE Recurring (Red line); (a) is tendency of median and (b) is the tendency of mean. 
 
5
10
15
20
25
30
R
O
E
/R
O
E
R
ec
u
rr
in
g
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
time
ROE ROERecurring
0
10
20
30
40
R
O
E
/R
O
E
R
ec
u
rr
in
g
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
time
ROE ROERecurring
- 111 - 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Line charts of Median operating performance of A share China IPO listed between 2006-2012 in the window 3-years prior 
IPO to the 3-years post IPO by cohort year. Two variables are used to proxy for operating performance: ROE (blue line); ROE recurring 
(Red line).  
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Table 4.14 Changes of ROEs 
 N. Mean Median S.D. Min Max  
>0  <0 
N. Mean Median  N. Mean Median 
Panel A. ROE1              
Year -1 to +3 1,042 -24.23 -21.78 16.22 -183.76 19.50  21 5.93 3.59  1,021 -24.85 -22.04 
Year -1 to +2 1,042 -23.94 -21.73 15.21 -152.75 9.29  19 3.40 2.92  1,023 -24.45 -21.93 
Year -1 to +1 1042 -23.40 -21.36 14.19 -153.97 15.32  14 3.81 2.43  1,028 -23.77 -21.51 
Panel B. ROE2              
Year -1 to +3 1,030 -23.67 -21.37 15.72 -170.90 12.81  24 -2.88 3.01  1,006 -24.16 -21.61 
Year -1 to +2 1,030 -23.21 -20.98 14.73 -150.95 8.42  23 -3.68 1.52  1,007 -23.66 -21.62 
Year -1 to +1 1,030 -22.48 -20.20 13.91 -152.91 31.72  17 -4.54 4.69  1,013 -22.78 -20.32 
In Table 4.14, the change of ROE1 and ROE2 are measured by means of %. 
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4.5 VC and Post-IPO Operating Performance (H1) 
This section focuses on VCs’ impact on IPO firms’ long-term operating performance. The 
operating performance of IPO companies is calculated based on a window from one-year 
prior IPO to three years after IPO. There are two reasons. The main reason is that we would 
like to investigate the long-performance of IPO, i.e. the returns from the ‘event’ of IPO. 
Apparently from 1 year before the event of IPO to 3 years after the event of IPO is a best 
to measure the returns from the ‘event’ of IPO. The more years included before IPO, the 
more contamination there might be. The second reason is that as shown in figures 4.1 and 
4.2, the ROE before the event of IPO are sort of stable. There are no significant fluctuations 
of ROE from 3 years before IPO to 1 year before IPO. Thus, it is reasonable that the results 
of the change of ROE from the time 2(3) years before IPO to 3 years after IPO are similar. 
Table 4.15 reports the comparison of the median ROE1 between the VC-backed IPOs and 
non-VC-backed IPOs by years. In the last column, it shows the z-value of Wilcoxon rank-
sum test which is used here to test the difference between the median values of the two 
groups.  
The full sample’s ROE1 by years (the first three columns of Table 4.15) shows that at 
three years after IPO all the IPOs underperform the level one-year pre-IPO substantially. 
IPOs issued after 2010 appear to suffer from more serious profitability reductions during 
the three years post-IPO period, and IPOs listed in 2011 exhibit the largest declines. 
Comparison between the overall VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs reveals no 
significant difference. Moreover, analysing the sample of each year reiterates this finding 
and is in line with the full sample: both the VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs listed in 
2011 are the most underperformed during three-year post-IPO period and there is no 
significant difference between the VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Table 4.16 reports the comparison of the median of ROE2 between the VC-backed IPOs 
and non-VC-backed IPOs. This shows that the characteristics of ROE2 follow a very similar 
pattern to the ROE1. For instance, VCs do not appear to exhibit any significant impact on 
improving IPOs’ long-run operating performance; and IPOs listed in 2011 are the most 
underperformed IPOs across the three years’ post-IPO period. This might be because in 
2011, China was facing a very tough economic environment from both domestic and 
overseas sides. The obvious declines of performance can be attributed to multiple factors 
such as domestic inflation, monetary tightening, appreciation of RMB, as well as European 
debit crisis. Many new IPOs show substantially decreased growth rates, and a considerable 
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proportion even exhibit negative growth rates compared to their pre-IPO level. In general, 
such results reveal that the decline in post-IPO operating performance is common across 
China A share IPOs, and VCs are not found to have any significant impact on alleviating 
the serious underperformance of the funded IPOs. 
 
Table 4.15 Changes of ROE1 of VC-backed and Non-VC-backed IPOs 
 Total  VC NVC  
Year N. -1 to +3  N. -1 to +3 N. -1 to +3 wilco. 
2007 100 -15.03  30 -12.94 70 -15.74 -0.72 
2008 71 -19.98  21 -21.47 50 -18.13 0.98 
2009 106 -20.04  51 -20.98 55 -19.02 0.78 
2010 345 -22.34  150 -21.28 195 -23.73 -0.78 
2011 273 -25.14  138 -25.29 135 -25.02 -0.16 
2012 147 -21.64  86 -21.77 61 -20.52 -0.22 
2007-2012 1,042 -21.78  476 -21.69 566 -22.02 0.64 
 N. -1 to +2  N. -1 to +2 N. -1 to +2 wilco. 
2007 100 -18.10  30 -17.31 70 -19.03 -1.06 
2008 71 -19.65  21 -19.82 50 -19.60 0.42 
2009 106 -18.63  51 -19.58 55 -18.45 0.71 
2010 345 -22.40  150 -21.72 195 -22.86 -0.78 
2011 273 -24.76  138 -23.73 135 -25.07 0.08 
2012 147 -20.23  86 -21.20 61 -19.18 0.32 
2007-2012 1,042 -21.73  476 -21.59 566 -21.95 0.62 
 N. -1 to +1  N. -1 to +1 N. -1 to +1 wilco. 
2007 100 -16.98  30 -16.22 70 -16.94 -0.46 
2008 71 -21.35  21 -22.33 50 -19.87 0.239 
2009 106 -19.61  51 -19.25 55 -19.65 0.66 
2010 345 -20.96  150 -20.73 195 -20.96 0.36 
2011 273 -24.00  138 -23.57 135 -24.23 -0.31 
2012 147 -21.10  86 -21.08 61 -21.26 0.54 
2007-2012 1,042 -21.36  476 -21.48 566 -21.33 1.10 
Table 4.15 reports the median of changes in ROE between the three years after IPO (year +3) 
and the one-year prior IPO (year -1) by two groups: the VC-backed and non-VC-backed. The 
unit of the ROE in the table is percentage (%); and the last column shows the z-value of the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
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Table 4.16 Changes of ROE2 of VC-backed and Non-VC-backed IPOs 
 Total  VC NVC   
Year N. -1 to +3  N. -1 to +3 N. -1 to +3  wilco. 
2007 91 -15.75  26 -14.87 65 -15.75  -0.30 
2008 71 -19.80  21 -20.47 50 -16.26  1.06 
2009 109 -19.85  53 -19.85 56 -19.65  0.83 
2010 342 -21.58  149 -21.01 193 -22.01  -0.85 
2011 271 -23.95  136 -23.88 135 -23.95  0.01 
2012 146 -21.06  85 -21.80 61 -19.48  0.02 
2007-2012 1,030 -21.37  470 -21.29 560 -21.57  0.71 
 N. -1 to +2  N. -1 to +2 N. -1 to +2  wilco. 
2007 91 -18.36  26 -18.80 95 -17.94  0.00 
2008 71 -17.62  21 -17.43 50 -17.72  0.37 
2009 109 -18.76  53 -18.01 56 -18.87  0.54 
2010 345 -21.61  150 -20.71 195 -21.98  -0.22 
2011 271 -23.12  136 -22.72 135 -23.57  0.41 
2012 146 -19.84  85 -20.40 61 -18.71  0.38 
2007-2012 1,030 -20.98  470 -20.77 560 -21.17  0.90 
 N. -1 to +1  N. -1 to +1 N. -1 to +1  wilco. 
2007 91 -16.42  26 -18.45 65 -15.72  0.10 
2008 71 -18.94  21 -20.17 50 -18.63  0.20 
2009 109 -18.96  53 -18.29 56 -19.43  0.62 
2010 342 -19.79  149 -19.59 193 -20.01  0.23 
2011 271 -23.00  136 -22.76 135 -23.14  0.52 
2012 146 -19.51  85 -19.51 61 -18.41  0.61 
2007-2012 1,030 -20.20  470 -20.44 560 -19.98  1.42 
Table 4.16 reports the median of changes in ROE2 between the three years after IPO (year +3) 
and the one-year prior IPO (year -1) by two groups: the VC-backed and non-VC-backed. The 
ROE2 is measure by percentage (%), and the last column shows the z-value of the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test; *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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                                                                   (a) ROE1                                                                                 (b) ROE2 
 
Figure 4.3 Comparison of operating performance between the VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs covering the window 3-years prior IPO to 
the 3-years post IPO.  All the operating performance are measured by the median value. (a) is the comparison of ROE1 and (b) is the comparison of 
ROE2. 
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As a supplement, Figure 4.3 illustrates the trends of ROE1 and ROE2 of the VC-backed 
(blue line) and non-VC-backed IPOs (red line) in two separate line charts for the three-year 
periods prior and after IPO. The ROE2 displays the same declining trend as ROE1, so the 
figure of ROE1 will be used for the interpretation. The line chart reveals that at year -3, i.e. 
three years before IPO, VC-backed IPOs enjoy evidently better ROE1 than the non-VC-
baked IPOs, but this gap almost disappears at year -2. Then at year -1 it is surpassed by the 
non-VC-backed IPOs, and ROE1 of all the IPOs then drops dramatically at the IPO year 
(year 0).  
Moreover, during the following three post-IPO years, the ROE1 of VC-backed IPOs 
shows a more serious decline than the ROE1 of the non-VC-backed IPO. Taken together, 
the figures and statistics illustrate that VC-backed IPOs experience greater operating 
performance reductions in the post-IPO period than the non-VC-backed IPOs, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. Such results are different with those in Krishnan 
et al. (2011) and Shu et al. (2011), where the operating performance (measured by ROA) 
of VC-backed IPOs is significantly higher than the operating performance of the non-VC-
backed IPOs. 
Next, Model 4.1 is regressed to examine the impact of VC-backing on the operating 
performance, which is also an examination of Hypothesis 1. Table 4.17 reports the results, 
where the VC-backed is used as main independent variable, while ROE1 and ROE2 as the 
dependent variables, respectively. Both regressions verify that there is no significant 
difference of operating performance between the VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed 
IPOs, which leads to the rejection of Hypothesis 1. Overall, China A share IPOs exhibit 
serious profitability deductions in the three-year post-IPO period relative to the pre-IPO 
level. However, VCs do not play a significant role in improving the underperformance. 
This runs contrary to the Certification theory of Jain and Kini (1995) which insists that VC-
backed IPOs exhibit significantly superior operating performance to non-VC-backed IPOs, 
and the screening hypothesis of Espenlaub et al. (2014) which suggests VC-backed IPOs 
are of higher quality that should perform better in the long-run. 
None of these studies supports Wang et al. (2003) and Chen and Liang (2016) which 
suggest significantly inferior post-IPO operating performance of VC-backed IPOs. Coakley 
et al. (2007) find that the differences of operating performance between VC-backed IPOs 
and non-VC-backed IPOs are not significant, but their cross-sectional results imply VCs 
do not have a significant and positive impact. Therefore, the results only support the first 
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part of my findings. To some extent, the results of this thesis support the findings of the 
following studies. Gangi and Lombardo (2008) reject the Certification and the Value-added 
function of VCs but conform to the Adverse selection function. They find that VC-backed 
IPOs exhibit constantly diminishing operating performance and profitability ratios over 
time. Chahine et al. (2012) suggest that syndication investments of VCs will lead to the 
increase of pre-IPO accounting numbers and reductions in post-IPO performance. However, 
the results of this thesis differ from these studies’ suggestions that VCs have a significantly 
negative impact on IPO long-run performance, i.e. this thesis finds no significant difference 
at all. The findings here are consistent with Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Rosa (2003) as 
they identify that VC-backed firms do not exhibit significantly superior long-run post-IPO 
operating performance relative to the non-VC-backed IPO firms.  
The coefficients of the control variables shown in Table 4.17 generate some different 
findings with those reported in Table 4.326. From the examination of VCs’ impact on market 
performance and operating performance, only the age of IPO firms shows the same effects, 
which is significantly positive. Older firms enjoy better post-IPO performance. It appears 
that IPO proceeds have no significant influence on the ROE, which is partly consistent with 
Table 4.3, where proceeds exhibit mixed impact. On the contrary to the findings in Table 
4.3, the underpricing and state-owned background are significantly and positively 
associated with operating performance. Such findings are consistent with the proposition 
that state-owned IPOs perform superior to the privately-owned IPOs because they get 
additional benefits from the government. Their operating losses are easily to be made up 
by government subsidies. High-tech IPOs exhibit significantly lower ROE compared with 
IPOs in the traditional industry. This is plausible since many high-tech firms invest a great 
proportion of capital into the research and development of the products in the post-IPO 
period. Hence, a longer time period than three years may be required before high-tech firms 
exhibit improved performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 Table 5.3 illustrates the results of the OLS regression of the variable VC-backed against the 36-month BHARs. The 
regressions exhibit that VC plays a significantly positive role in improving IPOs’ long-run stock market performance.  
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Table 4.17 Impact of VC on Long-run Operating Performance 
 ROE1 ROE2 
 (1) (2) 
VC-backed -0.879 -0.989 
 (0.252) (0.187) 
   
IPO Age 1.478 1.604 
 (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
Underpricing 2.567 2.313 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds 0.056 -0.099 
 (0.909) (0.836) 
SOE 8.046 7.148 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -3.038 -2.722 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
_cons -36.88 -35.18 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Adj-R2 0.1263 0.1081 
N. 1,013 1,003 
Table 4.17 reports the OLS cross-sectional regressions against the changes of 
ROE1/ROE2 of 1,028 China A share IPOs. In column (1), the dependent variable is 
changes of ROE1 between year -1 and year +3; In column (2), the dependent variable 
is changes of ROE2 between year -1 and year +3. The values in the brackets are p-
values. *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
4.6 VC Reputation and Long-run Operating performance 
4.6.1 VC Reputation and ROEs (H2) 
The above section reports no significant impact of VCs on IPOs’ operating performance. 
This section will focus on examining whether the reputation of VCs has any impact. This 
research question is specified in Hypothesis 2 and the Model 4.2 is adopted to carry out the 
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examination. As in Section 4.3.1, Model 4.2 is also applied twice: first on the sub-sample 
of VC-backed IPOs, and then on the full sample of IPOs.  
Table 4.18 reports the results (Model 4.2) based on the VC-backed IPOs, where the main 
dependent variable is the VC reputation and the dependent variable is the ROE1. Seven 
regressions are listed here because seven proxies are used to measure the VC reputation. 
Only the VC Age shows significantly positive association with ROE1 at 1% level, with a 
coefficient of 0.001. This means that as the age of VC increases by 1%, the ROE1 of VC-
backed IPOs will increase by 0.1 percentage point. As suggested by Nahata (2008), older 
VCs have more experience in their specialised industries, thereby bringing better 
performance to the IPO firms.  
However, the other six measurements (VC’s ranking, number, IPO market share, and 
the size) consistently illustrate that the VC reputation does not have any significant 
influence on the ROE1. The results suggest that generally the reputation of VCs cannot 
effectively distinguish the operating performance of the IPOs they funded from other VC-
backed IPOs, implying the rejection of Hypothesis 2. These results accord with the findings 
in Section 4.3, i.e. VC reputation has no significant impact on the long-run stock market 
performance (BHAR36). 
Table 4.19 provides the empirical results of the modified Model 4.2, but it seems that 
the reputation of VCs fails to present any association with the ROE1 no matter which proxy 
is used, including the VC Age27. Overall, the results lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 2, 
concluding that VC reputation fails to exert any significant impact on the IPO long-run 
operating performance. 
In addition, the control variables in these two tables generally tell the same story, and 
they are all significant. The older the IPO firm is or the higher is the underpricing, the 
higher is the operating performance. Meanwhile higher IPO proceeds lead to lower 
operating performance. State-owned IPOs perform significantly better than the privately-
owned VC-backed IPOs, but the high-tech IPOs perform significantly worse than IPOs of 
the traditional industry. 
 
 
                                                             
27 In Table 5.19, there are only 5 regressions. It is because the variable Top 20 and Top 50 are dummy variables, and the 
value zero means that the ranking of VC is after 20/50. While for non-VC-backed IPOs, no available VC rankings could 
be found and it is impracticable to replace the missing value in Top 20/50 by zero.  
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Table 4.18 VC Reputation and ROE1 on the VC-backed IPOs 
 ROE1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Top-20 0.591       
 (0.689)       
Top-50  0.214      
  (0.881)      
VC Age   0.001     
   (0.001)***     
VC IPO#    -0.038    
    (0.702)    
VC MS1     4.592   
     (0.707)   
VC MS2      8.745  
      (0.446)  
VC Size       0.000 
       (0.219) 
        
IPO Age 2.615 2.612 2.458 2.610 2.616 2.632 2.922 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** 
Underp. 1.919 1.907 1.577 1.857 1.892 1.867 2.124 
 (0.082)* (0.084)* (0.151) (0.094)* (0.087)* (0.091)* (0.047)** 
Proceeds -3.842 -3.807 -4.621 -3.819 -3.850 -3.919 -4.235 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
SOE 5.763 5.759 4.563 5.791 5.725 5.713 4.176 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.010)*** 
High-tech -4.198 -4.180 -4.581 -4.135 -4.107 -4.091 -3.473 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.012)** 
        
_cons -3.007 -3.251 5.017 -2.867 -2.815 -2.236 -1.184 
 (0.829) (0.815) (0.721) (0.837) (0.840) (0.873) (0.934) 
Adj-R2 0.0924 0.0921 0.1146 0.0924 0.0925 0.0934 0.1021 
N. 470 470 466 470 469 469 454 
Table 4.18 reports the cross-sectional OLS regression of seven VC reputation proxies against the changes 
of ROE1 between year -1 and year +3 based on the sample of 470 VC-backed IPOs from 2007-2012. 
Numbers in the brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
- 122 - 
 
Table 4.19 VC Reputation and ROE1 on the Full sample IPOs 
 ROE1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VC Age 0.000     
 (0.221)     
VC IPO#  -0.047    
  (0.614)    
VC MS1   -2.021   
   (0.867)   
VC MS2    0.878  
    (0.938)  
VC Size     0.000 
     (0.526) 
      
IPO Age 1.766 1.820 1.814 1.814 1.953 
 (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** 
Underpricing 2.874 2.805 2.848 2.845 3.033 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds -1.153 -1.118 -1.104 -1.111 -0.911 
 (0.067)* (0.075)* (0.079)* (0.077)* (0.152) 
SOE 6.930 7.212 7.175 7.167 6.525 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -3.160 -3.073 -3.078 -3.077 -2.828 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** 
      
_cons -27.37 -27.80 -28.00 -27.94 -31.36 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
Adj-R2 0.0784 0.0774 0.0771 0.0771 0.0766 
N. 1,024 1,028 1,027 1,027 1,012 
Table 4.19 reports the cross-sectional OLS regression of 5 different VC reputation proxies against the 
changes of ROE1 between year -1 and year +3, based on the full sample of 1042 China A share IPOs 
from 2007-2012. Numbers in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.6.2 High vs. Low Reputation (H3) 
This section focuses on examining the impact of different levels of VC reputation on IPO 
firms’ operating performance, as proposed in Hypothesis 3. Model 4.3 is employed in this 
section, where the dependent variable is the proxy for post-IPO operating performance. 
Specifically, it is the difference of ROE1/ROE2 between the one year prior-IPO and three 
years after IPO. The main reputation measurement will be the ranking of the lead VC. 
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(1) VC Ranking 
Table 4.20 reports a series of regression results using the changes in ROE1 and ROE2 
between year -1 to +3 as the dependent variable, respectively. The VCs with the ranking of 
top 20/50 VCs are defined as VCs with high reputation (Top-20/Top-50) and the rest VCs 
are defined as VCs with low reputation (Non-Top-20/Non-Top-50). Columns (1) and (2) 
reports the relationship between high and low VC reputation and the changes in ROE1, 
while Columns (3) and (4) are based on the ROE2. All four regressions yield very consistent 
results: none of the coefficients of the VC reputation metrics exhibit significant signs. Such 
results indicate that the level of VC reputation makes no significant difference in explaining 
the long-run post-issue operating performance of IPO firms. IPOs backed by the more 
reputable VCs exhibit no significant difference of performance from the non-VC-backed 
IPOs, neither do the IPOs backed by less reputable VCs. Therefore, this leads to the 
rejection of Hypothesis 3.  
Consequently, this thesis rejects the Screening hypothesis of VC reputation where VC 
exerts significant positive impact on IPO long-run performance. The results also contradict 
the findings of Jain and Kini (1995), Jain (2001), and Chemmanur and Loutskina (2014). 
However, the results here are analogous to, but not the same with, the findings of Coakley 
et al. (2007). They conclude that VCs exhibit no significant impact on the IPO performance, 
although they also find that VC reputation exhibits a significant negative impact on the 
post-IPO five-year’s operating performance.  
The effects of control variables reported in the four regressions are also highly consistent. 
The coefficients of the IPO Age are significantly and positively associated with the changes 
in ROE1/ROE2 at 1% level, which is consistent with many prior researches proposing that 
older firms have more experience in coping with the challenges after they get listed (e.g., 
Barry et al. 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; 
Coakley et al., 2007). The initial returns (Underpricing) and ROE1/ROE2 display a 
significantly positive association at 1% level. This is consistent with Jain and Kini (1994)’s 
Signalling hypothesis which suggests that firms with high initial returns will have superior 
post-IPO operating performance. It is also consistent with the findings of Lee and Wahal 
(2004). However, the results here are different from Nahata (2008) who does not find a 
significant relationship between underpricing and operating performance as well as 
between VC reputation and operating performance. 
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Table 4.20 VC Ranking and the Operating performance 
 ROE1 ROE1  ROE2 ROE2 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Top-20 -1.275   -0.924  
 (0.239)   (0.383)  
Non-Top-20 -0.603   -0.951  
 (0.489)   (0.265)  
Top-50  -1.542   -1.168 
  (0.130)   (0.240) 
Non-Top-50  -0.342   -0.780 
  (0.704)   (0.376) 
      
IPO Age 1.471 1.457  1.603 1.596 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Underpricing 2.563 2.553  2.316 2.312 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds 0.077 0.075  -0.098 -0.092 
 (0.876) (0.879)  (0.838) (0.848) 
SOE 8.047 8.095  7.144 7.163 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -3.025 -3.001  -2.726 -2.711 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -37.08 -36.97  -35.20 -35.22 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Adj-R2 0.1256 0.1263  0.1071 0.1072 
N. 1,013 1,013  1,003 1,003 
In Table 4.20, Ranking of Top 20/50 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each year; Numbers in the 
brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The IPOs that have government shareholders (SOE) display significantly higher ROEs 
than the privately-owned IPOs at 1% level. This finding confirms the findings of Clementi 
(2004) which suggest that government manipulates the performance of listed firms to make 
the accounting number more attractive. Moreover, high-tech IPOs also significantly 
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underperformed the IPOs in the traditional industry. In the research of Coakley et al. (2007), 
the high-tech IPOs are also found to exhibit significantly lower operating performance than 
the traditional IPOs, but only during the “bubble years”/ hot markets. The reason is that 
small-size firms tend to seek VC investments during the hot markets and get listed by virtue 
of VCs’ support within a short period. The results reported in this study might be because 
in the first few years after IPO, high-tech firms have to invest a great deal of capital for the 
product research and development which would lead to large expenditures. 
Lastly, the effects of IPO proceeds are mixed across the regressions. Before the two 
dummy variables SOE and High-tech are added, variable Proceeds shows a significantly 
positive slope. However, after adding SOE and High-tech, the slope becomes negative and 
insignificant. This is possible due to the variable SOE absorbing most of the effects of IPO 
size, given that many state-owned firms are very large. 
 
(2) Other reputation measurements 
Table 4.21 reports the results of the impact of VC reputation on the ROE1 when using other 
five alternative measurements of VC reputation. In the regressions, VCs with high 
reputation are classified as the VCs with the value in the upper quartile of the corresponding 
measurements, while the rest VCs are classified as VCs with low reputation. The empirical 
results obtained from the alternative reputation measurements are consistent with the results 
from the VC Zero2 IPO rankings. VC’s IPO market share is calculated in two ways: one is 
based on IPO proceeds, the other is based on IPO market capitalization. The results show 
that VC’s cumulative IPO market share does not show a significant impact of VC reputation. 
This contrasts with the studies of Nahata (2008), Kristshan et al. (2011), and Shu et al. 
(2011), which report that the market share is the only significant proxy for VC reputation.  
The five regressions in Table 4.21 generally demonstrate consistent effects: VC 
reputation exhibits no significant impact on the profitability or the return level of IPO firms. 
Similarly, in the regressions based on the five alternative reputation measurements and the 
ROE2 as reported in Table 4.22, the coefficients of VC reputation remain insignificant. This 
further confirms that the level of VC reputation does not significantly affect IPO firms’ 
long-run profitability.  
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Table 4.21 Alternative Reputation Measurements and ROE1  
 ROE1 
 VC IPO MS1 VC IPO MS2 VC Age VC IPO Number VC Size 
High -1.633 -1.929 -0.104 -2.649 -0.896 
 (0.189) (0.119) (0.934) (0.054)* (0.479) 
Low -0.573 -0.468 -1.123 -0.461 -0.966 
 (0.492) (0.575) (0.177) (0.571) (0.248) 
      
IPO Age 1.452 1.446 1.468 1.490 1.472 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Underpricing 2.586 2.578 2.580 2.523 2.553 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds 0.086 0.096 0.036 0.046 0.034 
 (0.862) (0.845) (0.941) (0.926) (0.945) 
SOE 8.058 8.048 7.953 8.095 8.059 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -3.043 -3.044 -3.101 -2.980 -3.030 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -37.05 -37.11 -36.55 -36.87 -36.57 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Adj-R2 0.1259 0.1265 0.1260 0.1276 0.1256 
N. 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 
In Table 4.21, for each reputation measurement, the High is defined as the first largest 25% of the Lead VC in each fiscal year. Changes in 
ROE1 is calculated by using the value at year (+3) distract the value at year (-1); Numbers in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote the 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.22 Alternative Reputation Measurements and ROE2  
 ROE2 
 VC IPO MS1 VC IPO MS2 VC Age VC IPO Number VC Size 
High -1.379 -1.303 0.617 -1.540 -0.345 
 (0.253) (0.281) (0.616) (0.255) (0.780) 
Low -0.791 -0.818 -1.534 -0.861 -1.289 
 (0.334) (0.317) (0.059)* (0.278) (0.115) 
      
IPO Age 1.589 1.593 1.588 1.608 1.587 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Underpricing 2.327 2.319 2.343 2.299 2.305 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds -0.082 -0.086 -0.136 -0.104 -0.126 
 (0.865) (0.858) (0.777) (0.829) (0.793) 
SOE 7.154 7.149 6.937 7.169 7.119 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -2.724 -2.727 -2.862 -2.700 -2.714 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -35.16 -35.26 -35.29 -34.55 -34.72 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Adj-R2 0.1077 0.1079 0.1080 0.1077 0.1080 
N. 1,003 1,003 1,003 1,003 1,003 
In Table 4.22, for each reputation measurement, the High is defined as the first largest 25% of the Lead VC in each fiscal year. Changes in 
ROE2 is calculated by using the value at year (+3) distract the value at year (-1). Numbers in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote 
the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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However, in accordance with Nahata (2008), VC age does not show any significant 
influence on improving the long-run performance in this study. While in Table 4.22, VC 
Age illustrates some exception: the coefficient of Low is negatively and weakly significant 
(10% level). It is possible that less reputable/younger VCs exert negative impact on IPO 
long-run operating performance. In order to attain and enhance their reputation and 
experience, younger VCs have the incentive to grandstand, thus leading to inferior 
performance of IPO firms. So the results here may be interpreted as providing weak support 
to the findings of research such as Gompers (1996), Gompers et al. (2003), Sørensen (2007), 
and Krishnan et al. (2011), where less reputable VCs are found to be associated with worse 
performance.  
Moreover, the cumulative number of IPOs VC have supported (VC IPO Number) does 
not differentiate the profitability of the VC-backed IPOs from the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
This contradicts a series of studies which have concluded VCs’ past performance is an 
effective indicator to measure the positive impact of VC reputation (Barry et al., 1990; Hsu, 
2004; Kaplan and Scholar, 2005; Krishnan et al., 2011; Atanasov et al., 2012). Additionally, 
the insignificant impact of VC size (High and Low) implies that the registered capital of 
VC firms cannot effectively capture VC reputation, although this study is the first to use 
this proxy for VC reputation. 
The impact of control variables illustrated in Table 4.21 and 4.22 affirms the regression 
results when using the VC ranking as the reputation measurement. The age of IPO firms, 
underpricing, and the government shareholders all exhibit significantly positive association 
with the ROE, while the high-tech IPOs suffer from significantly lower ROE than IPOs in 
traditional industries. 
This series of regressions provides the following insights into the impact of VCs on IPOs’ 
long-term operating performance. First of all, VCs seem to exhibit a positive influence on 
firms’ pre-IPO profitability, given the ROE of VC-backed IPOs are higher and faster 
growing than the non-VC-backed IPOs. However, this effect is reversed after IPO: VC-
backed IPOs exhibit great profitability losses compared with the non-VC-backed IPOs. VC 
reputation does not significantly affect this fall in the profitability of VC-backed IPOs in 
the long-run. Such conclusions lead to the rejection of VC’s screening, monitoring and 
value-adding functions. Meanwhile, the lack of significance of measurements of VC 
reputation also leads to the rejection of studies which suggest significantly negative impact 
of VCs, i.e., Adverse selection and Grandstanding hypothesis.  
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The failure to identify a significant relationship between the VC reputation and IPO 
operating performance can be attributed to several reasons. It is commonly acknowledged 
that VCs focus mostly in the firms with high growth rates and high risks. In the first few 
years after IPO, the VC-backed firms require a larger proportion of assets/capital inputs 
than other IPOs particularly in the stage of the new product development. What is more, 
the new developed products might need years to be recognized by the public before they 
truly become successful and bring substantial returns to the company. In this case, the first 
three years after IPO are not long enough to witness the effective impact of VC reputation. 
This scenario may induce the VC-backed IPOs to display inferior operating performance 
to the non-VC-backed IPOs in the first few post-IPO years. However, if the more reputable 
VCs have more experience to monitor the IPO firms as well as providing value-added 
service, it is also likely that a proportion of VC-backed IPOs will exhibit superior 
performance than the non-VC-backed IPOs.  
The lack of any positive impact of VC reputation on performance might be because of 
the measurement problem. Primarily, when using the ROE to evaluate the profitability of a 
company, the main profit indicator is the net profit. One of the biggest defects of net profit 
is that it can easily be influenced by factors apart from the profit from principal operations, 
such as profit/loss from other operations, investment income/loss, subsidy income, and 
income tax, etc. Any of these additional factors can be used as a channel to inflate profits. 
This conjuncture is line with the window-dressing hypothesis (Dechow and Douglas, 2000). 
In the years before IPO, firms’ profits might be inflated, and their performance might be 
improved in an effort to appear to be more attractive. 
 
4.6.3 The Impact of Boards (H4 and H5) 
From the series of regressions, VC reputation appears to have no significant impact on 
long-run operating performance, but it may be that the impact varies across different boards. 
Table 4.23 reports the cross-sectional regressions of VC ranking and the changes in ROE1 
and ROE2 between the year -1 to +3 carried out by boards. The first group is the IPOs listed 
on the Main board, and the second group is the IPOs listed on the SME and ChiNext boards. 
In accordance with the results based on the full sample, Table 4.23 reveals that the level of 
VC reputation exhibits no significant impact on either board regardless of which metric is 
used. Table 4.24 and Table 4.
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measurements of VC reputation. Again, they suggest that the level of VC reputation 
exhibits no significant impact on operating performance, with one exception. 
The age of VC is found to show weakly significant impact. In Table 4.24, on the Main 
board, IPOs backed by older VCs are found to exhibit 8.033 percentage point lower ROE1 
than the non-VC-backed IPOs, although it is only significant at 10% level. While VCs exert 
no significant impact on the ChiNext and SME boards. When replacing ROE1 with ROE2, 
the VC age again appears to have negative effects on the operating performance of IPOs 
on the main board and positive effects on the operating performance of IPOs on the SME 
and ChiNext boards (at the 10% level).  
The results are reported here as a matter of record but are not sufficiently enough to 
generate any firm conclusions, particularly when being taken together with the results from 
the other reputation metrics. 
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Table 4.23 VC Ranking and Operating Performance by Boards 
 
ROE1  ROE2 
Main Other Main Other  Main Other Main Other 
Top-20 -2.709 -0.368    -2.807 -0.140   
 (0.399) (0.744)    (0.394) (0.898)   
Non-Top-20 1.789 -0.093    0.807 -0.354   
 (0.574) (0.917)    (0.805) (0.680)   
Top-50   -2.709 -0.620    -2.807 -0.092 
   (0.399) (0.556)    (0.394) (0.928) 
Non-Top-50   1.789 0.109    0.807 -0.254 
   (0.574) (0.906)    (0.805) (0.775) 
IPO Age 2.298 1.574 2.298 1.561  2.801 1.720 2.801 1.715 
 (0.12) (0.003)*** (0.12) (0.003)***  (0.057)* (0.001)*** (0.057)* (0.001)*** 
Underpricing 4.465 1.595 4.465 1.587  3.816 1.371 3.816 1.368 
 (0.088)* (0.004)*** (0.088)* (0.004)***  (0.154) (0.011)** (0.154) (0.011)** 
Proceeds 1.046 -3.393 1.046 -3.39  0.757 -3.473 0.757 -3.464 
 (0.391) (0.000)*** (0.391) (0.000)***  (0.544) (0.000)*** (0.544) (0.000)*** 
SOE 14.75 5.333 14.75 5.370  15.87 4.150 15.87 4.147 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech 0.366 -2.849 0.366 -2.828  2.345 -2.691 2.345 -2.682 
 (0.916) (0.000)*** (0.916) (0.000)***  (0.509) (0.000)*** (0.509) (0.000)*** 
_cons -56.94 0.42 -56.94 0.475  -57.89 1.234 -57.89 1.165 
 (0.010)*** (0.963) (0.010)*** (0.959)  (0.010)*** (0.889) (0.010)*** (0.895) 
Adj-R2 0.2863 0.1108 0.2863 0.1112  0.2479 0.0997 0.2749 0.0995 
N. 108 905 108 905  109 894 109 894 
In Table 4.23, Top 20 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year. Changes in ROE1/ROE2 are the difference between year (+3) and year (-1); ‘Other’ refers to 
IPOs listed on SME and ChiNext boards; Numbers in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.24 Alternative Reputation Measurements and ROE1 by Boards 
 VC IPO MS1 VC IPO MS2 VC Age VC IPO Number VC Size 
 Main Other Main Other Main Other Main Other Main Other 
High -2.445 -0.897 -2.933 -1.138 -8.033 1.567 -2.654 -1.525 -2.073 0.242 
 (0.479) (0.496) (0.392) (0.386) (0.096)* (0.220) (0.596) (0.276) (0.578) (0.854) 
Low 0.974 0.026 1.357 0.100 1.991 -0.825 -0.043 0.067 2.101 -0.374 
 (0.749) (0.975) (0.656) (0.906) (0.479) (0.333) (0.987) (0.936) (0.506) (0.660) 
           
IPO Age 2.429 1.541 2.451 1.532 2.434 1.561 2.182 1.590 2.149 1.572 
 (0.106) (0.004)*** (0.101) (0.004)*** (0.096)* (0.003)*** (0.142) (0.003)*** (0.144) (0.003)*** 
Underpricing 4.278 1.610 4.168 1.601 5.144 1.629 4.163 1.578 4.393 1.597 
 (0.103) (0.004)*** (0.112) (0.004)*** (0.050)** (0.003)*** (0.119) (0.005)*** (0.098)* (0.004)*** 
Proceeds 1.057 -3.385 1.129 -3.386 1.490 -3.486 0.788 -3.376 0.807 -3.407 
 (0.390) (0.000)*** (0.359) (0.000)*** (0.230) (0.000)*** (0.522) (0.000)*** (0.510) (0.000)*** 
SOE 14.88 5.349 14.63 5.350 15.51 5.083 14.75 5.388 15.27 5.319 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech 0.620 -2.855 0.477 -2.852 0.961 -2.997 0.635 -2.811 0.360 -2.851 
 (0.858) (0.000)*** (0.890) (0.000)*** (0.778) (0.000)*** (0.855) (0.000)*** (0.917) (0.000)*** 
           
_cons -58.09 0.574 -58.94 0.662 -64.63 1.638 -52.66 0.114 -53.39 0.606 
 (0.010)*** (0.950) (0.008)*** (0.942) (0.004)*** (0.858) (0.018)** (0.990) (0.016)** (0.947) 
Adj-R2 0.2816 0.1112 0.2849 0.1116 0.3015 0.1140 0.2778 0.1120 0.2832 0.1110 
N. 108 905 108 905 108 905 108 905 108 905 
In Table 4.24, for each reputation measurement, the High is defined as the first largest 25% of the Lead VC in each fiscal year. Changes in ROE1 the difference 
between year (+3) and year (-1); ‘Other’ refers to IPOs listed on SME and ChiNext boards; Numbers in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote the significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.25 Alternative Reputation Measurements and ROE2 by Boards 
 VC IPO MS1 VC IPO MS2 VC Age VC IPO Number VC Size 
 Main Other Main Other Main Other Main Other Main Other 
High -2.283 -0.556 -2.368 -0.426 -8.921 2.088 -1.024 -0.544 -2.403 0.873 
 (0.519) (0.661) (0.507) (0.738) (0.071)* (0.093)* (0.842) (0.690) (0.530) (0.493) 
Low -0.067 -0.078 -0.042 -0.118 1.050 -0.986 -0.970 -0.184 0.893 -0.544 
 (0.983) (0.924) (0.989) (0.885) (0.716) (0.230) (0.727) (0.820) (0.783) (0.509) 
           
IPO Age 2.867 1.692 2.851 1.699 2.990 1.676 2.729 1.713 2.668 1.700 
 (0.055)* (0.001)*** (0.055)* (0.001)*** (0.040)** (0.001)*** (0.065)* (0.001)*** (0.068)* (0.001)*** 
Underpricing 3.684 1.371 3.650 1.364 4.450 1.434 3.763 1.357 3.695 1.370 
 (0.171) (0.011)** (0.175) (0.012)** (0.096)* (0.008)*** (0.168) (0.012)** -0.174 (0.011)** 
Proceeds 0.740 -3.456 0.752 -3.462 1.222 -3.554 0.626 -3.457 0.526 -3.474 
 (0.557) (0.000)*** (0.551) (0.000)*** (0.336) (0.000)*** (0.619) (0.000)*** -0.675 (0.000)*** 
SOE 15.94 4.181 15.81 4.172 16.60 3.760 15.83 4.184 16.28 4.079 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech 2.551 -2.672 2.347 -2.676 2.916 -2.835 2.569 -2.661 2.316 -2.668 
 (0.472) (0.000)*** (0.511) (0.000)*** (0.405) (0.000)*** (0.470) (0.000)*** -0.515 (0.000)*** 
           
_cons -58.17 1.250 -58.07 1.262 -66.06 2.562 -55.65 1.121 -54.38 1.411 
 (0.011)** (0.888) (0.011)** (0.887) (0.004)*** (0.772) (0.014)** (0.899) (0.016)** (0.873) 
Adj-R2 0.2708 0.0996 0.2718 0.0995 0.2933 0.1075 0.2685 0.0996 0.2720 0.1008 
N. 109 894 109 894 109 894 109 894 109 894 
In Table 4.25, for each reputation measurement, the High is defined as the first largest 25% of the Lead VC in each fiscal year. Changes in ROE2 is the difference 
between year (+3) and year (-1); ‘Other’ refers to IPOs listed on SME and ChiNext boards; Numbers in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote the significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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4.7 Conclusions 
According to the analysis in the sub-sections 4.5 and 4.6, VC reputation is found to exert 
no significant impact on long-run operating performance of China A share IPO firms. The 
results presented in sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 show that VC reputation does exert a 
significant positive impact on the stock market performance (measured by BHARs). Such 
mixed findings about VC’s function may be explained in several ways. 
Firstly, the stock market performance reflects the value of the listed firms in the 
expectations of investors about the prospects of the IPO firm in the future. According to 
the Certification function, the presence of a VC can efficiently reduce the information 
asymmetry between IPO firms and the outsiders. VCs are able to select more qualified 
firms. Table 4.4 appears consistent with these two theories. The comparisons between 
characteristics of IPO firms demonstrate that VC-backed IPOs have significantly larger size 
and are older than the non-VC-backed IPOs. Moreover, they benefit from significantly less 
uncertainty during the process of IPO as they exhibit lower gaps and underpricing levels. 
Therefore, IPOs funded by VCs have been labelled as high quality and high potential firms 
which have large growth possibilities in the future to investors. As investors build up 
confidence and positive expectations, the VC-backed IPOs are more likely to show 
favourable stock price performance in the post-IPO period. 
Secondly, IPO operating performance is measured here using ROE, a ratio based on 
accounting numbers. These data reflect recent past performance (e.g. earnings over the last 
12 months) and so have limited ability to reflect forward-looking expectations. This is a 
particular issue for recent IPOs since some, particularly in the high-tech sector, may not 
currently be making notable profits. However, these IPOs may still be viewed positively 
by investors if it is believed that their long-term prospects are healthy. As a result, a 
discrepancy appears when company share price performance and earnings performance 
over one, two or three years following the IPO date. 
Thirdly, there is the possibility that net profit used in ROE may be problematic as a 
measure of operating performance. VC reputation appears to play a mixed role on China A 
share IPO firms. It exerts a significant and positive role in improving the post-IPO stock 
market returns. However, VC reputation seems to have no influencing power on the post-
IPO ROE after three years of issuing.  
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Chapter 5 
Robustness Checks and Measurements of  
VC reputation 
This chapter begins by examining the robustness of the findings in the prior chapter, taking 
into account the selection bias of VCs. The results of the Heckman two-step model reiterate 
the prior findings on the impact of both VC-backing and VC reputation on the long-run 
post-IPO stock market performance. Next, this chapter further explores how the various 
proxies for VC reputation are related to each other and which characteristics affect the 
Zero2IPO ranking of VCs. VCs with higher IPO market shares, more IPOs, and larger 
capital size are more likely to have higher rankings whereas age is not an influential factor. 
Furthermore, occupying more seats on the board and engaging in more syndication 
investments also contribute to higher rankings. In contrast, VCs’ pre-IPO shareholdings 
and serving durations in the IPO firms do not seem to influence their rankings. Additionally, 
VCs with foreign ownership tend to rank more highly while state-owned VCs do not. 
 
5.1 Robustness Checks 
From the analysis in Chapter 4, VCs are found to have a significant positive impact on IPO 
firms’ long-run stock market performance, and there is some limited evidence that the 
impact is stronger if VCs are more reputable, based on the size of the slope coefficients28. 
                                                             
28 Un-tabulated statistic tests reveal no significant difference between high and low reputation VCs at the 0.10 level, 
however.  
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In this section, supplementary tests are conducted to check the robustness of the earlier 
results and the consistency of the VC reputation measurements.  
5.1.1 Models 
The results from the previous analysis will be re-examined taking account of the selection 
bias problem. To be more specific, VC investments are not randomly assigned. On the one 
hand, prior to an investment, VCs conduct elaborate due diligence and analyses among 
dozens of applicants, and only a few private firms will be chosen (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan 
and Stromberg, 2003; Lee and Wahal, 2004). What is more, the amount of cash flow 
allocated in each chosen firm depends greatly on the VC’s expectations regarding the 
method of exit, i.e. IPO or M&A. VCs may choose more qualified firms as investees ex 
ante, which then means that VC-backed IPOs are highly likely to have a better performance 
during the post investment period. 
On the other hand, only firms that are capable of taking advantage of VCs are willing to 
seek funding opportunities from VCs. Generally, as reputable VCs have more experienced 
in nurturing venture firms, very promising venture firms with great growth potential also 
prefer to choose reputable VCs to achieve their development goals. Meanwhile, higher 
quality private venture firms are more able to balance the trade-off between receiving 
benefits and giving up part of their control rights to VCs. This is because more reputable 
VCs are more likely to ask for seats on the board of directors in addition to equity stakes. 
Consequently, it is possible that an endogeneity problem may exist here. For example, 
as shown in Table 3.3, 89% of VC-backed IPOs choose to list on the ChiNext and SME 
boards, and both are described as smaller scale boards. Given the potential endogeneity 
choice between VCs and IPO firms, it may be that the parameters obtained earlier when 
estimating the impact of VCs on the IPO performance are biased. To address such concerns, 
the Heckman Two-step selection procedure will be applied here. 
Heckman two-step selection model 
As proposed by Heckman (1979), this model is built to address the concerns of the selection 
bias. The first step is to estimate the probability of VCs making investments in the private 
venture firms. This step uses a Probit model where the dependent variable is a binary 
variable, i.e. the dummy variable, VC-backed, denoting whether the IPO firms are VC-
backed. This step reflects the characteristics of IPO firms that are likely to influence the 
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choice of VC investments. The second-step regression includes the Inverse Mill’s Ratio 
(IMR) calculated from the first-step model as an additional explanatory variable to correct 
the selection bias when estimating the effects of VC reputation on the IPO long-run stock 
market performance. In summary, the models are: 
First Step (Probit regression): !"	(%&	'()*+,- = /) = 12 + 14	56789:;<= + 	1	>= + 	?=                        (5.1) 
Second step (OLS regression): @A	!+"B= = 	C2 +	C4	DE	FG;H<I= 	+	CJ	KLM= +	C>= + N=                                    (5.2) @A	!+"B= = 	C2 +	C4	DE	M<O= 	+ 	CJ	KLM= + 		C>= + N=                                                  (5.3) @A	!+"B= = 	C2 	+ 	C4	P9Qℎ= +	CJ	S7T= 	+		CU	KLM= 	+	C>= + N=	                       (5.4) 
 %&	'()*+,- is a dummy variable. It is equal to one if the IPO 9 is backed by VC and equal 
to zero if it is not. 	56789:;<=  denotes the the cumulative number of IPO firms in the 
province where the IPO 9 is located one year prior to the firm being listed. >=	is a set of 
control variables which are used in previous models, including the age of the IPO firm, 
underpricing, IPO proceeds, IPO firm’s state ownership, and whether it is a high-tech firm.. 
The logic of including 	56789:;<= is as follows. Firstly, it not only reveals the supply 
and demand of VC investments but is also independent of IPO firms’ post-issue 
performance. Under a special transition economy where the legal system is not well-
established, local governments are responsible for screening and selecting qualified firms 
to go public in their region/province, as well as regulating the quota of IPOs (Du and Xu, 
2009; Guo, et al., 2015). Usually the quota of IPOs in the coming year is predictable by 
referring to the numbers in the past years. VCs are more likely to place extra emphasis on 
firms located in the area with high IPO quotas in the recent years, which will enhance the 
chance of getting portfolio firms listed. 
In addition, the number of listed firms is highly related to the development of economic 
innovation and high-tech industries in each area. As is conductive to the development of 
innovative enterprises, a large proportion of IPO firms assemble in the regions that have 
followed progressive economic transition policies. VCs by virtue of their preference for 
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high-tech deals are more willing to expand the investments in such regions because of 
higher expected valuations. 
In the second step regressions, KLM=  refers to the inverse Mill’s ratio of IPO 9. The 
control variables remain the same as in the first step. Equation 5.2 pertains to Model 3.1, 
which estimates how the IPO firms’ performance differs by the inclusion of VC 
investments. Equation 5.3 pertains to Model 3.2, aiming at estimating whether the VC 
reputation exerts any significant impact on IPO firms’ long-run performance. Equation 5.4 
pertains to Model 3.3, and examine whether the impact of VCs differs with the level of 
VC’s reputation. 
 
Modified Heckman two-step Model 
An alternative method is also employed to control for selection bias as proposed by 
Heckman and Robb (1985) and Wooldridge (2002). First of all, the same first step 
regression (Probit) is regressed as discussed above. However, instead of calculating the 
inverse Mill’s ratio, the predicted value of the dependent variable (the VC backed is a 
binary variable) of the first step regression is calculated, which is expressed as %&'()*+,V . 
This variable is used to predict the probability of VC’s selection: the likelihood that a VC 
would invest the firm. Then, similar to the inverse Mill’s ratio, predicted value %&'()*+,V  
is applied in the second-step regression. In this way, the relationship between VC reputation 
and IPOs’ long-run performance are estimated with the correction of the selection-bias 
problem. The regression models of the second step are then expressed as: 
 
Second step (OLS regression): 
@A	!+"B= = 	C2 +	C4	DE	FG;H<I= 	+ 	CJ	DEFG;H<IWV +	C>= + N=                               (5.5) 
@A	!+"B= = 	C2 +	C4	DE	M<O= 	+ 	CJ	DEFG;H<IWV + 		C>= + N=                                     (5.6) 
@A	!+"B= = 	C2 	+ 	C4	P9Qℎ= +	CJ	S7T= 	+		CU	DEFG;H<IWV 	+	C>= +N=                    (5.7) 
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5.1.2 Results 
VC and IPO Performance 
Table 5.1 reports the results of using the Heckman Selection model to estimate the impact 
of VCs on IPO firms’ long-run performance. Column (1) reports the results of the first-step 
regression of Model 5.1, where the cumulative number of IPO firms in the province where 
the IPO firm (in our sample) is located one year prior to the IPO year is introduced as one 
of the variables that could impact VC’s choice. A positive significant slope for this variable 
indicates that VC investors are indeed sensitive to cumulative numbers of listed firms in an 
area/province. They are more likely to invest in firms located in an area with a high 
frequency of listed firms. Furthermore, all other control variables are statistically 
significant, indicating that VC-backed IPOs are older, can raise more capital at the time of 
IPO, and have lower underpricing. Whether firms are high-tech and state-owned also has a 
significant impact on the investment behaviour of VCs. The specification of the selection 
step is important since all the control variables in the predictive model of VC-backing are 
significant. 
According to the results of the selection equation, the IMR is calculated and %&'()*+,V  
is estimated. Columns (2) and (3) report the results of Models 5.2 and 5.5, estimating the 
impact of VCs in the OLS framework. In both regressions, VC-backed IPOs continue to 
exhibit significantly superior long-run market returns. On average, VC-backed IPOs appear 
to enjoy around 13.8 percent higher BHAR36 than the non-VC-backed IPOs. Such results 
are very close to the results obtained in Table 4.3 where the selection bias has not been 
controlled29. However, the IMR and %&'()*+,V  are not significant at all, suggesting the 
selection bias may not be a big issue in the estimations here. In other words, the regression 
results specify that VC’s choice of their portfolio firms displays little selection bias. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29 VC-backed are found to show 14 percent higher BHAR36 relative to the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
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Table 5.1 Heckman 2-step on Impact of VC (Table 4.3) 
 1st Step  2nd Step 
 VC-backed  BHAR36 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
Province# 0.001    
 (0.029)**    
     
IMR   -0.236  
   (0.600)  %&'()*+,V     0.679 
    (0.397) 
     
VC-backed   0.137 0.138 
   (0.011)** (0.010)*** 
Ln (IPO Age) 0.150  0.018 0.032 
 (0.005)***  (0.758) (0.584) 
Underpricing -0.108  -0.053 -0.060 
 (0.063)*  (0.276) (0.243) 
Ln(Proceeds) 0.118  0.019 0.030 
 (0.017)**  (0.706) (0.529) 
SOE 0.194  -0.205 -0.190 
 (0.034)**  (0.008)*** (0.015)** 
High-tech 0.203  0.169 0.190 
 (0.011)**  (0.046)** (0.026)** 
     
_cons -2.910  -0.695 -0.438 
 (0.000)***  (0.285) (0.733) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.0242    
Adj-R2   0.042 0.042 
N 1,086  1,086 1,086 
In Table 5.1, the Province# is the cumulative numbers of IPO firms in the province where 
the IPO firm is located one year prior to the firms get listed; IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio; %&'()*+,V  is the estimated value of VC-backed variable from the first-step regression; 
values in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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VC Reputation and IPO Performance 
The above analysis shows that the positive impact of VC-backing on IPO firms’ long-run 
performance remains statistically unaltered. The next step is to re-examine whether the 
results for VC reputation, reported in Chapter 5, also remain robust after correcting for 
selection bias. The logic of using Models 5.3 and 5.6 is as follows. For this re-examination, 
it will be assumed that the selection of VCs with high and low reputation is based on the 
same factors. Therefore, it is rational to use the inverse Mills ratio or predicted VC 
investment probabilities derived from first-step (Model 5.1) to control for selection bias in 
the estimation of impact of VC reputation. 
The regression results of Models 5.3 and 5.6 are presented together in Table 5.2. Similar 
to Table 4.4, the models are applied on the sub-sample of VC-backed IPOs. The two 
methods yield consistent results: VC reputation seems to play no significant role in 
distinguishing differences in long-run returns among VC-backed IPOs as none of the 
reputation proxies is significant. Furthermore, the IMR and %&'()*+,V  also exhibit no 
significant slopes, and this further verifies that selection bias is not a big issue in the 
estimations here. The coefficients of the control variables are not listed in this table as they 
remain qualitatively unchanged relative to those reported in Table 4.4.  
The same models are then replicated on the full sample of IPOs (i.e., including IPOs not 
backed by VCs) and the results are reported in Table 5.3. Again, the two models yield 
similar results to the earlier results shown in Table 4.5. All but two of the VC reputation 
measurements (VC Age and VC Size) exhibit a positive relation with the long-run 
performance. This means that compared to non-VC-backed IPOs, older VCs and larger-
size VCs are more likely to be associated with better superior IPO performance. The 
coefficients of the control variables are not listed as their sign and significance are 
unchanged. The statistically insignificant results of inverse Mills ratio and estimated VC-
backed variables again reveal that selection bias is not a big concern for this study. 
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Table 5.2 Heckman 2-step on the Impact of VC Reputation on VC-backed IPOs (Table 4.4)  
 Inverse Mill’s Ratio  !"#$%&'()  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Top-20 0.038        0.035       
 (0.658)        (0.683)       
Top-50  0.011        0.008      
  (0.892)        (0.928)      
VC Age   -0.028        -0.027     
   (0.632)        (0.638)     
VC IPO#    0.003        0.003    
    (0.641)        (0.653)    
VC MS1     -0.831        -0.846   
     (0.204)        (0.196)   
VC MS2      -0.857        -0.870  
      (0.164)        (0.158)  
VC Size       -0.010        -0.010 
       (0.451)        (0.453) 
IMR -0.770 -0.802 -0.797 -0.785 -0.887 -0.893 -0.693         
 (0.270) (0.252) (0.252) (0.257) (0.201) (0.198) (0.325)         !"#$%&'()          1.574 1.633 1.607 1.599 1.778 1.785 1.384 
         (0.193) (0.178) (0.183) (0.183) (0.139) (0.137) (0.258) 
                
Control Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 450 450 446 450 449 449 434  450 450 446 450 449 449 434 
Adj-R2 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.019  0.024 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.028 0.019 
In Table 5.2, Models 5.3 and 5.6 are examined based on the 450 VC-backed IPOs sub-sample. The IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio; *+,-./01) 	is the estimated value 
of VC-backed variable from the first-step regression; values in the brackets are the p-values; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.3 Heckman 2-step on the Impact of VC Reputation on the Full sample IPOs (Table 4.5)  
 Inverse Mill’s Ratio  !"#$%&'()  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VC Age 0.018      0.018     
 (0.012)**      (0.013)**     
VC IPO#  0.008      0.008    
  (0.119)      (0.127)    
VC MS1   -0.188      -0.209   
   (0.763)      (0.738)   
VC MS2    -0.370      -0.389  
    (0.532)      (0.511)  
VC Size     0.012      0.012 
     (0.025)**      (0.026)** 
            
IMR -0.223 -0.251 -0.315 -0.327 -0.195       
 (0.622) (0.580) (0.487) (0.471) (0.668)       !"#$%&'()        0.653 0.707 0.830 0.851 0.594 
       (0.418) (0.380) (0.304) (0.292) (0.464) 
            
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,082 1,086 1,085 1,085 1,070  1,082 1,086 1,085 1,085 1,070 
Adj-R2 0.042 0.038 0.036 0.036 0.040  0.042 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.040 
In Table 5.3, Models 5.3 and 5.6 are examined based on the full sample IPOs. The IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio; 	*+,-./01)  is the estimated value of VC-backed variable from the first-step regression; values in the brackets are the p-values of coefficients. The control 
variables included are Age of IPO firm, underpricing, IPO proceeds, a dummy for state ownership, and a dummy for high-tech.  *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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High & Low Reputation and IPO Performance 
This section examines the impact of VC reputation (i.e. high and low) after the correction 
for selection bias. The same selection equation is still used to model the likelihood of VCs 
making investments in private firms. As listed in Models 5.4 and 5.7, the IMR and the !"#$%&'()  calculated from the first-step probit regression will be added in the second-
step regression as an extra regressor to estimate the impact of the level of VC reputation on 
IPO firms’ long-run performance, respectively.  
In these two models, VCs are separated into two groups - high and low reputation. These 
two second-step regressions pertain to Model 4.3 estimated in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Table 5.4 
shows the results of the regressions, where VC reputation is measured by the annual 
Zero2IPO rankings: the ranking of Top 20/50 VCs is defined as VCs with high reputation 
and the rest are defined as VCs with low reputation. Column (1) uses the IMR to correct 
the VC selection bias. The results remain statistically consistent with Table 4.630. Relative 
to non-VC-backed IPOs, IPOs funded by Top 20 VCs outperform the IPOs funded by lower 
ranking VCs, albeit the difference is slight. More specifically, IPOs funded by Top 20 VCs 
enjoy 14.5 percentage points higher BHAR36 values, while the IPOs by remaining VCs 
with low reputation exhibit BHAR36 that are 13.7 percent higher than the non-VC-backed 
IPOs. However, un-tabulated tests reveal this difference between VC-backed IPOs to be 
insignificant at the 10% level. 
In Column (2) where Top 50 VCs are classified as VCs with high reputation, the impact 
of VC reputation is generally consistent with Column (1). Although the coefficient of Non-
Top-50 (0.141) is slightly higher than for Top-50 (0.138), this difference is not significant 
(un-tabulated). Compared to the results prior to the control of selection bias (in Table 4.7), 
the results here are still quite consistent.  
Uniform results are obtained from Columns (3) and (4) where !"#$%&'()  is used as the 
variable to control VC selection. Overall, such results indicate that getting rid of the 
selection bias, VCs exert a positive impact on post-IPO long-run performance, regardless 
of the level of VC reputation. The model is re-examined in regressions where VC reputation 
is measured by alternative proxies and the results are reported in Appendix A.4. 
 
                                                             
30 In Column (8) of Table 4.6, the coefficient of Top-20 is 0.149 which is significant at 10% level; the coefficient of non-
Top-20 is 0.137 which is significant at 5% level.  
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Table 5.4 VC Ranking and BHAR36 
 Inverse Mill’s Ratio  *+,-./01)  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Top-20 0.145   0.141  
 (0.063)*   (0.070)*  
Non-Top-20 0.137   0.136  
 (0.025)**   (0.025)**  
      
Top-50  0.138   0.134 
  (0.057)*   (0.064)* 
Non-Top-50  0.141   0.141 
  (0.027)**   (0.026)** 
      
IMR -0.229 -0.235    
 (0.612) (0.605)    *+,-./01)     0.668 0.681 
    (0.407) (0.400) 
      
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
_cons -0.452 -0.442  -0.698 -0.696 
 (0.725) (0.731)  (0.283) (0.285) 
Adj-R2 0.041 0.041  0.042 0.042 
N 1,086 1,086  1,086 1,086 
In Table 5.4, the second step OLS regression is based on the full sample IPOs. The IMR is the 
inverse Mill’s ratio;  !"#$%&'()  is the estimated value of VC-backed variable from the first-step 
regression; Values on the brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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VC reputation on different Boards 
From the previous analysis, the significant positive impact of VC-backing/VC reputation 
is found to be driven by the impact on the IPOs in the non-Main Board. This section 
estimates the robustness of such results controlling for selection bias. Models 5.4 and 5.7 
will be re-examined on the sub-samples, i.e. IPOs listed on the main board, and IPOs listed 
on the SME and ChiNext boards. Again the Zero2IPO ranking is used as the reputation 
measurement and the Top 20/50 VCs are classed as reputable VCs. Table 5.5 reports the 
results, which are highly consistent with early studies, while the results of control variables 
are statistically unchanged from Table 4.11. 
VC-backed IPOs on the ChiNext and SME boards still exhibit significantly superior 
performance. The coefficients suggest that more reputable VCs appear to produce greater 
performance improvements to the IPOs than the less reputable VCs, when compared to the 
non-VC-backed IPOs. Again, this difference is not statistically significant at the 10% level 
(un-tabulated). In contrast, on the main board, neither the higher reputation VCs nor the 
lower reputation VCs have any significant impact on the long-run performance (compared 
to non-VC-backed IPOs). 
 In addition, Models 5.4 and 5.7 are also re-examined by using the alternative reputation 
measurements. However, none of the five proxies reveal any significant impact of VC 
reputation. The coefficients of IMR and 	!"#$%&'()  remain insignificant31, suggesting 
that the selection bias is not a big issue in this research.32  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
31 These results are shown in Appendix A.5. 
32 Sorenson (2007) and Nahata (2008) claim that VC’s choices of investment projects are associated with selection bias 
and that it is necessary to correct this when estimating the impact of VC on IPOs. 
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Table 5.5 VC Ranking and BHAR36 by Boards (Table 4.11) 
 Inverse Mill’s Ratio  !"#$%&'()  
 Ranking 20  Ranking 50  Ranking 20  Ranking 50 
 Main Other  Main Other  Main Other  Main Other 
Top-20 -0.120 0.188     -0.116 0.186    
 (0.556) (0.027)**     (0.569) (0.029)**    
Non-Top-20 0.015 0.144     0.015 0.144    
 (0.939) (0.028)**     (0.938) (0.028)**    
Top-50    -0.120 0.171     -0.116 0.169 
    (0.556) (0.030)**     (0.569) (0.032)** 
Non-Top-50    0.015 0.150     0.015 0.150 
    (0.939) (0.028)**     (0.938) (0.028)** 
            
IMR 1.057 -0.227  1.057 -0.237       
 (0.464) (0.637)  (0.464) (0.623)       !"#$%&'()        -1.388 0.569  -1.388 0.588 
       (0.578) (0.508)  (0.578) (0.495) 
            
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 155 931  155 931  155 931  155 931 
Adj-R2 0.050 0.038  0.050 0.038  0.049 0.038  0.049 0.038 
Table 5.5 reports the results of Models 5.4 and 5.7. VC reputation is measured by the Top 20/50 ranking of VC. The IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio; *+,-./01)  
is the estimated value of VC-backed variable from the first-step regression; values in the brackets are the p-values of coefficients; The control variables included 
are Age of IPO firm, underpricing, IPO proceeds, dummy variable for SOE, and dummy variable for high-tech; *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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5.2 Measurements of VC Reputation  
Chapter 5 has examined the effects of VC reputation on IPO firms’ long-term stock market 
performance and operating performance, using a variety of proxies for VC reputation. In 
general, these yield consistent results across the various regressions. However, the proxy 
measurements of reputation are far from being perfectly correlated. 
Among the five types of proxies for reputation, VC ranking is the most multi-faceted 
metric. Released by the Zero2IPO research group, it evaluates VC’s performance every 
fiscal year on the basis of a variety of aspects, including the Capital under Management, 
the Amount of Capital Raised, Investment, Exits, and the Comprehensive Returns33. This 
measure is used in Chapter 5 to construct the dummy variables Top-20 and Top-50. An 
advantage of using this metric as a proxy for reputation is that it captures the time-varying 
performance VCs on a year-by-year basis. Secondly, it is constructed from a range of 
individual indicators and thereby reflects a ‘composite’ of quality signals, which is likely 
to be more reliable than using any single-item indicator. The alternative proxies for VC 
reputation are:  
(1) VC’s IPO market share is calculated based on IPO proceeds and IPO market 
capitalization, respectively. The cumulative market share of a VC may reveal the 
VC’s control of the market, and whether it has a defensible competitive position in a 
certain period. 
(2) VC’s IPO number primarily illustrates a VC’s activity in the capital market and its 
popularity among entrepreneurial start-up firms. This variable differs from the current 
year’s IPO number (used in the Zero2IPO VC Ranking) as it counts the cumulative 
number of IPOs through the sample period. 
(3) VC Age reflects a VC’s survivorship across years of fierce competition and ever-
changing financial market conditions. 
(4) Registered capital measures a VC’s size in terms of the capital recorded at its starting 
point. A VC company with a substantial capital backing may be viewed as reliable 
                                                             
33 Table 4.5 lists the weights of each component that are involved to assess the ranking in each year across 2004 to 2012. 
The detailed explanation about this table and how the ranking is constructed has been explicitly shown in Section 4.1.3, 
Chapter 4.    
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and attractive in the market. As with the Zero2IPO metric, this measure too is unique 
to this study. 
Many prior studies have based their conclusions about VC reputation on using single-
item proxies. This thesis includes these for comparative purposes but prefers to focus on a 
market-based, real-world ranking system (Zero2IPO). Consequently, an intriguing question 
is whether these individual measurements are associated with the Zero2IPO ranking of VCs. 
Another issue is whether these single-item measurements are correlated to each other. 
5.2.1 Variables and Models 
In order to address the questions, a Probit model is applied separately to the two dummy 
variables Top 20 and Top 50. The explanatory variables are the other four measurements, 
along with a series of characteristics that are also suggested to be decisive to the evaluation 
of VC reputation. 
(1) Pre-IPO shareholdings. The VC’s pre-IPO equity holdings in the IPO firms could 
reveal the extent of a VC’s involvement with the firm, and its ability to provide capital 
to IPO firms (Barry et al., 1990). A VC that invests more is likely to be more engaged 
in the funded firms and provide more screening and monitoring functions. The 
variable is constructed by summing up each VC’s total pre-IPO equity holdings in all 
the IPO firms it has funded in each year.  
(2) Board Member.  This variable measures the total number of seats that the VC occupies 
on the board of directors of the IPO firm. It has been commonly acknowledged that 
VC’s most significant specialty as an equity investor is to add value, in addition to 
providing money to the invested companies (Bygrave and Timmons 1992). 
Rosenstein et al. (1993) propose that probably the most distinctive capability to 
discriminate a VC from the rivals is the quality of its value-adding ability, since being 
able to provide money is not a conclusive advantage among VCs. This variable is 
calculated by summing up all the board seats a VC occupies in all the funded IPO 
firms every year.  
(3) VC Syndication. This variable refers to the VC’s ability to conduct syndication 
investment with other VCs. Specifically, this variable is calculated by summing up 
the frequency of syndication investments a VC undergoes in each fiscal year. 
Syndication investment is commonplace since VCs can share information on the 
funded entrepreneurial companies with each other. It is also an ideal approach to 
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improve the efficiency of risk sharing, and increase portfolio diversification, thereby 
improving the quality of project selections. It further guarantees VC’s investment 
scale and augments the successful exit possibility of the project investment 
(Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007). In fact, through syndication investment VCs 
ensure their share-holdings in the portfolio companies (Lerner, 1994). Tian (2012) 
states that VC syndication plays an essential role in value creation for the invested 
firms. It improves IPO firms’ innovation productivity (measured by the number of 
patents) as syndication investments allow VCs to invest more capital in younger firms, 
in earlier rounds, and at earlier stages. Besides, the syndicated VC-backed IPOs also 
enjoy better operating performance, as measured by ROA, EBITDA/assets34, and 
profit margin.  
Reputable VCs rarely syndicate with less experienced VCs in the first round of 
investment (Manigart et al., 2002). Also, because of their better assessment skills, 
more reputable VCs prefer to rely on their own judgement, rather than that of the 
lower level VCs (Tykvová, 2007). This would suggest that more reputable VCs are 
associated with low syndication frequencies, relative to the less reputable VCs.  
However, alternative arguments exist. Start-up companies are keen for more funds 
and the value-added benefits brought by the VC investors (Walz and Cumming, 2004). 
Less reputable VCs may also join the reputable VCs in the same project.  The 
reputable VCs prefer to involve  other VCs (usually less reputable VCs) to ensure the 
amount of equities at hand at the start-up stage, when not fearing the sharing of 
information with less reputable VCs (Lerner, 1994). From this perspective, more 
reputable VCs would be linked with more syndication investments.  
New and less reputable VCs are keen to build relationships with the established VCs. 
According to Podolny (2001), participation in syndicated investments is crucial if they 
want to access more valuable information and investment opportunities. It has been 
widely suggested that through syndication, VCs gradually form their networks, along 
with improving their performance (Hochberg et al., 2007; Sorensen, 2007; Pollock et 
al., 2015). Thus, less reputable VCs could be associated with more syndication 
investments. The VC Syndication variable will be used here to examine the potential 
                                                             
34 EBITDA is short for Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
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impact of syndication investment on the level of VC reputation, i.e., the VC Ranking 
of Top 20/50 in this case. 
 
(4)  VC Ownership. Two dummy variables are used here to differentiate the ownership 
structures of VCs: (1) VC-SS, which equals 1 if the VC is funded by government, and 
equals 0 otherwise; and (2) VC-Foreign, which equals 1 for the foreign VCs or VCs 
that have been funded by an overseas investment body, and equals 0 otherwise.   
In order to encourage the development of high-tech and emerging industries, 
governments worldwide have supported the development of the VC industry through 
various policies. Although state-owned VC-backed projects may benefit in certain 
ways (e.g. better in moderating the information asymmetry), their initial incentives 
can be negatively affected by the government’s political targets (Lerner, 1999). 
Numerous studies have documented a negative association between government 
ownership and VCs’ performance35. 
China’s IPO market is known to be dominated by the government, and this also 
applies to the VC industry. VCs who have close connections with governments may 
enjoy certain advantages and benefits. Francis et al. (2009) and Du (2011) suggest 
that IPO companies backed by state-owned VCs exhibit shorter approval processes 
since they are much easier to be endorsed by security regulation institutions. However, 
the state-owned VCs may also suffer from excessive administrative controls from 
government. By intervening in VC’s activities, equities, and operational decisions, 
the political controls imposed could undermine VC investors’ efficiency and 
performance significantly. As a result, the governmental background might also be 
detrimental to VC’s reputation. 
An increasing number of foreign VCs have expanded their business and conducted 
many IPOs in China.  Given that many foreign VCs are very experienced, their 
reputation might be higher than that for domestic VCs in China.  
 
                                                             
35 For instance, VC’s successful exit rate, patents number applied and the value-added to enterprises. 
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(5) VC Investment Durations. The length of VCs’ involvement is a potential indicator of 
reputation. Barry et al. (1990), Espenlaub et al. (1999), and Arthurs and Busenitz 
(2006) all adopt this variable to proxy for VCs’ experience. It is possible that more 
experienced and reputable VCs are more likely to serve in a company for longer 
periods. Gompers (1996) finds that less reputable VCs tend to serve in the firm for a 
shorter period than reputable VCs. 
In addition, given that VCs provide value-added services via involvement in corporate 
management and governance in the invested firms, the longer the VCs serve, the 
greater the effort that VCs will likely devote to the project (Fitza et al., 2009). Hence, 
the duration of VC investments measures VCs’ capability of management and 
corporate governance. Many well-known VCs are famous for their management 
experience.  
Thirdly, VCs usually provide multiple-rounds of investments in the invested firms. 
The longer the VCs’ investment duration is, the more subsequent funding they will 
invest. This could reflect that the VCs are able to raise sufficient capital to support 
their investments, which is proposed to be a significant predictor for reputation 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Atanasov et al., 2012). It is therefore reasonable to 
suggest that reputable VCs are associated with longer investment durations. This 
variable is calculated by summing up the years each VC serves in the IPO firms before 
the IPO date.  
Table 5.6 reports the summary of the characteristics of 800 VCs that have funded A share 
IPO firms during 2004 and 2012. A VC that has more than one IPO in year t will only be 
listed one time, but it will be listed again in different years. The maximum value of the five 
variables listed above for VCs will then be recorded if they have multiple IPOs in year t. 
Table 5.6 demonstrates that the average age of VCs at the invested firms’ IPO date is 5.7 
years, with the youngest age being 10 months and the oldest being around 51 years. On 
average, VCs conduct two IPOs in each year, and the maximum number of IPOs a VC 
conducts is 48 across the sample years36. No VC occupies more than three board seats in 
an invested IPO firm. It may be noted that on average each VC has one syndication IPO 
investment in each year, and the largest being 16 IPOs (un-tabulated). 
                                                             
36 This is the Shenzhen Capital Group (SCGC).  
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Table 5.7 illustrates the same characteristics as in Table 4.7, relating to Top 20 VCs. 
The table shows that higher ranked VCs are older and control more capital. Both their IPO 
numbers and IPO market shares are around three times greater than the lower ranked VCs. 
Moreover, Top 20 VCs are more likely to hold more equity stakes and occupy more board 
seats in the invested IPO firms. Likewise, the frequency of syndication investments of the 
Top 20 VCs is also higher. Table 5.8 reports the characteristics of Top 50 VCs and the non-
Top-50 VCs and it shows very similar results to Table 5.7. Data from these two tables 
indicates that higher ranked VCs are more active in the IPO market, and they are also more 
involved in the invested IPO firms. 
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Table 5.6 Characteristics of VCs 
 N. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Top 20 800 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Top 50 800 0.30 0.46 0 1 
VC Age 790 2,066 1,849 319 18,497 
VC IPO# 801 2.05 3.02 1 48 
VC MS1, % 800 1.75 4.92 0.05 65.48 
VC MS2, % 800 1.84 6.14 0.02 82.11 
VC Size 774 429.29 1,579.23 0 35,000 
VC Ownership 782 0.34 0.64 0 2 
      
Max VC Shareholding (Pre-IPO), % 800 7.33 6.69 0.07 46.87 
Max VC Shareholding (After-IPO), % 800 5.43 5.01 0 35.11 
Max VC Board Members 800 0.74 0.90 0 3 
Max VC Syndications 800 0.82 0.39 0 1 
Max VC Duration 800 3.84 1.99 1 13 
Table 5.6 is the summary of characteristics of 801 VCs. VC Age is measured by days; VC size is measured by Million yuan; The VC Ownership 
is used to illustrate the ownerships of VC investors, and VCs are separated to three groups: the privately-owned VC, state-owned VC, and foreign 
VC, which equals to 0, 1, and 2, respectively; VC duration is measured by years. 
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Table 5.7 Characteristics of Top-20 and Non-Top-20 VCs 
 Top-20  Non-Top-20 
 N. Mean S.D. Min Max  N. Mean S.D. Min Max 
VC Age 181 2,285 2,492 367 18,497  609 2,001 1,606 319 9,995 
VC IPO# 183 3.44 5.64 1 48  617 1.63 1.31 1 12 
VC MS1, % 183 3.09 7.49 0.08 65.48  617 1.35 3.76 0.05 51.63 
VC MS2, % 183 3.45 9.88 0.04 82.11  617 1.37 4.37 0.02 59.56 
VC Size 171 945.62 3,006.68 0 35,000  603 282.87 743.18 0 10,000 
            
Max VC Shareholding (Pre-IPO),% 183 8.23 6.71 0.45 46.87  617 7.06 6.67 0.07 36.06 
Max VC Shareholding (Post-IPO),% 183 6.24 5.15 0.34 35.11  617 5.20 4.94 0 27.05 
Max VC Board Members 183 0.98 1.01 0 3  617 0.66 0.85 0 3 
Max VC Syndications 183 0.85 0.36 0 1  617 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Max VC Duration 184 3.91 2.17 1 12  616 3.82 1.94 1 13 
Table 5.7 is the summary of characteristics of the 801 VCs. Each VC will only be shown once in each year even if it has funded more than one IPOs, but 
it can be shown repeatedly if it has funded IPOs in different years. For VCs have multiple IPOs in a single year, we list the maximum data of VC’s 
shareholdings before IPO and after IPO, number of VC on boards, and the frequency of VC syndication. VC Age is measured by days; VC size is measured 
by Million yuan. 
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Table 5.8 Characteristics of Top-20 and Non-Top-20 VCs 
 Top-50  Non-Top-50 
 N. Mean S.D. Min Max  N. Mean S.D. Min Max 
VC Age 238 2,437 2,420 367 18,497  552 1,907 1,514 319 9,995 
VC IPO # 241 3.19 5 1 48  559 1.56 1.23 1 12 
VC MS1, % 241 2.85 6.70 0.08 65.48  559 1.28 3.82 0.05 51.63 
VC MS2, % 241 3.10 8.75 0.05 82.11  559 1.30 4.48 0.01 59.56 
VC Size 228 812.19 2,625.46 0 35,000  546 269.40 761.12 0 10,000 
            
Max VC Shareholding (Pre-IPO),% 241 8.25 6.91 0.34 46.87  559 6.93 6.57 0.07 36.06 
Max VC Shareholding (Post-IPO),% 241 6.21 5.26 0.26 35.11  559 5.10 4.86 0 27.05 
Max VC Board Members 241 0.95 1.02 0 3  559 0.64 0.83 0 3 
Max VC Syndications 241 0.85 0.36 0 1  559 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Max VC Duration 242 3.96 2.18 1 12  558 3.79 1.90 1 13 
Table 5.8 is the summary of characteristics of all the 801 VCs: each VC will only be shown once in each year even if it has funded more than one IPOs, but it 
can be shown repeatedly if it has funded IPOs in different years. For VCs have multiple IPOs in a single year, there are two ways to compute VC’s shareholdings 
before IPO and after IPO, number of VC on boards, and the frequency of VC syndication. We sum them up or take the maximum value. Besides, VC Age is 
measured by days; VC size is measured by Million yuan. 
 
 
- 157 - 
 
 
5.2.2 Results 
(1) Correlations 
Table 5.9 presents the Spearman correlation matrix among the proxies for VC reputation 
and the potential decisive variables. In general, there are significant positive relationships 
between the seven reputation measurements. Firstly, the correlation between the Top 20/50 
and the other measurements ranges between 0.2 and 0.3. The only exception is VC’s IPO 
quantity which is correlated with the VC’s IPO market share at a relatively higher level 
(0.506/0.443). This is very plausible since the number of IPOs is one of the two components 
to calculate VC’s IPO market share. VC age is not significantly correlated with VC 
rankings. More surprisingly, it is negatively associated with Top 20 (-0.019). Given that 
VC age has been used as a proxy for reputation in earlier studies, this result demonstrates 
that different choice of reputation measure may potentially generate mixed findings across 
different studies. The correlation between reputation proxies and the variables are generally 
positive, though the values of the correlation are low. 
(2) Regression Results 
In this sub-section, Probit regressions are used to examine whether the traditional reputation 
proxies can predict the Zero2IPO VC ranking. For the sake of reliability of the regression, 
the VC sample is chosen from 2007 to 2012 as the number of VC-backed IPOs is too few 
in the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Therefore, the sample includes all the VCs that have 
implemented IPOs every year from 2007 to 2012. In order to obtain reliable conclusions, 
Top 20 and Top 50 are used separately as dependent variables. 
Table 5.10 reports the results of the Probit regression on the ranking of Top 20 VCs, 
where the year fixed effect is controlled. The regressions generate expected results for VC’s 
IPO market share, VC’s IPO quantity, and VC size and they all display significant and 
positive associations with the VC Ranking, while VC Age is not significantly correlated 
with the VC ranking when regressed individually. However, when all the reputation proxies 
are involved in the regression (shown in the last two columns) VC Age generates a strong 
and significant negative impact on the VC Ranking. 
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Table 5.9 Correlation matrix of VC Reputation Measurements 
 Top20 Top50 Age IPO# MS1 MS2 VC Size Ownership Shares Seats Syn. Dur. 
Top20 1            
Top50 0.830* 1           
VC Age -0.019 0.048 1          
VC IPO# 0.222* 0.266* 0.277* 1         
VC MS1 0.233* 0.295* 0.184* 0.506* 1        
VC MS2 0.231* 0.285* 0.150* 0.443* 0.967* 1       
VC Size 0.217* 0.266* 0.066 0.330* 0.216* 0.190* 1      
Ownership 0.070* 0.096* 0.246* -0.084* 0.056 0.057 -0.008 1     
Pre-IPO, % 0.187* 0.187* 0.215* 0.268* 0.092* 0.051 0.256* 0.230* 1    
Board Seats 0.152* 0.153* 0.242* 0.246* 0.094* 0.067 0.162* 0.140* 0.468* 1   
Syndication 0.175* 0.189* -0.044 0.434* 0.158* 0.144* 0.176* -0.157* 0.086* 0.100* 1  
Duration 0.091* 0.104* 0.398* 0.458* 0.276* 0.255* 0.184* 0.039 0.469* 0.365* 0.319* 1 
In Table 5.9, for VCs have multiple IPOs in a single year, we sum up each VC’s shareholdings before IPO and after IPO, number of VC on boards, 
and the frequency of VC syndication. Besides, VC Age is measured by days; VC size is measured by Million yuan.* denotes the significance of at least 
5% level. 
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While the majority of the single-item variables exhibit a positive association with Top 
20 and Top 50, VC age exhibits a negative association with VC ranking. Around half of the 
Top 20 VCs are relatively old, having operated for more than 15 years and some for more 
than 50 years. However, the majority of lower ranked VCs were established the same year 
as, or one year prior to, their invested firms’ IPO date. Given that VC Age fails to generate 
a significant correlation with the Zero2IPO ranking when tested individually, it appears 
that the advantage/impact cumulated by age seems to be neglected in Zero2IPO’s process 
of ranking VCs.  
Another reason for the confusing empirical impact of VC age might be due to the VC 
sample used here. In fact, hundreds of VC firms are involved when composing the rankings, 
but this study only selects those VCs who had accomplished A share IPOs during the test 
period. These VCs may already be the outstanding VCs who are able to support firms to 
IPO. Hence, it is possible that the chosen VCs’ age happens to present a reversed, or non-
significant association with ranking.   
Aside from the relationships between reputation proxies, there are also some interesting 
findings from other variables. To begin with, across the seven regressions, the number of 
board seats that VCs occupy is positively correlated with the VCs’ ranking. This implies 
that it may be easier for more reputable VCs to become a board member in the IPO firms 
and to be more engaged in the operational and management activities. Meanwhile, VCs’ 
syndication investment frequency is also significantly and positively related to their 
rankings. The more reputable VCs are able to initiate or attract many other VCs to jointly 
invest in a project. 
Next, the foreign ownership of VCs is also found to be favourable to their rankings. This 
might be because those foreign VCs who are active in China’s capital market are already 
highly respected and have built up a widespread reputation. It is understood that those 
foreign VCs have more experience in managing IPO firms. In contrast to foreign ownership, 
state ownership is found to exert no significant influence on VC’s ranking. Such a finding 
may indicate that state-owned VCs neither get back-door benefits from their connection 
with government, nor are they damaged by the interference from government (or that these 
two effects cancel out). Similarly, the length of time that the VC serves in IPO firms 
(Duration) is also not a significant determinant of VC’s ranking, and neither are the VC’s 
shareholdings prior to IPO.  
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Table 5.11 reports the results of Probit regressions on the ranking of Top 50 VCs, where 
the year fixed effect is also controlled. These results show consistent impacts from VC’s 
IPO market share, VC’s IPO quantity, and VC Size, which are positively and significantly 
associated with the Zero2IPO ranking of VCs. VC age exhibits no significant association 
with the ranking, whether examined individually or jointly with other reputation 
measurements. This verifies that the age is not a crucial factor when the performance-based 
VC’s ranking is composed by Zero2IPO. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined some robustness checks on the selection bias of VC. Two 
methods are applied. The first one is that Heck-man two step, where in the first step the 
number of IPO firms in the province the IPO is located is include as a variable to explain 
the probability of VC-backing. Then the inverse mill’s ratio is included in the second stage 
to control the selection bias. The second method is to include the predicted the probability 
of VC backing as in the second stage. All results are robust. This chapter also examines 
whether there are any correlations between the traditional VC reputation measurements and 
the Zero2IPO ranking which is exclusive to China. Overall, the market share of the VC, the 
total IPO quantities of VC, and the size of the VC are all significant factors that could 
influence the Zero2IPO ranking of the VC. The more IPOs a VC accomplishes, the larger 
is the VC’s market share, and the more capital it controls, the more likely it is ranked as 
Top 20/50 VCs. However, mixed results are found for the age of VC, i.e., it is more likely 
for younger VCs to be ranked in the Top 20 VCs, while it seems to be independent of the 
ranking of Top 50. Some young VCs may be able to achieve excellent performance because 
they are actually managed by their parent VCs.  
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     Table 5.10 Association between Top-20 and the Other Reputation Measurements 
 Top 20 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VC MS1 26.94     19.94  
 (0.000)***     (0.002)***  
VC MS2  23.10     17.95 
  (0.000)***     (0.001)*** 
VC IPO#   0.175   0.104 0.120 
   (0.000)***   (0.036)** (0.010)*** 
VC Age    -0.108  -0.348 -0.352 
    (0.197)  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
VC Size     0.068 0.065 0.068 
     (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** 
        
Pre-IPO, % 1.990 1.986 0.955 0.844 0.988 1.365 1.344 
 (0.037)** (0.037)** (0.293) (0.352) (0.297) (0.170) (0.177) 
Board Seats 0.104 0.102 0.100 0.111 0.102 0.113 0.109 
 (0.063)* (0.066)* (0.071)* (0.043)** (0.064)* (0.049)** (0.057)* 
Syndication 0.410 0.432 0.295 0.395 0.412 0.259 0.256 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.021)** (0.022)** 
VC-SS -0.178 -0.191 -0.230 -0.153 -0.232 -0.042 -0.058 
 (0.318) (0.282) (0.194) (0.394) (0.195) (0.828) (0.766) 
VC-Foreign 0.530 0.540 0.856 0.849 0.983 0.948 0.974 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Duration -0.043 -0.037 -0.032 0.018 -0.060 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.103) (0.158) (0.212) (0.478) (0.809) (0.627) (0.712) 
        
D Years. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. 
_cons -1.195 -1.216 -1.148 -0.320 -1.666 0.635 0.610 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.592) (0.000)*** (0.372) (0.388) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1735 0.1690 0.1496 0.1275 0.1373 0.1922 0.1927 
N. 754 754 754 744 728 727 727 
Table 5.10 reports the results of logit regression of Top 20 VC ranking on the other reputation measurements 
and a series of control variables based on a sample of 800 VCs; D Years. refers to the control of years’ effect 
using a series of dummy variables. Values in the brackets are p-values of coefficients; ***, **,* denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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    Table 5.11 Association between Top-50 and the other Reputation Measurements 
 Top 50 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VC MS1 15.25     7.479  
 (0.000)***     (0.054)*  
VC MS2  13.29     7.215 
  (0.000)***     (0.047)* 
VC IPO#   0.208   0.167 0.171 
   (0.000)***   (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
VC Age    0.045  -0.137 -0.135 
    (0.562)  (0.116) (0.120) 
VC Size     0.084 0.077 0.079 
     (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
        
Pre-IPO, % 1.443 1.392 0.657 0.828 0.739 0.783 0.769 
 (0.097)* (0.108) (0.442) (0.328) (0.404) (0.389) (0.398) 
Board Seats 0.109 0.111 0.107 0.118 0.114 0.108 0.108 
 (0.044)** (0.040)** (0.050)* (0.028)** (0.034)** (0.052)* (0.053)* 
Syndication 0.475 0.479 0.351 0.497 0.480 0.335 0.332 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
VC-SS 0.115 0.110 0.060 0.055 0.055 0.129 0.124 
 (0.450) (0.471) (0.698) (0.724) (0.726) (0.437) (0.455) 
VC-Foreign 0.526 0.542 0.807 0.707 0.996 1.000 1.013 
 (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Duration -0.028 -0.024 -0.038 -0.007 -0.004 -0.032 -0.031 
 (0.239) (0.311) (0.117) (0.779) (0.855) (0.225) (0.239) 
        
D Years. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. 
_cons -3.348 -3.161 -1.772 -2.194 -2.646 -2.224 -2.223 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.017)** (0.015)** 
Pseudo-R2 0.1406 0.1367 0.1440 0.1118 0.1294 0.1627 0.1631 
N. 777 777 777 767 751 750 750 
Table 5.11 reports the results of logit regression of Top 50 VC ranking on the conventional reputation 
measurements and a series of control variables based on a sample of 800 VCs; D Years. refers to the control 
of years’ effect using a series of dummy variables. Values in the brackets are p-values of coefficients; ***, 
**,* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This is the final chapter of this thesis and the main aim of this chapter is to summarise the 
findings obtained from earlier chapters, regarding the role of Venture Capital (VC) and VC 
Reputation in the long-run post-issue performance of China IPOs. This chapter will then 
discuss how the findings contribute to policies for the improvement of long-term IPO 
performance, and the development of the VC industry in China. The final section points 
out some limitations to this thesis and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
6.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis examines whether the long-run performance of China IPOs is impacted by VC-
backing and VC reputation. This study also examines a much wider range of reputation 
metrics than is commonly employed in prior studies, including a real-world, market driven 
metric devised by Zero2IPO. Furthermore, this study also examines whether the impact of 
VC-backing and VC reputation varies across the different trading boards in China. For the 
implementation of the research questions, in this thesis two types of long-run post-IPO 
performance are examined - the stock market performance and the operating performance. 
In general, China IPOs are found to exhibit significant underperformance in the long-run. 
VCs are found to have a significant and positive impact on the long-run post-issue stock 
market performance, but make no significant difference to the operating performance.  
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6.1.1 VC and Long-run Post-IPO Performance 
This research examines 1095 China A share IPOs from 2004 to 2012. The long-run 
performance is investigated for a period up to 36 months after the issuing, where the first 
month starts from the month following the issue. The BHARs are adopted to measure the 
post-IPO stock market performance, and each IPO in the sample is matched with a specific 
benchmark portfolio according to the size and/or M/B ratio. China IPOs are found to exhibit 
significant underperformance during the long-run post-issue period regardless of which 
benchmark is used.  
In addition, the VC-backed IPOs are found to significantly outperform non-VC-backed 
IPOs. In particular, the 36-month returns of VC-backed IPOs outperform the benchmark 
by 7.04%, while the non-VC-backed IPOs underperform the benchmark by -10.59% (see 
Table 4.2). This indicates that the long-run underperformance of China IPOs is dominated 
by the non-VC-backed IPOs. Multivariate regressions reaffirm that VC-backed IPOs 
significantly outperform the non-VC-backed IPOs. Such findings add evidence to VC’s 
Certification and Monitoring functions as proposed in a number of prior studies (e.g. 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Doukas and Gonenc, 2005; Hochberg, 2011; Lahr and Mina, 
2012). 
This thesis also finds that China IPOs experience serious long-run profit deterioration, 
where ROE is used as the main measure for operating performance. However, VCs exert 
no significant impact on the long-run operating performance of IPOs, which is consistent 
with Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Rosa (2003). 
 
6.1.2 VC reputation and Long-Run performance 
This thesis focuses on the examination of the impact of VC reputation on IPOs’ long-run 
performance and further examines whether the impact of VC reputation varies with the 
level of reputation. In particular, a series of metrics are created to measure the reputation 
of VCs, including the VC Zero2IPO Ranking, VC’s IPO market share, VC’s IPO quantity, 
VC age, and VC size.  
Compared to the non-VC-backed IPOs, both more reputable VC-backed IPOs and less 
reputable VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly superior stock market performance, and 
this pattern is mainly driven by IPOs listed on the SME and ChiNext Boards, which are 
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mainly smaller-sized firms. However, this study also finds that the reputation of VCs 
appears to have no significant impact on the long-run stock market performance of VC-
backed IPOs, which is consistent with Wang and Wang (2011), and Otchere and Vong 
(2016). 
One explanation for this finding is that several different effects may be operating in 
different directions, resulting in an insignificant difference between high and low reputation 
VCs. Firstly, for more reputable VCs, the Value-adding hypothesis would suggest a 
positive influence on post-IPO long-run stock market performance, since higher reputation 
VCs can provide better screening, monitoring and value-added services. 
Less reputable VCs also exhibit a positive impact on IPO long-run stock market 
performance would suggest that the Grandstanding hypothesis could not be supported. 
Such results would also suggest that less experienced VCs may have better understanding 
of the invested firms (Butler and Goktan, 2013) as they get more involved with the firms 
(closer distance and longer interaction period). Therefore, if both effects are operating 
together this might explain why VC reputation exhibits no significant impact on the VC-
backed IPOs’ long-run stock market performance at the aggregate level. 
The analysis of long-run operating performance exhibits different results for VC-
backing, and VC reputation remains insignificant. In addition, neither the more reputable 
VC-backed nor the less reputable VC-backed IPOs exhibit significantly different long-run 
operating performance from that of non-VC-backed IPOs. What is more, the analysis by 
boards also fails to capture any significant impact of VC reputation on the long-run 
operating performance.  
The mixed findings regarding the impact of VC-backing on share price performance and 
operating performance may be explained in several ways. Firstly, the stock market 
performance reflects the expectations of investors about the prospects of the IPO firms in 
the future. IPO operating performance is measured here using ROE, a ratio based on 
accounting numbers. These data reflect recent past performance (e.g. earnings over the last 
12 months) and thereby have limited ability to reflect forward-looking expectations. This 
is a particular issue for recent IPOs since some, particularly in the high-tech sector, may 
not immediately be making notable profits after IPO. However, these IPOs may still be 
viewed positively by investors if it is believed that their long-term prospects are healthy. 
As a result, a discrepancy appears when measuring stock market performance and earnings 
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performance over one, two or three years following the IPO date. There is also the 
possibility that net profit used in ROE may be problematic as a measure of operating 
performance. 
6.1.3 Additional Findings 
In addition to the above findings, this thesis also finds that the effects of VC-backing/VC 
reputation are robust after correcting for the potential self-selection bias between VC and 
IPO firms with the Heckman two-step model. 
In particular, this thesis further assesses whether the traditional single-item measures for 
VC reputation have any association with the market-based and multi-item reputation 
measure published by Zero2IPO. The empirical analyses suggest that higher IPO market 
share, more IPO numbers, and larger size are contributing factors to obtaining higher VC 
rankings, but VC age appears to be less important. More reputable VCs tend to occupy 
more board seats, but their shareholdings and investment durations appear to have no 
influence on the ranking. Furthermore, higher ranked VCs appear to get involved in more 
syndication investments, indicating that networks are another important factor to VC 
reputation. However, compared to the state-owned VCs, foreign VCs are more likely to be 
ranked highly in China. This may be because most of the foreign VCs who have business 
in China are the world’s leading VCs, and they are more experienced and famous than 
almost all of the domestic VCs. 
 
6.2 Policy Implications 
VCs are identified as risk-based investments which concentrate on unestablished firms with 
high risk and high growth potential. A number of studies based on the US market have 
documented that VCs have a significant impact on the IPOs’ long-run performance 
(although findings are often mixed). This thesis finds that VCs in China do not play the 
exact same role as in the US market. This sub-section sheds light on the differences and 
then tries to bring forward some China-specific suggestions to the market participants. 
(1) Broaden the Sources of Funding  
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Unlike the VCs in western markets, the source of funds in China is still quite limited37. 
Currently, state-owned VCs are still the leading capital providers for VC investments. 
Pension funds and most investment banks/financial institutions are prohibited from 
investing in VC-related businesses. However, state-owned VCs can suffer from serious 
problems, such as limitations on capital scales, less effective incentive-constraint 
mechanisms, and imperfect risk control systems. This thesis finds that state-owned IPOs 
significantly underperform privately-owned IPOs. Although VCs have no significant 
impact on IPO long-run operating performance, they exert a significantly negative impact 
on the state-owned IPOs’ long-run operating performance (un-tabulated). Nevertheless, 
promoting the diversification of capital sources might help to mitigate this problem. 
To encourage diversification, support from government is crucial. However, the support 
should focus on offering a positive policy orientation. With positive guidance from 
government, VC investments can be made more appealing to other capital sources, thereby 
weakening the leading role of government capital. For example, China could formulate and 
implement policies that could encourage the private capital to enter the business of venture 
capital. The government could also work on raising the citizens’ awareness of venture 
investment, thereby encouraging individuals, institutions, and public investors to invest in 
venture firms through VC institutions. 
(2) Provide More Favourable Tax Policies  
The serious profitability deterioration of VC-backed IPO firms might be improved by 
promoting preferential tax policies towards the VC investments. For example, although a 
few preferential tax policies exist for venture firms, there are no specific policies for the 
investors in VCs or VC firms. Meanwhile, existing set of policies for venture firms can also 
be improved. For instance, one of the most important preferential tax policies for high-tech 
firms is that the new-established high-tech firms can be exempted from income tax for two 
years from the year of production. This policy has very limited effect because many venture 
firms report little (or no) profit in the early years. Since VCs usually serve in the invested 
firms for several years before exit, the two year exemption is very likely to expire before 
the VC-backed firm conducts an IPO.  
                                                             
37 In the developed markets, pension funds, charities, and various financial institutions are the main capital providers of 
VCs. 
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Therefore, to promote the development of VC investments and IPO performance, China 
should focus on making more effective tax policies. For example, policies can be made to 
increase the tax allowance of VC firms and VC capital providers, thereby cutting down VC 
investors’ transaction costs and investment risks, increasing their investment returns, and 
raising their willingness to invest money in VC firms. Meanwhile, more preferential tax 
policies for high-tech firms, if possible for VC-backed IPOs, could be made through 
reducing the tax rates, extending the tax relief ranges, and formulating more flexible and 
diverse tax incentives. 
(3) Encourage more Involvements from VCs 
In western markets, VCs prefer to invest at the early stage, and then nurture the funded 
firms for a number of years before they exit. However, VCs in China appear to place more 
weight on late stage investments, especially in the expansion projects. Generally, the 
average investment duration of a VC before IPO is 3.8 years, and a large number of VCs 
starts the investment only one year before IPO. Indeed the late-stage investment reduces 
risks and improves the likelihood of successful exits for VCs. However, it also generates 
less rewards. For IPO firms, short duration of VC investment means that VCs’ cultivation 
of IPO firms is lessened, and their impact on the operational structure and corporate 
governance is reduced. This might be a possible reason for the lack of a long-lasting impact 
of VCs in China.  
To ensure venture firms make the best use of VC investments and exhibit better long-
run performance, this thesis proposes that the government could promulgate some 
preferential policies to encourage VCs to select early-stage projects. Building a complete 
system of risk evaluation for the venture investments will also be beneficial to the reduction 
of uncertainty in the early-stage investments. Moreover, for early stage investments, more 
syndications between VCs should be encouraged because this is effective for the sharing 
of risk and information. In addition, the government could also provide some supports to 
the newly-established VCs, thereby enhancing the performance of IPOs backed by these 
VCs.  
(4) Seek for the Most Suitable VC  
This thesis finds that the effects of VCs are more applicable to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises which are more likely to in need of VCs’ advanced management skills and 
value-added services, in addition to money. In contrast, in the large-scale and established 
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firms which have already built a well-organized operational structure, the additional 
benefits VCs provide appear to be less effective. For example, the reputable VCs usually 
request more control rights from the IPO firms. This might lead to more severe conflicts of 
interests when the IPO firm is established, which might end up with lower performance. 
Hence, it is suggested that firms should take their ownership into consideration when 
seeking for funding.  
In addition, the analysis indicates that less reputable VCs also exert a positive impact on 
IPO performance relative to non-VC-backed IPOs. Even though VCs with higher 
reputation are older, more experienced, and have stronger financial backgrounds, their 
intensity of involvement in IPO firms is equivalent to that of less reputable VCs, e.g. 
shareholdings, number of board seats, and investment durations. This thesis proposes that 
venture firms should select the most suitable VCs which can provide the most appropriate 
value-added services to optimize the firms’ value, rather than chasing VC’s reputation 
blindly. For many small-scale start-ups which are not that attractive to these very 
prestigious VCs, a less reputable VC may perform at a similar level to the top VCs. 
Therefore, this thesis further advocates that it is not necessary to aim at the most reputable 
VCs when entrepreneurs are selecting VC firms.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
6.3.1 Limitations 
This section addresses several limitations which remain to be addressed in future studies. 
First of all, since this thesis fails to identify any significant effects from VC-backing/VC 
reputation on post-IPO operating performance, additional measurements for the operating 
performance can be employed to examine the robustness of these results. Alternatively, like 
the stock market performance, future studies may also construct a portfolio as a benchmark 
for each IPO when calculating the operating performance (e.g. the difference between the 
ROE of sample IPO and the average ROE of the benchmark portfolio).  
Secondly, this study examines the impact of VCs on the long-run post-IPO performance 
over three-years. However, the analysis does not control for the time that VCs completely 
38exit IPO firms. In fact, the post-IPO duration of VCs may be far less than three years . 
                                                             
38 Since 2009, the lock-up period has been shortened from 36 months to 12 months for a large number of VC and PE 
shareholders. 
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Consequently, the impact of VCs found in this thesis cannot distinguish between the impact 
when VCs are serving in the IPO firms, and the ex-post long-term impact after VCs leave. 
Therefore, to have a further understanding of the impact of VCs, studies could be designed 
with the information on when the VCs exit the IPO. 
Thirdly, owing to the lack of data availability, this thesis confronts several weaknesses 
in the measurement of VC reputation. The capital under management should be the most 
appropriate proxy for VC size, however it is replaced here by VCs’ registered capital. In 
fact, the capital managed by a VC firm could be far more than the registered capital, and it 
is a time-varying variable. Nonetheless, the registered capital only reflects the assets in the 
accounts when the firm was established, and thereby may generate misleading results 
regarding the impact of VCs’ financial strength on IPO long-run performance. Moreover, 
variables that could reflect VCs’ investment performance and profitability should also be 
employed as reputation measurements in future studies of VC reputation, e.g., the total 
amount of money VCs invested in IPO firms, VCs’ total investment rounds, the number of 
projects VCs invested, and VCs’ returns on investments. Additionally, two of the measures 
used here (VCs’ IPO market share and IPO quantity) are based only on the A share markets. 
Therefore, as the accessibility to richer data grows, future studies about VC reputation 
could be enriched by including data from the B share market as well.  
 
6.3.2 Future Research 
This thesis also leads to several recommendations to future academic researchers on the 
issue of VC reputation. To begin with, it may be better to use a multi-indicator variable to 
proxy for VC reputation as it could capture a more comprehensive impact of VC reputation. 
However, how many indicators and which particular indicators should be included still 
remain to be ascertained in future studies. Moreover, the impact of VCs might vary by the 
level of reputation. It is a potential are for future research. Another crucial question here is: 
what the boundary between high and low reputation is. That is, different cut-off points to 
differentiate high and low reputation may generate different results. In the future, a more 
solid method to define high and low reputation is an interesting question. Furthermore, 
neural networks are an econometric tool that is powerful to address bias and may be worthy 
investigating in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 The background of China Stock Market  
The stock market of China was established in the beginning of 1990s. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) was established on 19 Dec 1990 and followed by the 
establishment of Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) on 4 July 1991. There are three main 
types of trading markets in the mainland China Stock market:   
(1) Main Board market. The Main Board is located on both the SHSE and SZSE. This 
board is designed for the IPO of medium and large mature enterprises who have large-
scale capital and strong profitability. It imposes very strict listing requirements to issuers, 
such as the term of operation, equity size, profitability and minimum market values. The 
majority of the large-scale issuing IPOs are conducted on the Main Board.  
(2) Small and Medium Sized Board market (SME). Launched in 2004 on the SZSE, it 
was initiated to prepare for the establishment of the Second Board. It is one of the 
components of (but independent from) the Main Board. Listing requirements of SME are 
identical to the Main Board, whereas the distinct difference is that the IPO issue scales are 
usually smaller. Hence, the SME is dominated by the medium-scale IPO issuing from the 
fast-growing medium-sized mature enterprises.  
(3) ChiNext Board. This Nasdaq-type board was established on Oct 30 2009 on the SZSE, 
and it is also called the Second Board. It is framed for the IPO for high-tech enterprises 
and fast-growing small- and medium-sized enterprises. Listing requirements of this board 
are much looser than the Main Board. It is suitable for enterprises who demonstrate 
outstanding growth characteristics and are particularly strong in technology innovation 
activities. Nevertheless, these firms also exhibit high uncertainty in operating 
performance due to their relatively immature business patterns at the IPO time.  
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Shares traded on China stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) are categorised in two 
major types: A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are the common shares of mainland China-
based companies which are nominated and quoted in Chinese RMB. They constitute the 
majority of shares circulating on China stock market. The face value of B-shares is also 
nominated in RMB, but they are quoted in foreign currencies, i.e. B-shares on SHSE and 
SZSE are quoted in US dollars and HK dollars, respectively. 
 
Table A1.1 describes the cumulated number of listed companies and market 
capitalization of A shares across 1995 to 2012. The SHSE takes the leading role in China 
stock market in terms of market capitalization since the Main board is primarily based 
here and consists of large size firms. On average, SHSE contributes 70% of the entire A 
share market capitalization throughout the sample years which has always been at least 
two times more than the SZSE. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that numbers of listed companies 
on SHSE and SZSE, both of which exhibit an increasing tendency. In a long period from 
1995 to 2009, more companies were listed on the SHSE than on the SZSE. However, 
from 2010 the number of listed companies on SZSE exceeded the SHSE, and the gap 
becomes wider in the next 3 years. In 2009, it was 860 vs. 783, while in 2012 the number 
became 1,156 vs. 945. 
In 1995, there were 311 A share listed companies, with a market capitalization of 
333.783 billion yuan. 40% of the companies were listed on the SZSE but they only 
contributed to 26.71% of the total market capitalization. In 2000, the number of listed 
companies was increased by three times to 1,060, while the market capitalization 
illustrated a dramatic increase by 13 times to 4,780 billion yuan. After that, the Chinese 
stock market developed at a slow pace in the next few years. In 2005, the total number of 
listed companies slightly increased to 1,365, but the market capitalization reduced notably 
to 3,184 billion yuan. This retrogressive phenomenon was mainly because of the share-
split restructure reformation carried out by the China Securities Regulation Commission 
in 2005. This period is more likely to be the preparation stage for this reform1 (Hou et al., 
2012). 
From 2006, the number of listed firms experienced great growth. By the end of 2012, 
there were 2,101 listed companies in the entire market. The establishment of ChiNext 
board in 2009 was a key reason for the enormous growth of listed companies. The overall 
                                                             
1 A description of the reform process can be found from Appendix 1.3. 
- 173 - 
 
market capitalization peaked in 2007 (32,560.43 billion yuan) with 1,516 listed 
companies. As the market recover from the financial crisis occurred in 2008, the total 
market capitalization rebounded to above 25 billion in 2010. After a slight fluctuation, the 
total market capitalization turned out to be around 22 billion yuan at the end of 2012. 
Figure A1.1 demonstrates the cumulative distribution of the number of A share listed 
companies and the distribution of market capitalization of SHSE and SZSE across 1995 
to 2012. 
 
 
Table A1.1 Total Number and Market Capitalization of A share listed Firms  
 SHSE SZSE Total 
 N. Mkt Cap % N. Mkt Cap % N. Mkt Cap 
1995 184 244.645 73.29 127 89.138 26.71 311 333.783 
2000 559 2,674.725 55.96 501 2,105.293 44.04 1,060 4,780.018 
2005 829 2,287.703 71.83 536 896.975 28.17 1,365 3,184.678 
2006 835 7,135.887 80.25 582 1,756.455 19.75 1,417 8,892.341 
2007 852 26,931.556 82.71 664 5,628.874 17.29 1,516 32,560.430 
2008 851 9,757.032 80.43 725 2,373.506 19.57 1,576 12,130.539 
2009 860 18,444.196 76.37 783 5,706.174 23.63 1,643 24,150.370 
2010 881 17,923.954 69.76 985 7,769.488 30.24 1,866 25,693.442 
2011 919 14,851.884 71.64 1,101 5,878.413 28.36 2,020 20,730.297 
2012 945 15,829.442 71.86 1,156 6,199.969 28.14 2,101 22,029.411 
Table A1.1 shows the cumulative number and market capitalization of all A share firms listed 
on SHSE and SZSE in each year from 1995-2012. The market capitalization is in the unit of 
Billion Yuan. 
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Figure A1.1 Frequency of China A share Stocks and the Total Market Capitalization from 1995-2012.
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Table A1.2 Frequency of China A share IPOs 
Year SHSE SZSE Full 
1990 7 1 8 
1991 0 5 5 
1992 22 18 40 
1993 77 52 129 
1994 65 42 107 
1995 16 12 28 
1996 104 102 206 
1997 86 123 209 
1998 54 50 104 
1999 45 52 97 
2000 87 46 133 
2001 75 0 75 
2002 70 1 71 
2003 67 0 67 
2004 61 39 100 
2005 3 12 15 
2006 14 52 66 
2007 25 101 126 
2008 6 71 77 
2009 9 90 99 
2010 28 321 349 
2011 39 243 282 
2012 26 129 155 
Total 986 1,562 2,548 
Table A1.2 reports the number of A share IPOs listed on the China stock market 
from 1990 to 2012. The SHSE means the Shanghai stock exchange and the SZSE 
means the Shenzhen stock exchange.  (Figure 1.2) 
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A.2 VC Industry in China 
A.2.1 Capital Resource 
In China, the development of VCs is closely related to the support from government. In 
the US market, capital resources for VCs are quite diversified, e.g., the pension funds, 
donated funds from charity, financial institutions, industrial companies, wealthy family of 
individual, and etc. Unlike the US, the government serves as the dominating source of 
capital in China, especially in the early stage. Initially (1994-1998), government and 
financial institutions are the two main capital sources for VC firms in China. As 
illustrated in Table A2.1, government held more than half share of the total VC capital 
before 1996, since the majority of VCs were state-owned2. For instance, some of the 
outstanding government-backed VCs are: BVCC, East-Lake VC, and Shenzhen Capital 
Group3.  
As the VC industry developed, its capital resources become more and more diversified. 
More private capital was invested into the VC firms, as lots of large-scale enterprises had 
launched for VC investments, such as the CICC4. In 1999, the private capital sector 
surpassed the financial institutions to the second largest capital source for VCs. Moreover, 
such growing trend continued and since 2007 the private capital sector had replaced the 
government and been the largest source, despite of another fall back in 2009 and 2010. 
Besides, capital from individuals increased from barely any to as high as 18.9% from 
1994 to 2012, which had been the third largest capital source for VCs since 2008. 
The capital invested by financial institutions fell sharply from 21.9% to only 4% in 
2002, and then fluctuated around this level in the following years. Meanwhile, in the past 
20 years a number of foreign VCs, such as the Softbank, Goldman Sachs, and IDG5, were 
attracted to expand businesses in China. The proportion of foreign capital had once 
reached up to 35% (in 2002). However, with the increasing diversity of capital resources, 
the proportion decreased to around 5% since 2006. Figure A2.1 illustrates the distribution 
of capital resources in China for VCs during the years 1994 to 2012.  
                                                             
2  Those VCs were owned by the independent state-owned companies, universities, or directly owned by the 
governments. 
3 BVCC: Beijing Venture Capital Co., Ltd. Founded in 1998 and is jointly owned by Beijing Stated-owned Assets 
Management Corporation and other institutions; East-lake VC: Wuhan East-lake Innovation and Technology 
Investment Co., Ltd. Founded in 1999 by the governments of Hubei province and Wuhan City; Shenzhen Capital Group, 
founded in 1998 by the Shenzhen government. Now it has become the biggest and most famous VC in China. 
4 CICC: China International Capital Corporation Limited. In 1998, they announced to set-up seed capitals to provide 
VC funds to domestic high-tech industry in China.     
5  IDG: International Data Group (US), world’s biggest IT publication, research, development and VC company, 
established the “Pacific technology VC Funds” in 1998 and invested 20 million yuan to the “Jindie Software Company”.     
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Table A2.1 Capital Resources of VCs in China 
Panel A: Capital Resources of VCs from 1994 to 2003 
% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
State-owned 58.7 56.5 55.7 48.9 49.1 45.7 34.6 34.3 35 39 
Private 4.7 8.2 9.4 8.9 16.2 24.1 35.6 37.0 23 35 
FIs 36.2 34.9 34.4 29.9 23.6 22.0 23.0 21.9 4 6 
Foreign 0.4 0.4 0.5 11.7 10.2 6.4 4.3 4.1 35 17 
Others 0 0 0 0.6 0.9 1.8 2.5 2.7 3 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Panel B: Capital Resources of VCs from 2004 to 2012 
% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
State-owned 39 36 39 36 37 41.9 38.8 33.2 30.6 
Private 28 33 34 46 46.8 36.3 35.7 42.9 38.6 
FI 7 8 9 6 1.3 3.3 4.1 1.9 2.1 
Foreign 21 11 4 3 3.6 5.4 3.9 2.8 5.1 
Individual 3 3 5 6 6.9 10.1 14.9 13.7 18.9 
Others 3 9 9 3 4.3 2.9 2.5 5.5 4.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In Table A2.1, the State-owned includes the government and government institutions; Private capital 
includes the money from privately-held companies and listed companies; The FIs refer to financial 
institutions, including both bank and non-bank financial institutions; Foreign capital refers to the 
capital from overseas, including wholly foreign-owned enterprises and/or partnerships that have 
registered and operated in China, and the foreign institutions.  
 
 
Figure A2.1 Allocation of Capital Resources of VCs in China from 1994 to 2012. 
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A.2.2 Industry  
Industry distribution of China VC investments is dispersed. VCs tend to investigate a 
range of criteria when choosing new projects, e.g. innovation capability, market prospect, 
growth possibility and the quality of firm’s management team. Usually, the small- and 
medium-sized technological enterprises are the most preferred choice for VC investors. 
This is mainly because these firms have more efficient technology innovation process, 
which are more adaptive to the market fluctuations, thereby exhibiting higher growth 
rates. However, in recent years, VCs in China seemed to have dispensed their 
conventional investment preferences and have shifted their eyes to all the high-growth 
projects regardless of industry. 
Table A2.2 demonstrates the industry distribution between high-tech industries and 
non-high-tech industries of China VC investments from 2001 to 2012. Investments into 
high-tech projects declined steadily, whether measured in terms of projects numbers or 
the capital amount. Meanwhile, non-high-tech projects show a steady increase over time 
(see Figure A2.2). VCs shifted their investment preference mainly because numerous 
emerging industries started to show tremendous development potential, such as the 
industry in New Material, New Resources, Medicine and Healthcare. 
 
Table A2.2 Industry distributions of China VC Investments 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel A: Investment Projects (%) 
High-tech 87.4 85.8 73.1 76.7 78.3 67.9 65.5 63.2 67.7 67.0 53.4 55.3 
Non-High-
tech 12.6 14.2 26.9 23.3 21.7 32.1 34.5 36.8 32.3 33.0 46.6 44.7 
Panel B: Investment Amount (%) 
High-tech - - 79.8 67.7 79.5 62.2 51.1 55.2 52.3 52.4 44.9 47.6 
Non-High-
tech - - 20.2 32.3 20.5 37.8 48.9 44.8 47.7 47.6 55.1 52.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table A2.2 reports the allocation of China VC investments into the high-tech and non-high-tech industries 
from 2001 to 2012, in terms of quantities of projects and investment amounts. Information from the table 
are extracted from the “China VC Annual Report” from the year 2002 to 2013.  
 
 - 179 -   
 
 
Figure A2.2 Industry distributions of China VC Investments. The figure 
illustrates the distributions of China VC Investments in the high-tech and non-
high-tech industries from 2001 to 2012. 
 
 A.2.3 Stage 
The life cycle of venture firms can roughly be divided into five stages: the seed, start-up, 
expansion, mature and reconstruction. Demands for capital differ according to the stage. 
The earlier the stage is, the higher the risk is, but the higher the returns VC investors will 
obtain. Correspondingly, risks associated with expansion or mature projects are much 
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lower but are less likely to generate high returns. In fact, the returns of late stage projects 
are very close to the returns generated by traditional financing (Gompers, 1995).  
However, VCs’ investment timing in China venture firms differs notably when 
compared to the VC investments in western markets: VCs are more biased towards the 
late stage IPOs. Table A2.3 exhibits the percentage of VC investments stages in terms of 
both quantity and capital scale from 2001 to 2012. Unlike the US market, VCs in China 
focus more on late stage investment. Across these years, generally more than half of the 
VC-backed projects occurred in expansion and mature stages, which had occupied around 
70% of the total amount of money invested by VCs. Besides, the seed stage investments 
experienced a large increase from 2006 but fell back to the original level in 2011. The 
proportion of start-up stage projects fluctuated in a range between 20% and 30%, while 
the investment amounts had decreased from up to 30% to less than 20%. Figure A2.3 
shows the stages of VC investments in China by two bar charts. 
 
Table A2.3 Investment stages of VCs 
% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Panel A: Project Quantity of Investment 
Seed 11.6 16.0 13 15.8 15.4 37.4 26.6 19.3 32.2 19.9 9.7 12.3 
Start-up 30.5 28.1 19.3 20.6 30.1 21.3 18.9 30.2 20.3 27.1 22.7 28.7 
Expansion 49.7 44.1 49.5 47.9 41.0 30.0 36.6 34 35.2 40.9 48.3 45.0 
Mature 8.2 11.8 18.2 15.5 11.9 7.7 12.4 12.1 9.0 10.0 16.7 13.2 
Recon. - - - 0.3 1.6 3.6 5.4 4.4 3.4 2.2 2.6 0.8 
Panel B: Investment Amount 
Seed 14.5 9.2 5.3 5.0 5.2 30.2 12.7 9.4 19.9 10.2 4.3 6.6 
Start-up 28.5 30.3 16.9 13.5 20.0 11.5 8.9 19.0 12.8 17.4 14.8 19.3 
Expansion 48.8 46.3 37.5 49.3 46.8 39.4 38.2 38.5 45.0 49.2 55.0 52.0 
Mature 8.2 14.2 40.4 32.2 26.3 14.6 35.2 26.5 18.5 20.2 22.3 21.6 
Recon. - - - 0.0 1.7 4.3 5.0 6.6 3.7 3.0 3.6 0.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table A2.3 reports the investment stages of VC in China during 2001 and 2012. The Recon. Refers to the 
reconstruction stage. Information from the table asre extracted from the “China VC Annual Report” from 
the year 2002 to 2013. 
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Figure A2.3 Investment stages of VCs. This figure illustrates the distribution of VC 
Investment in different stages in China from 2001 to 2012, in terms of number of the 
projects and investment amount.  
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A.2.4 Exit 
The exit mechanism is an extremely important step within the VC investment system, 
since this is the time VCs transfer their investments from equities into capital/cash. Given 
the importance of this step, it is necessary to build and optimize an efficient exit 
mechanism for VCs. 
A VC firm usually establishes a fund with the money raised from investors. Each fund 
has a certain duration which could further be split into two periods: investment period and 
exit period. During the investment period, VCs invest in and cultivate promising projects 
in the name of the fund. However, VCs have to exit any investment during the exit period 
to cash out because they have to return the principal (as well as the agreed profits) to 
investors before the fund expires. 
There are 4 major channels for VCs to exit: IPO, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), 
Share repurchase agreement (Repo) and Clearance. Among them, IPO is the most ideal 
channel. VCs sell the shares they owned in the portfolio firms when the market value 
goes up drastically, therefore to gain huge returns. M&A is the second preferred choice 
for an exit. Although the rewards are not as huge as an IPO, it shortens the exit cycle and 
reduces the transaction costs a lot. What is more, the M&A allows the use of equity 
shares as a form of payment. Conventionally, for VCs, Repo is always considered as a 
plan-B, as it only can help VCs to guarantee the investment principal. The last option is 
Clearance, which is used when the investment fails: this option minimizes losses. 
Due to the variations of institutional background, VC’s patterns of exit channels vary 
across different countries. Table A2.4 and Figure A2.4 illustrate the distributions of exit 
channels of VCs in China from 2003 to 2012. In 2003 and before, M&A and Repo were 
the most prevailing ways to exit, and each of them accounted for around 40% of the exits. 
However, the IPO exit rate at that time was rather low: only 5.4%. In fact, before 2004, 
main board was the only available market for the trading of listed firms, and it required 
very strict and high standards for IPO, which could explain these figures.  
Once China had established the SME board in 2004, the IPO exit rate started to 
increase and in 2008 it reached 22.7%. With the establishment of the ChiNext board in 
2009, the IPO exit rate further peaked at nearly 30% in 2010 and held steady in 2011 and 
2012. In comparison, the M&A exit rate decreased sustainably from over 50% in 2004 to 
28.6% in 2010, and further declined to less than 20% in 2012. The trends of Repo exit 
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option have been less volatile, wavering around 30% throughout 2003 to 2011. Lastly, 
since 2004, the Clearance exit option had fallen in popularity by around half. 
 
Table A2.4 Weights of VC Exit Channels 
% Pre-2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
IPO 5.4 12.4 11.9 12.7 24.2 22.7 25.3 29.8 29.4 29.4 
M & A 40.4 55.3 44.4 28.4 29.0 23.2 33.0 28.6 30.0 18.9 
Repo 36.3 27.6 33.3 30.4 27.4 34.8 35.3 32.8 32.3 45.0 
Clearance 14.9 4.8 10.4 7.8 5.6 9.2 6.3 6.9 3.2 6.7 
Others 3.0 0.0 0.0 20.6 13.7 10.1 0.0 1.9 5.1 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
In Table A2.4, the M&A refers to Merge and Acquisitions; Repo refers to share 
repurchase/repurchase agreement. Resources of the table are from the: China VC Annual Report in 
the year of 2004 and 2013. 
 
 
 
Figure A2.4 Exit Channels of VCs from 2003 to 2012. 
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Table A2.5 VC Quantity, Gross Capital Raised and Investment Amount 
 Quantity 
Capital 
under 
management 
Investment 
Amount 
Cumulative 
investment 
projects 
Investment 
Intensity 
1985-1994 26 4.17 0.70 202 3.47 
1995 27 5.13 0.20 36 5.57 
1996 32 5.52 0.16 30 5.23 
1997 51 10.12 0.22 32 6.82 
1998 76 16.88 0.33 62 5.37 
1999 118 30.62 0.98 165 5.96 
2000 249 51.20 2.92 514 5.69 
2001 323 61.93 4.14 662 6.25 
2002 366 68.85 5.59 641 8.72 
2003 315 61.65 - - 9.2 
2004 304 61.75 21.99 3,172 9.72 
2005 319 63.16 32.61 3,916 9.01 
2006 345 66.38 41.08 4,592 8.03 
2007 383 111.29 49.55 5,585 9.73 
2008 464 145.57 76.97 6,796 10.41 
2009 576 160.51 90.62 7,432 10.6 
2010 720 240.66 149.13 8,693 13.57 
2011 860 319.80 203.66 9,978 15.51 
2012 942 331.29 235.51 11,112 13.23 
In Table A2.5, the gross capital, investment amount is counted by Billion yuan, the investment 
intensity is counted by Million yuan/project. The numbers listed in the first row shows the 
cumulative numbers for the first four indicators and the average investment intensity from 1985 to 
1994.    (Figure 1.2) 
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A.3 The split-share reformation 
At the early stage of the development period, the most exclusive pattern of the mainland 
China security market is the separation of shareholder structure. Shares held by 
shareholders are separated into tradable shares and non-tradable shares, i.e. only a small 
proportion of listed companies’ shares are allowed to be circulated in the secondary 
market, while the rest of shares are forbidden to be traded. The tradable shares are mainly 
composed of the public shares, whereas non-tradable shares are mainly composed of 
state-owned shares and legal person shares. Due to the institutional reasons, a large 
volume of, nearly two thirds of, shares are non-tradable shares which are held by the large 
shareholders. This means that only one-third of shares in China stock market are tradable, 
and the majority are held by the medium and small investors. Such differences in shares’ 
circulation system had generated acute unbalance in the cost of stock ownerships, 
interests and rights between large shareholders and the medium and small investors, 
which have seriously put a brake on the economic growth and development of China 
capital market. The split-share problem had used to be allegorized as the Sword of 
Damocles of China stock market, therefore it is necessary to solve it. 
From the state-owned stock reduction onward, the split-share reform aimed at 
gradually converting all the non-tradable shares to tradable ones. In this way can the 
reform protect the legitimate interests of public investors and enhance the adaptability of 
stock market. China attempted to confront the problem several times in 1998 and 2001 
but were all forced to be suspended as the effects are unsatisfactory. However, in 2004, it 
was officially carried out with the issue of a relevant regulation, and the pilot work of the 
reform was launched in April 29th, 2005. Later in September, this institutional and 
structural reformation had reached a full-scale stage. Till now, this reform is still 
recognized as the most profound and far reaching action since the establishment of China 
security market. 
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A.4 VC Reputation and Initial market performance 
The impact of VC reputation on the initial performance is examined to examine whether 
VC reputation has the certification function on China IPOs.  Table A4.1 reports the 
results of regressions of the ranking of lead VCs and IPO underpricing on a sample of 
1,205 IPOs listed from 2004 to 2012. Ranking of Top 20/50 are treated as high reputation 
VCs, respectively. Two specific variables that are suggested to be related to the 
underpricing are controlled in the regression together with three control variables. They 
are time gap between offering date and listing date and the first day P/E ratio.  
Four regressions are illustrated in Table A4.1, and they exhibit very consistent results. 
In each regression, the coefficients of Top-20 and Non-Top-20 are all significantly and 
negatively associated with the underpricing, indicating that both the IPOs backed by more 
reputable and less reputable VCs enjoy lower underpricing than the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Moreover, as all the coefficients of Top-20 are more negative than the Non-Top-20, it 
further means that IPOs funded by more reputable VCs are experiencing even less 
underpricing than the IPOs funded by less reputable VCs. Such finding is consistent with 
Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Lerner (1994) and Coakley et al. 
(2009), where VCs are found to play Certification function on IPO firms. In order to 
maintain and enhance their reputation, VCs would rather to set the offering price close to 
the true value of IPO firms and avoid the falsely certificate. Hence VC-backed IPOs are 
displaying lower initial returns than the non-VC-backed IPOs. 
The empirical results of the control variables across the regressions are also very 
consistent. On the one hand, the age and the proceeds of IPO firms are significantly and 
negatively related to underpricing, implying that the older the IPO firms and the larger 
size the IPO firms, the lower the underpricing. Meanwhile, high-tech IPOs exhibit 
significantly less initial returns than the traditional industry IPOs. On the other hand, the 
time gap between offering date and listing date, and the first-day P/E ratio are both 
positively related with underpricing. At the same time, state-owned IPOs seem to bear 
higher underpricing than the privately-owned IPOs, meaning that the government might 
interfere the decision of price setting and set the offering price at a low level in order to 
extract substantial initial returns. 
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Table A4.1 VC Ranking and the Underpricing 
 
Underpricing Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Top-20 -0.155 -0.142   
 (0.000)*** (0.001)***   
Non-Top-20 -0.146 -0.141   
 (0.000)*** (0.000)***   
Top-50   -0.161 -0.157 
   (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-Top-50   -0.141 -0.130 
   (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
     
IPO Age -0.087 -0.076 -0.087 -0.076 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Gap 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.010 
 (0.000)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** 
P/E 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds -0.213 -0.245 -0.213 -0.244 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
SOE  0.226  0.227 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
High-tech  -0.097  -0.096 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
     
_cons 3.017 3.284 3.019 3.283 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
N. 1,205 1,201 1,205 1,201 
In Table A4.1, Ranking of Top 20/50 is based on Lead VC’s ranking in each fiscal year from 
2004 to 2012. Values in the brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote the coefficients of the 
variables are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table A4.2 reports the regression results using the alternative reputation measurements 
on the IPO underpricing. VC’s IPO market share, calculating both by proceeds and 
market capitalization, exhibit different impact with the other three reputation 
measurements. The underpricing of IPOs backed by VCs with higher market share exhibit 
no significant difference with the non-VC-backed IPOs; on the contrary, IPOs backed by 
VCs with lower market share exhibit significantly lower underpricing than the non VC-
backed IPOs. Such results are inconsistent with the reputation effects by using the ranking 
of VC. 
However, results of the other reputation measurements are consistent with the ranking 
of VCs, confirming that higher VC reputation can effectively reduce the underpricing 
level of IPO firms. From Columns (3) to (5), it is found that coefficients of all the High 
and Low are significantly negative. The results also manifest that the underpricing of 
IPOs backed by more reputable VCs are even lower than the IPOs backed by less 
reputable VCs. 
Additionally, effects of control variables are robust to the all the VC reputation 
measurements. They are also robust to the effects shown in the table by using ranking of 
Top 20 and 50 as reputation measurements. Older and larger scale firms, high-tech firms 
are more apt to set their offering price closer to the true value. Conversely, firms have 
more uncertainty before listing (longer gaps) are likely to suffer from higher underpricing 
level. Besides, IPO underpricing is found to have positive association with the first day 
P/E ratio. Last but not least, the more the equities held by government shareholders, the 
higher the underpricing will be. 
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Table A4.2 Alternative Reputation Measurements and Underpricing 
 VC IPO MS1 VC IPO MS2 VC Age VC IPO Number VC Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High -0.040 -0.046 -0.197 -0.233 -0.182 
 (0.389) (0.322) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Low -0.176 -0.174 -0.125 -0.110 -0.145 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
IPO Age -0.072 -0.073 -0.075 -0.075 -0.076 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Gap 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 
 (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** 
P/E 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds -0.244 -0.244 -0.243 -0.245 -0.247 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
SOE 0.217 0.218 0.234 0.226 0.227 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -0.096 -0.096 -0.092 -0.097 -0.096 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
      
_cons 3.242 3.259 3.253 3.283 3.312 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
N. 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201 
In Table A4.2., measurements of VC reputation are based on Lead VC’s value in each fiscal year; For each proxy, High reputation is the first 
largest 25%, and low is the latter 75%; Values in the brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote the coefficients of the variables are significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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A.5 VC reputation and the Operating Performance 
In this sub-section, Model 4.2 is applied to test the Hypothesis 3. The operating 
performance is measured by ROE2 and VC reputation is measured by VC age, VC IPO 
quantities, VC IPO market share, and VC registered capital. Table A5.1 illustrates the 
results of regressions based on 1,042 A share IPOs from 2007 to 2012. The results are 
consistent with Table 5.19 that the reputation of VCs has no significant power in 
predicting the three-year’s post-IPO operating performance. 
Table A5.1 VC Reputation and ROE2 
 ROE2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VC Age 0.000     
 (0.398)     
VC IPO#  -0.023    
  (0.753)    
VC MS1   -1.632   
   (0.858)   
VC MS2    1.302  
    (0.880)  
VC Size     0.000 
     (0.367) 
      
IPO Age 1.543 1.582 1.581 1.582 1.598 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Underpricing 2.412 2.375 2.401 2.398 2.515 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Proceeds -0.112 -0.0783 -0.0732 -0.0812 -0.119 
 (0.817) (0.871) (0.879) (0.866) (0.808) 
SOE 6.914 7.055 7.030 7.020 6.624 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
High-tech -2.755 -2.739 -2.729 -2.728 -2.769 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
      
_cons -35.20 -35.66 -35.73 -35.67 -35.44 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Adj-R2 0.1071 0.1067 0.1064 0.1064 0.1074 
N. 999 1,003 1,002 1,002 988 
Table A5.1 reports the cross-sectional OLS regression of 5 different VC reputation proxies against 
the changes of ROE2; Numbers in the brackets are p-values; *, **, *** denote to the coefficients of 
variables are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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A.6 Selection Bias Issue 
Following the Section 6.2.2, this thesis also applies the Heckman 2-step model on the 
regressions where VC reputation is measured by alternative proxies on the full sample 
IPOs. The regression model used are the same as Model 6.4 and Model 6.7.  
Table A6.1 reports the results of second-step regression, and the results could compare 
with Table 5.10. Table 5.10 shows that compare to the non-VC-backed IPOs, IPOs 
funded by more reputable VCs enjoy higher BHAR36 than the IPOs funded by less 
reputable VCs. Nevertheless, completely different results are obtained here. Table A6.1 
reveals that after controlling the selection bias using both methods, neither the more 
reputable VCs, nor the less reputable VCs exert any significant influence on IPO firms’ 
long-run stock market performance. Nearly none of the coefficients of High or Low is 
significant6. However, as documented in Table 6.10, the Ranking of Top 20/50 VCs 
exhibit significant impact on the IPO long-run stock market performance even after the 
control of selection bias. Therefore, it might be concluded that the Ranking of VCs is a 
more significant measurements for VC reputation, comparing to the traditional reputation 
measurements. It also reveals that the multi-factor indicator proxy is more effective in 
capturing the effects of VC reputation than the single-factor indicators. 
Moreover, Table A6.2 illustrates the same models by using the alternative five 
reputation measurements on different boards. Panel A of Table A6.2 shows the results of 
Model 6.4, and Panel B shows the results of Model 6.7. The results show that after the 
selection bias is controlled, neither the more reputable VCs nor the less reputable VCs 
exhibits significant impact on IPO long-run performance. However, Table 5.12 shows 
that VCs are found to exhibit significantly positive impact on IPOs listed on the SME and 
ChiNext boards. Impact of more reputable VCs are stronger as before. Consequently, the 
significant impact of the alternative reputation proxies vanish as the selection bias is 
controlled. In comparison, the positive impact still exists when using the Ranking as 
proxy for reputation7. 
 
                                                             
6 When we use VC’s past cumulative IPO numbers as proxy of reputation, more reputable VC-backed IPO exhibit 
significantly better BHARs than non VC-backed IPOs at 10% level. 
7 See Table 6.11. 
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Table A6.1 Alternative Reputation and BHAR36 – High/Low (Table 5.10) 
 Inverse Mill’s Ratio  !"#$%&'()  
 VC MS1 VC MS2 VC Age VC IPO# VC Size  VC MS1 VC MS2 VC Age VC IPO# VC Size 
IMR -0.268 -0.262 -0.281 -0.243 -0.267       
 (0.554) (0.563) (0.534) (0.591) (0.554)       !"#$%&'()        0.735 0.718 0.767 0.693 0.742 
       (0.361) (0.372) (0.340) (0.389) (0.357) 
            
High 0.390 0.393 0.243 0.122 0.250  0.375 0.377 0.240 0.120 0.251 
 (0.650) (0.648) (0.574) (0.055)* (0.266)  (0.663) (0.661) (0.578) (0.059)* (0.263) 
Low 0.288 0.287 0.150 - 0.161  0.274 0.273 0.148 - 0.164 
 (0.738) (0.738) (0.727) - (0.466)  (0.750) (0.750) (0.731) - (0.457) 
            
Con. Var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Adj-R2 0.045 0.045 0.037 0.039 0.038  0.038 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.045 
N 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086  1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 
Table A6.1 illustrates the results of Model 6.4 and 6.7 based on the full sample IPOs. The IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio; values in the brackets are 
the p-values of coefficients; The control variables included are Age of IPO firm, underpricing, IPO proceeds, dummy variable for SOE, and dummy 
variable for high-tech. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 - 193 -   
 
Table A6.2 Alternative reputation and BHAR36 by boards (Table 5.12) 
Panel A: Inverse Mills Ratio 
 VC MS1 VC MS2 VC Age VC IPO # VC Size 
 Main ChiNext Main ChiNext Main ChiNext Main ChiNext Main ChiNext 
IMR -0.272 1.026 -0.264 1.014 -0.303 1.028 -0.255 0.938 -0.289 1.085 
 (0.571) (0.475) (0.581) (0.480) (0.527) (0.475) (0.595) (0.515) (0.547) (0.452) 
High 0.449 -0.090 0.449 -0.083 0.390 -0.457 0.149 -0.151 0.221 0.266 
 (0.604) (0.582) (0.604) (0.605) (0.438) (0.575) (0.029)** (0.425) (0.430) (0.486) 
Low 0.310 - 0.308 - 0.281 -0.360 - - 0.127 0.291 
 (0.720) - (0.721) - (0.574) (0.657) - - (0.644) (0.427) 
Control Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 931 155 931 155 931 155 931 155 931 155 
Adj-R2 0.035 0.056 0.035 0.056 0.033 0.051 0.036 0.058 0.032 0.052 
Panel B: !"#$%&'()  !"#$%&'()  0.651 -1.366 0.630 -1.345 0.716 -1.356 0.622 -1.212 0.679 -1.403 
 (0.447) (0.583) (0.462) (0.589) (0.403) (0.587) (0.467) (0.627) (0.429) (0.574) 
High 0.438 -0.090 0.438 -0.083 0.386 -0.452 0.148 -0.153 0.222 0.257 
 (0.613) (0.585) (0.613) (0.607) (0.442) (0.580) (0.030)** (0.419) (0.428) (0.502) 
Low 0.299 - 0.298 - 0.277 -0.356 - - 0.129 0.280 
 (0.729) - (0.730) - (0.579) (0.661) - - (0.640) (0.445) 
Control Var. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 931 155 931 155 931 155 931 155 931 155 
Adj-R2 0.035 0.055 0.043 0.055 0.034 0.050 0.036 0.057 0.033 0.050 
In Table A6.2, the second step OLS regression is based on the full sample IPOs. The IMR is the inverse Mill’s ratio; !"#$%&'()  is the estimated value 
of VC-backed variable from the first-step regression; The control variables included are Age of IPO firm, underpricing, IPO proceeds, dummy variable 
for SOE, and dummy variable for high-tech. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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A.7 Lists of China A share IPOs and VC companies 
Table A7.1 Lists of China A share IPOs listed from 2004-2012. 
Local 
Code Name 
Local 
Code Name 
002001 ZHEJIANG NHU 002040 NANJING PORT 
002002 JIANGSU GOLDEN MRA.TECH. 002041 SHANDONG DENGHAI SEEDS 
002003 ZHEJIANG WEIXING INDL. DEV. 002042 HUAFU TOP DYED MELANGE YARN 
002004 CHONGQING HUAPONT PHARM. 002043 DEHUA TB NEW DECORATION MATERIAL 
002005 ELEC-TECH INTL. 002044 JIANGSU SANYOU GROUP 
002006 ZHEJIANG JINGGONG SCI.& TECH. 002045 GUOGUANG ELECTRIC 
002007 HUALAN BIOLOGICAL ENGR. 002046 LUOYANG BRG.SCI.& TECH. 
002008 HAN'S LASER TECH. 002047 SHENZHEN GLOBE UN.INDL. 
002009 JIANGSU MIRACLE LOGIST. SYSTEM 002048 NINGBO HUAXIANG ELT. 
002010 ZHEJIANG TRANSFAR 002049 TONGFANG GUOXIN ELTN. 
002011 ZHEJIANG DUN'AN ARTIFICIAL ENV. 002050 ZHEJIANG SANHUA 
002012 ZHEJIANG KAN SPECIALTIES MATERIAL 002051 CHINA CAMC ENGINEERING 
002013 HUBEI AVIATION PRECISION MACHINERY 002052 SHENZHEN COSHIP ELTN. 
002014 HUANGSHAN NOVEL 002053 YUNNAN SALT & CHM.IND. 
002015 XIAKE COLOR SPINNING 002054 DYMATIC CHEMICALS 
002016 GUANGDONG SHIRONGZHAOYE 002055 SHENZHEN DEREN ELT. 
002017 EASTCOMPEACE TECHNOLOGY 002056 HENGDIAN GP.DMEGC MGN. 
002018 ANHUI HUAXING CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 002057 SINOSTEEL ANHUI TIANYUAN TECH. 
002019 ZHEJIANG HANGZHOU XINFU PHARM. 002058 SHANGHAI WELLTECH ATMTN. 
002020 ZHEJIANG JINGXIN PHARM. 002059 YUNNAN TOURISM 
002021 ZOJE SEWING MACHINE 002060 GUANGDONG NO.2 HYPW. ENGR. 
002022 SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO ENGR. 002061 ZHEJIANG JIANGSHAN CHM. 
002023 SICHUAN HAITE HIGH TECH. 002062 HONGRUN CON.GP. 
002024 SUNING APPLIANCE 002063 YGSOFT 
002025 GUIZHOU SPACE APPLIANCE 002064 ZHEJIANG HUAFON SPANDEX 
002026 SHANDONG WEIDA MACHINERY 002065 DHC SOFTWARE 
002027 HEDY HOLDING 002066 RUITAI MATS.TECH. 
002028 SIEYUAN ELECTRIC 002067 ZHEJIANG JINGXING PAPER JOINT STOCK 
002029 FUJIAN SEPTWOLVES IND. 002068 JIANGXI BLACK CAT CARBON BLACK 
002030 DA AN GENE OF SUN YAT- SEN UVTY. 002069 ZHANGZIDAO GROUP 
002031 GUANGDONG GREATOO MOLDS 002070 ZHONGHE 
002032 ZHEJIANG SUPOR 002071 JIANGSU HONGBAO HWRE. 
002033 LIJIANG YULONG TOURISM 002072 SHANDONG DEMIAN 
002034 ZHEJIANG MIZUDA PRINTING & DYEING 002073 MESNAC 
002035 ZHONGSHAN VATTI GSA.STK. 002074 JIANGSU DONGYUAN ELECT. GP. 
002036 NINGBO YAK TECH.INDL. 002075 JIANGSU SHAGANG 
002037 GUIZHOU JIULIAN IND. EXPLOSIVE 002076 CNLIGHT 
002038 BEIJING SL PHARMACEUTICAL 002077 JIANGSU DAGANG 
002039 GUIZHOU QIANYUAN PWR. 002078 SHANDONG SUN PAPR.IND. JOIST. 
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Local 
Code Name 
Local 
Code Name 
002079 SUZHOU GOOD-ARK ELTN. 002123 RONGXIN POWER ELECTRONIC 
002080 SINOMA SCI.& TECH. 002124 NINGBO TECH-BANK 
002081 SUZHOU GD.MANTIS CON. 002125 XIANGTAN ELECTROCHEM. SCIEN. 
002082 ZHEJIANG DONGLIANG NEW BLMS. 002126 ZHEJIANG YINLUN MCH. 
002083 SUNVIM GROUP 002127 JIANGSU XINMIN TEXTILE SCTC. 
002084 GUANGZHOU SEAGULL KITCHEN&BATH PRO 002128 HUOLINHE OPENCUT COAL IND. 
002085 ZHEJ.WANFENG AUTO WHEEL 002129 TIANJIN ZHONGHUAN SEMICON. 
002086 SHANDONG ORNTL.OCE.SCI.- TECH. 002130 SHENZHEN WOER HTSHRIN. MATERIAL 
002087 HENAN XINYE TEX. 002131 ZHEJIANG LEO 
002088 SHANDONG LUYANG SHRE. 002132 HENAN HENGXING SCTC. 
002089 SUZHOU NEW SEA UN.TELC. TECH. 002133 COSMOS GROUP 
002090 WISCOM SYSTEM 002134 TIANJIN PRINTRONICS CIRCUIT 
002091 JIANGSU GUOTAI INTL.GP. 002135 ZHEJIANG SOUTHEAST SPACE FRAME 
002092 XINJIANG ZHONGTAI CHEMICAL 002136 ANHUI ANNADA TTM.IND. 
002093 GUOMAI TECHNOLOGIES 002137 SHENZHEN SEA STAR TECH. 
002094 QINGDAO KGKG.APPD. CHEMY. 002138 SHENZHEN SUNLORD ELTN. 
002095 ZHEJIANG NETSUN 002139 SHENZHEN TOPBAND 
002096 HUNAN NANLING IND. EXPLV.MATS. 002140 EAST CHINA ENGR.SCTC. 
002097 SUNWARD INTEL.EQU. 002141 GUANGDONG RONSEN SUPER MICROWIRE 
002098 FUJIAN SBS ZIPPER SCI. & TECH. 002142 BANK OF NINGBO 
002099 ZHEJIANG HISOAR PHARMACEUTICAL 002143 SICHUAN GAOJIN FOOD 
002100 XINJIANG TECON ANM.HBDY. BIO-TECH 002144 HONGDA HIGH-TECH HLDG. 
002101 GUANGDONG HONGTU TECH. 002145 CNNC HUA YUAN TITANIUM DIOXIDE 
002102 FUJIAN GUANFU MOD.HHLD. WARES 002146 RISESUN REAL ESTATE DEV. 
002103 GUANGBO GROUP STOCK 002147 MAANSHAN FANGYUAN SLEWING RING 
002104 HENGBAO 002148 BEIJING BEWINNER COMMS. 
002105 HL (SHENZHEN) 002149 WESTERN METAL MATERIALS 
002106 SHENZHEN LAIBAO HI.TECH. 002150 JIANGSU TONGRUN EQU. TECH. 
002107 SHANDONG WOHUA PHARM. 002151 BEIJING BDSTAR NAV. 
002108 CANGZHOU MINGZHU PLASTIC 002152 GRG BANKING EQUIPMENT 
002109 SHAANXI XINGHUA CHEMY. 002153 BEIJING SHIJI INFO.TECH. 
002110 SANSTEEL MINGUANG 002154 ZHEJIANG BAOXINIAO GRMT. 
002111 WEIHAI GUANGTAI ARPT. EQU. 002155 CHENZHOU MINING GP. 
002112 SAN BIAN SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY 002156 NANTONG FUJITSU MICROELS. 
002113 HUNAN TIANRUN ENTS.HLDG. 002157 JIANGXI ZHENGBANG TECH. 
002114 YUNNAN LUOPING ZINC & ELTY. 002158 SHANGHAI HANBELL PRECISE MACHINERY 
002115 SUNWAVE COMMUNICATIONS 002159 WUHAN SANTE CBWS.GP. 
002116 CHINA HAISUM ENGINEERING 002160 JIANGSU ALCHA ALUM. 
002117 TUNGKONG 002161 INVENGO INFO.TECH. 
002118 JILIN ZIXIN PHARM.INDL. 002162 SHANGHAI CIMIC HOLDINGS 
002119 NINGBO KANGQIANG ELTN. 002163 AVIC SANXIN 
002120 NINGBO XINHAI ELECTRIC 002164 NINGBO DONLY TNSM. EQUIPMENT 
002121 SHENZHEN CLOU ELTN. 002165 NANJING HONGBAOLI 
002122 TIANMA BEARING GROUP 002166 GUILIN LAYN NATINGDTS. 
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Local 
Code Name 
Local 
Code Name 
002167 GNGD.OR.ZCIND.SCTC. 002210 SHENZHEN FEIMA INTL. SPCH. 
002168 SHENZHEN HIFUTURE ELEC. 002211 JIANGSU HONGDA NEW MRA. 
002169 GUANGZHOU ZHG.ELEC. 002212 GNGD.NAN YANG CAB.GP. HLDG. 
002170 SHN.BATIAN ECOL.TCNQ. 002213 SHENZHEN TERCA TECH. 
002171 ANHUI JIC.CPR.SHRE. 002214 ZHEJIANG DALI TECH. 
002172 JIANGSU AOYANG TECH. 002215 SHENZHEN NOPOSION AGCHM. 
002173 PURE PEARL GROUP 002216 ZHENGZHOU SANQUAN FOODS 
002174 SUSINO UMBRELLA 002217 SHANDONG LIAHERD CHM. IND. 
002175 GUILIN GUANGLU MG.INSTM. 002218 SHENZHEN TOPRAYSOLAR 
002176 JIANGXI SPC.ELEC.MTR. 002219 GNDUWI.BILG.PHARM. 
002177 GUANGZHOU KINTCH. 002220 DALIAN TIANBAO GRN.FDS. 
002178 SHANGHAI YANSMRT.GP. 002221 ORIENTAL ENERGY 
002179 CHINA AVTN.OPTC.ELTG. 002222 CASTECH 
002180 ZHUHAI WANLIDA ELEC. 002223 JIANGSU YUYUE MDEQT.& SUPP. 
002181 GUANGDONG GZH.DLY.MDA. 002224 ZHEJIANG SANLUX RUB. 
002182 NANJING YUNHAI SMTL. 002225 PUYANG REFRAC.GROUP 
002183 ETERNAL AI.SPCH.MAN. 002226 ANHUI JIANGNAN CHM.IND. 
002184 SHANGHAI HT.CNTL.SY. 002227 SHN.AUTO ELEC.PWR.PLT. 
002185 TIANSHUI HUN.TECH. 002228 XIAMEN HXP.PRINTING 
002186 CHINA QUANJUDE GP. 002229 FUJIAN HONGBO PRINTING 
002187 GUANGZHOU GRANDBUY 002230 ANHUI USTC IFLYTEK 
002188 ZHEJIANG NEW JLN.ELTN. 002231 ALLWIN TELECM. 
002189 LIDA OPTICAL & ELT. 002232 QIMING INFORMATION TECH. 
002190 SIC.CHENGFEI INTG.TECH. 002233 GUANGDONG TAPAI GP. 
002191 SHENZHEN JINJIA COPRGP. 002234 SHANDONG MINHE ANM.HBDY. 
002192 LUXIANG 002235 XIAMEN ANNE 
002193 SHANDONG JINING RUYI WTX. 002236 ZHEJIANG DAHUA TECH. 
002194 WUHAN FINGU ELEC.TECH. 002237 SHANDONG HUMON SMELTING 
002195 SHANGHAI HYRON SFTW. 002238 SHENZHEN TOPWAY VID. COMM. 
002196 ZHEJIANG FOUNDER MTR. 002239 JIANGSU KINGFIELD GARM. 
002197 SHENZHEN ZHENGTONG ELTN. 002240 GUANGDONG WEIHUA 
002198 GNGD.JIAYING PHARM. 002241 GOERTEK 
002199 ZHEJIANG ET.CRYSTAL ELT. 002242 JOYOUNG 
002200 YUNNAN GRN.LD.BILG.TECH. 002243 SHENZHEN BEAUTY STAR 
002201 JIANGSU JIUDING NEW MRA. 002244 HANGZHOU BJ.RLST.GP. 
002202 XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCTC. 002245 JIANGSU AUCKSUN 
002203 ZHEJIANG HAILIANG 002246 SICHUAN NITROCELL 
002204 DALIAN HUARUI HVY.IND. GP. 002247 ZHEJIANG DILONG NEW MRA. 
002205 XINJIANG GUOTONG PIPE. 002248 WEIHAI HUADONG ATMTN. 
002206 ZHEJIANG HAILIDE NEW MRA. 002249 ZHONGSHAN BROAD-OCE.MTR. 
002207 XINJIANG ZHUDG.PTL.TECH. 002250 LIANHE CHEMICAL TECH. 
002208 HEFEI URBAN CON.DEV. 002251 BETTER LF.COML.CHN.SHRE. 
002209 GUANGZHOU TECH-LONG PACK.MACH. 002252 SHANGHAI RAAS BLOOD PRDS. 
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Local 
Code Name 
Local 
Code Name 
002253 WISESOFT 002298 ANHUI XINGLONG ELECT. 
002254 YANTAI TAYHO ADVD.MATS. 002299 FUJIAN SUNNER DEV. 
002255 SUZHOU HAILU HVY.IND. 002300 FUJIAN NANPING SUN CAB. 
002256 SHENZHEN RAINBOW FINE CHM.IND. 002301 SHENZHEN COMIX STNERY. 
002258 LIER CHEMICAL 002302 XINJIANG WEST CON.GP. 
002259 SICHUAN SHENGDA FOREST. IND. 002303 SHENZHEN MYS ENV.PROTC. & TECH. 
002260 GUANGDONG ELECPRO ELEC. APPLIANCE HLDG. 002304 JIANGSU YANGHE BREW.JST. 
002261 TALKWEB INFO.SY. 002305 WUHAN LANGOLD RLST. 
002262 JIANGSU NHWA PHARM. 002306 BEIJING XIANGEQING 
002263 ZHEJIANG GT.STHEAST. 002307 XINJIANG BEIXIN ROAD & BDG.GP. 
002264 FUJIAN NEW HUA DU SUPERCENTER 002308 VTRON TECHNOLOGIES 
002265 YUNNAN XIYI INDUSTRY 002309 ZHONGLI SCTC.GROUP 
002266 ZHEJIANG FFJG.HYPR.EQU. 002310 BEIJING OR.LANDSCAPE 
002267 SHAANXI PRVL.NATGS. 002311 GUANGDONG HAID GROUP 
002268 WESTONE INFO.IND. 002312 CHENGDU SANTAI ELTN.IND. 
002269 SHANGHAI MBWE.FASH. & ACCS. 002313 SUNSEA TELECOM. 
002270 SHANDONG FIN CNC MACH. 002314 YAHGEE MODULAR HOUSE 
002271 BEIJING ORNTL.YUHONG WATERPROOF TECH. 002315 FOCUS TECHNOLOGY 
002272 SICHUAN CRUN 002316 SHENZHEN KEYBRIDGE COMMS. 
002273 ZHEJIANG CYL.OPTECH 002317 GUANGDONG ZHONGSHENG PHARM. 
002274 JIANGSU HUACHANG CHM. 002318 ZHEJIANG JIULI HI-TECH METALS 
002275 GUILIN SANJIN PHARM. 002319 LETONG CHEMICAL 
002276 ZHEJIANG WANMA CABLE 002320 HAINAN STRAIT SHIPPING 
002277 HUNAN FRIENDSHIP & APO. COML. 002321 HENAN HUAYING AGRI.DEV. 
002278 SHANGHAI SK PTL. & CHM. EQU. 002322 NINGBO LGG.ONMTG.TECH. 
002279 BEIJING JOIN-CHEER SFTW. 002323 JIANGSU ZHONGLIAN ELEC. 
002280 HANGZHOU NEW CEN.INFO. TECH. 002324 SHANGHAI PRET CMPS. 
002281 ACCELINK TECHS. 002325 SHENZHEN HONGTAO DCRT. 
002282 BOSUN TOOLS 002326 ZHEJIANG YONGTAI TECH. 
002283 TIANRUN CRANKSHAFT 002327 SHENZHEN FUANNA BEDDING AND FURNISHING 
002284 ZHEJIANG ASIA-PACIFIC MECH.& ELECT 002328 SHANGHAI XINPENG IND. 
002285 SHENZHEN WORLD UNION PROPS.CONSULTATION 002329 GUANGXI HUANGSHI DAIRY 
002286 BAOLINGBAO BIOLOGY 002330 SHANDONG DELISI FOOD 
002287 TIBET CHEEZHENG TIBETAN MEDICINE 002331 ANHUI WANTONG TECH. 
002288 GUANGDONG CHAOHUA TECH. 002332 ZHEJIANG XIANJU PHARM. 
002289 SUCCESS ELECTRONICS 002333 SUZHOU LOPSKING ALMN. 
002290 SUZHOU HESHENG SPC.MRA. 002334 SHENZHEN INV.ELEC. 
002291 FOSHAN SATURDAY SHO. 002335 XIAMEN KEHUA HENGSHENG 
002292 GUANGDONG ALP.ANIM.& CUL. 002336 RENRENLE COML.GP. 
002293 LUOLAI HOME TEXTILE 002337 TIANJIN SAIXIANG TECH. 
002294 SHENZHEN SALUBRIS PHARMS. 002338 CHANGCHUN UP OPTOTECH 
002295 GUANGDONG JINGYI METAL 002339 INTEGRATED ELT.SYS.LAB 
002296 HENAN SPLENDOR SCTC. 002340 SHENZHEN GRN.ECO-MANF. HI TECH 
002297 HUNAN BOYUN NEW MATS. 002341 SHENZHEN SELEN SCTC. 
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002342 JULI SLING 002386 YIBIN TIANYUAN GP. 
002343 ZHEJIANG HEXIN IND.GP. 002387 BLACKCOW FOOD 
002344 HAINING CHINA LTHR.MKT. 002388 SHENZHEN SUNYES EMF. HLDG. 
002345 GUANGDONG CHJ IND. 002389 ZHEJIANG NANYANG TECH. 
002346 SHANGHAI ZHEZHONG CON. 002390 GUIZHOU XINBANG PHARM. 
002347 ANHUI TAIER HDY. 002391 JIANGSU CHANGQING AGRCL. 
002348 GOLDLOK TOYS HDG. (GNGD.) 002392 BEIJING LIER HIGH TEMPERATURE MATS. 
002349 NANTONG JINGHUA PHARM. 002393 TIANJIN LISHENG PHARM. 
002350 BEIJING CRTV.DS.ATMTN. 002394 JIANGSU LIANFA TEXTILE 
002351 EDIFIER TECHNOLOGY 002395 WUXI DBLE.EH.MCR.FBM. 
002352 MANNSHAN DINGTAI RARE EARTH NEW MRA. 002396 FUJIAN STAR-NET COMM. 
002353 YANTAI JEREH OLSR.GP. 002397 HUNAN MENDALE HMT. 
002354 DALIAN KEMIAN WOOD IND. 002398 XIAMEN ACADEMY OF BLDG. RESH.GP. 
002355 SHANDONG XINGMIN WHEEL 002399 SHENZHEN HEPALINK PHARM. 
002356 SHENZHEN HAONINGDA METERS 002400 GUANGDONG ADVR. 
002357 SICHUAN FULIN TRSP.GROUP 002401 CHINA SHIPPING NET.TECH. 
002358 HENAN SENYUAN ELEC. 002402 SHENZHEN H & T INTEL. CNTL. 
002359 SHANDONG QIXING IO.TWR. 002403 ZHEJIANG AISHIDA ELEC. 
002360 SHANXI TOND CHEMICAL 002404 ZHEJIANG JIAXIN SILK 
002361 ANHUI SHENJIAN NEW MATS. 002405 NAVINFO 
002362 HANWANG TECHNOLOGY 002406 XUCHANG YND.DRIVE SHAFT 
002363 SHANDONG LONGJI MCH. 002407 DO-FLUORIDE CHEMS. 
002364 HANGZHOU ZHONGHENG ELEC. 002408 ZIBO QIXIANG TENGDA CHM. 
002365 QIANJIANG YONGAN PHARM. 002409 JIANGSU YOKE TECH. 
002366 SICHUAN DANFU COMPR. 002410 GLODON SOFTWARE 
002367 CANNY ELEVATOR 002411 JIANGSU JIUJIUJIU TECH. 
002368 TAIJI COMPUTER 002412 HUNAN HANSEN PHARM. 
002369 SHENZHEN ZOWEE TECH. 002413 JIANGSU CHANGFA REFRIG. 
002370 ZHEJIANG YATAI PHARM. 002414 WUHAN GUIDE INFRARED 
002371 BEIJING SEVENSTAR ELTN. 002415 HANGZHOU HIK VIS.DIG. TECH. 
002372 ZHEJIANG WEIXING NEW BLDG.MATS. 002416 SHENZHEN AISIDI 
002373 SUREKAM 002417 FUJIAN SUNNADA COMM. 
002374 SHANDONG LIPENG 002418 ZHEJIANG KANGSHENG 
002375 ZHEJIANG YASHA DECORATION 002419 RAINBOW DEPT.STORE 
002376 SHANDONG NEW BEIYANG INFO.TECH. 002420 GUANGZHOU ECHOM SCTC. 
002377 HUBEI GUOCHUANG HI-TECH. MRA. 002421 SHENZHEN DAS INTELLITECH 
002378 CHONGYI ZHANGYUAN TGTN. 002422 SICHUAN KELUN PHARM. 
002379 SHDG.LOFTEN ALMN.FOIL 002423 ZHONGYUAN SPC.STEEL 
002380 NANJING SCIYON ATMTN.GP. 002424 GUIZHOU BAILING GROUP PHARM. 
002381 ZHEJIANG DBLE.ARROW RUB. 002425 KAISER (CHINA) HLDG. 
002382 SHANDONG BLU.SAIL PLAST. & RUB. 002426 SUZHOU VTY.PRECN.MANF. 
002383 BEIJING UNISTRONG SCTC. 002427 ZHEJIANG UNIFULL INDL. FIBER 
002384 SUZHOU DONGSHAN PRECN. MNFG. 002428 YUNNAN LINCANG XINYUAN GERMANIUM INDL. 
002385 BEIJING DABEINONG TECH. GP. 002429 SHENZHEN MTC 
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002430 HANGZHOU HANGYANG 002474 FUJIAN RONGJI SFTW. 
002431 PALM LANDSCAPE ARCHI. 002475 LUXSHARE PRECN.IND. 
002432 ANDON HEALTH 002476 SHANDONG PLM.BIOCS. 
002433 GUANGDONG TAIANTANG PHARM. 002477 CHUYING AGRO-PAST.GP. 
002434 ZHEJIANG WANLIYANG TNSM. 002478 JIANGSU CHANGBAO STEELTUBE 
002435 CHANG JIANG RUNFA MCH. 002479 ZHEJIANG FFJG.ENV.TMELC. 
002436 SHENZHEN FASTPRINT CCT. TECH. 002480 CHENGDU XINZHU RD. & BDG. MCH. 
002437 HARBIN GLORIA PHARMS. 002481 YAN TAI SHUANG TA FOOD 
002438 JIANGSU SHENTONG VALVE 002482 SHENZHEN GRANDLAND DCRT. GP. 
002439 BEIJING VENUSTECH 002483 JIANGSU RAINBOW HVIND. 
002440 ZHEJIANG RUNTU 002484 NANTONG JNH.CAPACIT. 
002441 ZHONGYEDA ELECTRIC 002485 SINOER MEN'S WEAR 
002442 LONGXING CHEMICAL STOCK 002486 SHANGHAI CHALLENGE TEX. 
002443 ZHEJIANG KINGLAND PIPE. & TECHS. 002487 DAJIN HEAVY INDUSTRY 
002444 HANGZHOU GT.STAR INDL. 002488 ZHEJIANG JINGU 
002445 JIANGYIN ZHONGNAN HVY. INDS. 002489 YOTRIO GROUP 
002446 GUANGDONG SHENGLU TELECM.TECH 002490 SHANDONG MOLONG PTL.MCH. 
002447 DALIAN YI QIAO MARINE SEEDS 002491 JIANGSU TONGDING OPTIC ELECTRONIC 
002448 ZYNP 002492 ZHUHAI WINBASE INTL.CHM. TNK.TERM. 
002449 FOSHAN NATIONSTAR OPEL. 002493 RONGSHENG PETRO CHM. 
002450 BEIJING KANGDE XIN CPST. MRA. 002494 HUASI AGRI.DEV. 
002451 SHANGHAI MORN ELEC.EQU. 002495 GUANGDONG JIALONG FOOD 
002452 HUNAN CNGO.HVLG.SWGR.GP. 002496 JIANGSU HUIFENG AGROCHEMICAL 
002453 SUZHOU TIANMA SPY.CHEMS. 002497 SICHUAN YAHUA INDL.GP. 
002454 SHAI.JIALENG SONGZHI AUTMB.AIRCONDITION 002498 QINGDAO HANHE CABLE 
002455 WUXI BAICHUAN CHM.IND. 002499 KELIN ENP.EQUIPMENT 
002456 SHENZHEN O-FILM TECH 002500 SHANXI SECURITIES 
002457 NINGXIA QINGLONG PIPES IND. 002501 JILIN LIYUAN ALMN. 
002458 SHANDONG YISHENG LIVE.& POULTRY BREEDING 002502 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGY 
002459 QINHUANGDAO TITO.HDY. 002503 DONGGUAN SOUYUTE FASH. 
002460 JIANGXI GANFENG LITHIUM 002504 JIANGSU DONGGUANG MCR. ELTN. 
002461 GUANGZHOU ZHUJIANG BREW. 002505 HNN.DAKANG PASTURE FRMG. 
002462 CACHET PHARM. 002506 SH CHAORI SOLAR EN.SCTC. 
002463 WUS PRINTED CIRCUIT (KUNSHAN) 002507 CHONGQING FULING ZHACAI GP. 
002464 KEE EVER BRT.DEC.TECH. 002508 HANGZHOU ROBAM APP. 
002465 GUANGZHOU HAIGE COMMS. GP. 002509 TIANGUANG FIRE-FIGHTING 
002466 SICHUAN TIANQI LITHIUM INDS. 002510 TIANJIN MOTOR DIES 
002467 NET263 002511 C&S PAPER 
002468 ZHEJIANG IDC FLUID CNTL. 002512 TATWAH SMARTECH 
002469 SHANDONG SUNWAY PETROCH. ENGINEER 002513 JIANGSU LANFENG BIOCH. 
002470 SHANDONG KINGENTA ECOL. ENGR. 002514 SUZHOU BOAMAX TECHS.GP. 
002471 JIANGSU ZHONGCHAO CABLE 002515 JINZI HAM 
002472 ZHEJIANG SGUN.DRIVELINE 002516 JIANGSU KUANGDA AUTMB. TEX.GP. 
002473 NINGBO SNLT.ELECT.APPC. 002517 TAIYA SHOES 
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002518 SHENZHEN KSTAR SCTC. 002563 ZHEJIANG SEMIR GRMT. 
002519 JIANGSU YINHE ELTN. 002564 ZHANGJIAGANG CHM.MCH. 
002520 ZHEJIANG RIFA DIG.PRECN. MCH. 002565 SH LUXIN PCKG.MATS.SCTC. 
002521 SHANDONG QIFENG SPECIAL PAPER 002566 JILIN JIAN YISHENG PHARM. 
002522 ZHEJIANG ZHONGCHENG PCKG.MRA. 002567 TANGRENSHEN GROUP 
002523 ZHUZHOU TIANQIAO CRANE 002568 SHANGHAI BAIRUN FLFR. 
002524 GUANGZHENG STL.STRUC. 002569 ZHEJIANG BUSEN GARM. 
002526 SHANDONG MNG.MCH.GP. 002570 ZHEJIANG BEINGMATE SCIEN.INDS. 
002527 SHANGHAI STEP ELECTRIC 002571 ANHUI DELI HHLD.GLASS 
002528 SHENZHEN INFINVOA 002572 SUOFEIYA HOME CLLN. 
002529 FUJIAN HAIYUAN AUTOMATIC EQPM. 002573 BEIJING SPC ENVM.PROTC. TECH. 
002530 JIANGSU FENGDONG THM. TECH. 002574 ZHEJIANG MING JEWELRY 
002531 TITAN WIND EN.(SUZHOU) 002575 GUANGDONG QUNXING TOYS JOINT-STOCK 
002532 SHIMGE PUMP IND.GP. 002576 JIANGSU TONGDA PWR.TECH. 
002533 GOLDCUP ELEC.APPARATUS 002577 SHENZHEN RAPOO TECH. 
002534 HANGZHOU BOILER GP. 002578 FUJIAN MINFA ALUM. 
002535 LINZHOU HEAVY MCH.GP. 002579 HUIZHOU CHINA EAGLE ELT. TECH. 
002536 HENAN PROV.XIXIA AUTMB. WATER PUMP 002580 SHANDONG SACRED SUN PWR. SOURCES 
002537 QINGDAO HAILI METAL ONE 002581 ZIBO WANCHANG SCTC. 
002538 ANHUI SIERTE FTLZ.IND. 002582 HAOXIANGNI JUJUBE 
002539 SHINDOO CHEMICAL IND. 002583 HYTERA COMMS. 
002540 JIANGSU ASPAC.LT.ALLOY TECH. 002584 XILONG CHEMICAL 
002541 ANHUI HONGLU STL.CON. (GP.) 002585 JIANGSU SHUANGXING COLOR PLAST.NEW MATS. 
002542 CHINA ZHONGHUA GTH.ENGR. 002586 ZHEJIANG RECLAIM CON.GP. 
002543 GUANGDONG VANWARD NEW ELECTRIC 002587 SHENZHEN AOTO ELTN. 
002544 GCI SCTC. 002588 STANLEY FERTILIZER 
002545 QINGDAO ET.STL.TWR.STK. 002589 SHANDONG REALCAN PHARM. 
002546 NANJING XINLIAN ELTN. 002590 ZHEJIANG VIE SCTC. 
002547 SUZHOU CHUNXING PRECN. MECH. 002591 JIANGXI HENGDA HI-TECH 
002548 SHENZHEN JINXINNONG FEED 002592 NANNING BALING TECH. 
002549 HUNAN KAIMEITE GASES 002593 XIAMEN SUNRISE WHEEL GP. 
002550 CHANGZHOU QIANHONG BIOPHARMA 002594 BYD 
002551 SHENZHEN GLORY MED. 002595 SHANDONG HIMILE MECH. SCTC. 
002552 BAODING HEAVY IND. 002596 HAINAN RUIZE NEW BLDG. MRA. 
002553 JIANGSU NANFANG BEARING 002597 ANHUI JINHE INDL. 
002554 CHINA OIL HBP SCTC. 002598 SHANDONG ZHANGQIU BLOWER 
002555 WUHU SHUNRONG AUTO PARTS 002599 BEIJING SHENGTONG PRINT. 
002556 ANHUI HUILONG AGRI.MPD. 002600 JPMF GUANGDONG 
002557 CHACHA FOOD 002601 HENAN BILLIONS CHEMS. 
002558 CHONGQING NEW CEN.CRUISE 002602 ZHEJIANG CEN.HUATONG AUTV.PART 
002559 JIANGSU YAWEI MACH.TOOL 002603 SHIJIAZHUANG YILING PHARM. 
002560 HENAN TONG-DA CABLE 002604 SHANDONG LONGLIVE BIO TECH. 
002561 SHANGHAI XUJIAHUI COML. 002605 SHANGHAI YAOJI PLAYING CARD 
002562 BROTHER ENTS.HLDG. 002606 DALIAN INSULATOR GP. 
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002607 WUHU YAXIA AUTOMOBILE 002650 JIAJIA FOODSTUFF GP. 
002608 SAINTY MARINE 002651 CHENGDU LEEJUN INDL. 
002609 SHENZHEN JIESHUN SCTC. IND. 002652 SUZHOU YANGTZE NMTS. 
002610 JIANGSU AKCOME SLR.SCTC. 002653 XIZANG HAISCO PHARM.GP. 
002611 GUANGDONG DONGFANG PRECN.SCTC. 002654 SHENZHEN MASON TECHS. 
002612 LANCY 002655 SHANDONG GETTOP ACOUSTIC 
002613 LUOYANG NORTH GLSS.TECH. 002656 GUANGZHOU CANUDILO F&A. 
002614 XIAMEN COMFORT SCTC.GP. 002657 SINODATA 
002615 ZHEJIANG HAERS VACUUM CTRS. 002658 BEIJING SDL TECH. 
002616 GUANGDONG CHANT GP. 002659 JIANGSU ZHONGTAI BDG. STL.STRUCD. 
002617 ROSHOW TECHNOLOGY 002660 MOSO PWR.SUPP.TECH. 
002618 SHENZHEN DANBOND TECH. 002661 KEMEN NOODLE MNFG. 
002619 ZHEJIANG DGN.PI.MNFG. 002662 BEIJING WKW AUTV.PAS. 
002620 SHENZHEN RUIHE CON.DCRT. 002663 PUBANG LND.ARCHI. 
002621 DALIAN SUNLIGHT MCH. 002664 XIN ZHI MOTOR 
002622 JILIN YONGDA GROUP 002665 BEIJING SHOUHANG RES. SVN. 
002623 CHANGZHOU ALMADEN STK. 002666 GUANGDONG DELIAN GROUP 
002624 ZHEJIANG JINLEI REFRAC. 002667 ANSHAN HEAVY DUTY MINING MACHINERY 
002625 ZHEJIANG LSH.AUTO PARTS 002668 GUANGDONG HOMA APP. 
002626 XIAMEN KINGDOMWAY GP. 002669 SHANGHAI KANGDA NMTS. 
002627 HUBEI YICHANG TRSP.GP. 002670 GUANGDONG HUASHENG ELECT.APP. 
002628 CHENGDU R&BR.ENGR. 002671 SHANDONG LONGQUAN PIPE. ENGR. 
002629 SICHUAN RENZHI OILFIELD TECH.SVS. 002672 DONGJIANG ENVIRONMENTAL 
002630 CHINA WSTN.PWR.INDL. 002673 WESTERN SECURITIES 
002631 DER INTL.HM.FURNISHING 002674 XINGYE LEATHER TECH. 
002632 ZHEJIANG DAOMING OP.& CHM. 002675 YANTAI DONGCHENG BIOCHEMICALS 
002633 SHENKE SLIDE BEARING 002676 GUANGDONG SUNWILL PRECISING PLASTIC 
002634 ZHEJIANG BANGJIE DIG. KNTG.SHRE. 002677 ZHEJIANG MEIDA INDUSTRIAL 
002635 SUZHOU ANJIE TECH. 002678 GUANGZHOU PER.RVR.PIANO GP. 
002636 GOLDENMAX INTL.TECH. 002679 FUJIAN JINSEN FORESTRY 
002637 ZHEJIANG ZANYU TECH. 002680 LIANYUNGANG HUANGHAI MACHINERY 
002638 DONGGUAN KINGSUN OT. 002681 SHENZHEN FENDA TECHNOLOGY 
002639 FUJIAN SNOWMAN 002682 FUJIAN LONGZHOU TRSP. 
002640 SHANXI BAIYUAN TROUSERS CHAIN MAN. 002683 GUANGDONG HONGDA BLASTING 
002641 YONGGAO 002684 GUANGDONG DYNAVOLT POWER TECHNOLOGY 
002642 UNITED ELECTRONICS 002685 WUXI HUADONG HEAVY MCH. 
002643 YANTAI VALIANT FINE CHEMS. 002686 ZHEJIANG YILIDA VENTILATOR 
002644 LANZHOU FOCI PHARM. 002687 ZHEJIANG GIUSEPPE GRMT. 
002645 JIANGSU HUAHONG TECH. STK. 002688 JINHE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
002646 QINGHAI HUZHU BARLEY WINE 002689 SHENYANG BRILLIANT ELEV. 
002647 ZHEJIANG HONGLEI COPPER 002690 HEFEI MEIYA OT.TECH. 
002648 ZHEJIANG SAT.PETROCH. 002691 SHIJIAZHUANG ZHONGMEI COAL MINE EQU.MANF. 
002649 BEYONDSOFT 002692 JIANGSU NEW YUANCHENG CABLE 
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002693 HAINAN SHUANGCHENG PHARMACEUTICALS 300033 HEXIN FLUSH INFO.NET. 
002694 GOODY SCIENCE & TECH. 300034 BEIJING CISRI GAONA MATS.& TECH. 
002695 JIANGXI HUANG SHANG HUANG FOOD 300035 HUNAN ZHONGKE ELECTRIC 
002696 BAIYANG AQUATIC GP. 300036 BEIJING SUPERMAP SFTW. 
002697 CHENGDU HONGQI CHAIN 300037 SHENZHEN CAPCHEM TECH. 
002698 HARBIN BOSHI ATMTN. 300038 BEIJING METENO COMM. TECH. 
002699 MEISHENG CULTR. & CRTV. 300039 SHANGHAI KAIBAO PHARM. 
002700 XINJIANG HAOYUAN NATURAL GAS 300040 HARBIN JIUZHOU ELECTRIC 
002701 ORG PACKAGING 300041 HUBEI HUITIAN ADHESIVE ENTER. 
002702 FUJIAN TENGXIN FOOD STK. 300042 NETAC TECHNOLOGY 
002703 ZHEJIANG SHIBAO 300043 XINGHUI AUTO MODEL 
300001 QINGDAO TGOOD ELEC. 300044 SHENZHEN SUNWIN INTEL. 
300002 BEIJING ULTRAPOWER SFTW. 300045 HWA CREATE 
300003 LEPU MED.TECH. (BEJ.) 300046 HUBEI TECH SEMICS. 
300004 NANFENG VENTILATOR 300047 SHENZHEN TIANYUAN DIC INFO. 
300005 BEIJING TOREAD OUTDR. PRDS. 300048 HICONICS DRIVE TECH. 
300006 CHONGQING LUMMY PHARM. 300049 INNER MOI.FURUI MED.SCI. 
300007 HENAN HANWEI ELTN. 300050 DINGLI COMMS. 
300008 SHANGHAI BESTWAY MAR. ENGR.DSGN. 300051 XIAMEN 35 COM TECH. 
300009 ANHUI ANKE BIOTECH. (GP.) 300052 SHENZHEN ZHONGQING BAOWANG NET.TECH. 
300010 BEIJING LANXUM TECH. 300053 ZHUHAI ORBITA CNTL.ENGR. 
300011 BEIJING DINGHAN TECH. 300054 HUBEI DINGLONG CHM. 
300012 CENTRE TESTING INTL. (SHN.) 300055 BEIJING WATER BUS.DR. 
300013 JIANGSU XINNING MOD. LOGIST. 300056 XIAMEN SAVINGS ENV. 
300014 EVE ENERGY 300057 SHANTOU WANSHUN PACKAGE MATERIAL 
300015 AIER EYE HOSPITAL GP. 300058 BLUEFOCUS COMM.GP. 
300016 BEIJING BEILU PHARM. 300059 EAST MONEY INFO. 
300017 SHANGHAI WANGSU SCTC. 300061 SHANGHAI CONANT OPTICS 
300018 WUHAN ZHONGYUAN HUADIAN SCTC. 300062 FUJIAN CEE INSTALLATIONS 
300019 CHENGDU GUIBAO SCTC. 300063 GUANGDONG SKY DRAGON PRINTING INK GP. 
300020 ZHEJIANG ENJOYOR ELTN. 300064 ZHENGZHOU SINO-CRYSTAL DIAMOND 
300021 GANSU DA YU WATER-SAVING 300065 BEIJING HIGHLANDER DIGITAL TECH. 
300022 GIFORE AGRI.MCH.CHAIN 300066 JIANGXI SANCHUAN WATER METER 
300023 BODE ENERGY EQU. 300067 SHANGHAI ANOKY TEX.CHM. 
300024 SIASUN ROBOT & ATMTN. 300068 ZHEJIANG NARADA PWR.SCE. 
300025 HANGZHOU HUAXING CHUANGYE COMM. 300069 ZHEJIANG JINLIHUA ELEC. 
300026 TIANJIN CHASE SUN PHARM. 300070 BEIJING ORIGINWATER TECH. 
300027 HUAYI BROTHERS MDA. 300071 SPEARHEAD INTMKG.COMM. GP. 
300028 CHENGDU GEEYA TECH. 300072 BEIJING SJ ENP. & NMT. 
300029 JIG.HUASHENG TIANLONG PHOTOELECTRIC 300073 BEIJING EASPRING MRA. TECH.CL.A 
300030 GUANGZHOU IMPROVE MED. INSTRUMENTS 300074 AVCON INFO.TECH.CL.A 
300031 WUXI BOTON BELT 300075 BEIJING EGOVA CL.A 
300032 JINLONG MCH. & ELT. 300076 NINGBO GQY VID. & TELC. JST. 
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300077 NATIONZ TECHNOLOGIES 300120 TIANJIN JINGWEI ELECTRIC WIRE 
300078 HANGZHOU CENTURY 300121 SHANDONG YANGGU HUATAI CHM. 
300079 SUMAVISION TECHS. 300122 CHONGQING ZHIFEI BILG. PRDS. 
300080 HENAN XINDAXIN MATS. 300123 SUNBIRD YACHT 
300081 HEBEI HENGXIN MOBL.BUS. 300124 SHENZHEN INOVANCE TECH. 
300082 LIAO NING OXIRANCHEM 300125 DALIAN EAST NEW ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
300083 JN. (DGA.)PRECN.COMPNS. 300126 SHANGHAI KEN TOOLS 
300084 LANZHOU HAIMO TECHS. 300127 CHENGDU GALAXY MAGNETS 
300085 SHENZHEN INFOTECH TECHS. 300128 SUZHOU JINFU NEW MRA. 
300086 HAINAN HONZ PHARM. 300129 SHANGHAI TAISHENG WIND POWER EQU. 
300087 WINALL HI-TECH SEED 300130 SHENZHEN XINGUODU TECH. 
300088 WUHU TOKEN SCIENCE 300131 SHENZHEN YITOA INTEL. CNTL. 
300089 GREAT WALL GROUP 300132 FUJIAN GREEN PINE 
300090 ANHUI SHENGYUN MCH. 300133 ZHEJIANG HUACE FILM & TV 
300091 JIANGSU JIN TONG LING FLUID MCH.TECH. 300134 SHENZHEN TAT FOOK TECH. 
300092 SICHUAN KEXIN MECH. & ELECT.EQU. 300135 JIANGSU BAOLI ASPHALT 
300093 GUANGDONG GOLDEN GLSS. TECHS. 300136 SHENZHEN SUNWAY COMM. 
300094 ZHANJIANG GLA.ATC.PRDS. 300137 HEBEI SAILHERO ENP. HIGH-TECH 
300095 JIANGXI HUAWU BRAKE 300138 CHENGUANG BIOTECH GP. 
300096 YLZ INFO.TECH. 300139 BEIJING FUXING XIAOCHENG ELTECH.STK. 
300097 DALIAN ZHIYUN ATMTN. 300140 XI'AN QIYUAN MECH.AND ECEQ. 
300098 GOSUNCN TECH.GROUP 300141 SUZHOU INDL.PARK HESHUN ELEC. 
300099 UROICA MNG.STY.ENGR. 300142 WALVAX BIOTECHNOLOGY 
300100 NINGBO SNGN.AUTO PARTS 300144 HANGZHOU SONGCHENG TSM. DEV. 
300101 CHENGDU GDL.ELCT.TECH. 300145 NANFANG PUMP IND. 
300102 XIAMEN CHANGELIGHT 300146 BY-HEALTH 
300103 XI'AN DAGANG RD.MCH. 300147 XIANGXUE PHARM. 
300104 LESHI INET.INFO.& TECH. 300148 HUNAN TANGEL PBL. 
300105 YANTAI LGU.PWR.TECH. 300149 JIANGMEN QUANTUM HI-TECH BIOLOGICAL 
300106 XINJIANG WSTN.ANIMAL HUSBANDRY 300150 BEIJING CEN.RL.TECH. 
300107 HEBEI JIANXIN CHM. 300151 SHENZHEN CHANGHONG MOLD TECHNOLOGY 
300108 TONGHUA SHUANGLONG CHM. 300152 XUZHOU COMBUSTION CNTL. TECH. 
300109 BOAI NKY PHARMS. 300153 SHANGHAI COOLTECH POWER 
300110 QINGDAO HUAREN PHARM. 300154 SHENZHEN RILAND IND. 
300111 ZHEJIANG SUNFLOWER LT. EN.SCTC. 300155 GUANGDONG ANJUBAO DIG. TECH. 
300112 SHENZHEN MAXONIC ATMTN. CNTL. 300156 TIANLI ENV.ENGR. 
300113 HANGZHOU ICAFE TECH. 300157 LANDOCEAN ENERGY SVS. 
300114 ZHONGHANG ELT.MG.INSTS. 300158 SHANXI ZHENDONG PHARM. 
300115 SHENZHEN EVERWIN PRECN. TECH. 300159 XINJIANG MCH.RESH.INST. 
300116 SHAANXI J&R FIRE PROTC. 300160 JIANGSU XIUQIANG GLASSWORK 
300117 BEJ.JIAYU DOOR WINDOW & CUI.WALL JST. 300161 WUHAN HUAZHONG NMC.CNTL. 
300118 RISEN ENERGY 300162 LEDMAN OPTOELECTRONIC 
300119 TIANJIN RINGPU BIO-TECH. 300163 NINGBO XIANFENG NMT. 
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300164 TONG OIL TOOLS 300208 QINGDAO EVERCONTAINING ELEC. 
300165 JIANGSU SKYRAY INSTM. 300209 TIANZE INFO.IND. 
300166 BEJ.OR.NAT.COMM.SCTC. 300210 ANSHAN SENYUAN R&B. 
300167 SHENZHEN DVISION VID. COMMS. 300211 JIANGSU YITONG HT. 
300168 WONDERS INFORMATION 300212 BEIJING E-HUALU INFO TECH. 
300169 CHANGZHOU TIANSHENG NEW MATS. 300213 BEJ.JX.FEIHONG ELECT. 
300170 HAND ENTERPRISE SLTN. 300214 SHANDONG RIKE CHM. 
300171 SHANGHAI TOFFLON SCTC. 300215 SUZHOU ELEC.APT.SCIENCE ACADEM. 
300172 NANJING CEC ENV.PROTC. 300216 HUNAN CHINA SUN PHARM. MCH. 
300173 SOTECH MACHINERY 300217 ZHENJIANG DONGFANG ELEC. HEATING TECH. 
300174 FUJIAN YUANLI ACV.CARBON 300218 ANHUI ANLI ARTIFICIAL LTHR. 
300175 LONTRUE 300219 GUANGZHOU HONGLI OPTO ELT. 
300176 GUANGDONG HONGTEO ACCURATE TECH. 300220 WUHAN GOLDEN LASER 
300177 GUANGZHOU HI TARGET NAV. TECH. 300221 GUANGDONG SILV.AGE SCTC. 
300178 SHENZHEN TEMPUS GLB. TRVL.HDG. 300222 SHANGHAI CSG SMRT.SCTC. 
300179 SF DIAMOND 300223 INGENIC SEMICON. 
300181 ZHEJIANG JOLLY PHARM. 300224 YANTAI ZHENGHAI MAGNETIC MRA. 
300182 BEIJING JETSEN TECH. 300225 SHANGHAI KINLITA CHM. 
300183 QINGDAO EASTSOFT COMM. TECH. 300226 SHANGHAI GANGLIAN E-COM. HDG. 
300184 WUHAN P&S INFO.TECH. 300227 SHENZHEN SUN.LSR. & ELTN. TECH. 
300185 TONGYU HEAVY INDUSTY 300228 ZHANGJIAGANG FURUI SPC. EQU. 
300186 GUANGDONG DAHUANONG ANM. HLPR. 300229 BEIJING TRS INFO.TECH. 
300187 HUNAN YONKER ENP. 300230 SHANGHAI YONGLI BELTING 
300188 XIAMEN MEIYA PICO INFO. 300231 BEIJING TRUST & FAR TECH. 
300189 GRAND AGRISEEDS TECH. 300232 UNILUMIN GROUP 
300190 JIANGSU WELLE ENV. 300233 SHANDONG JINCHENG PHARM. AND CHM. 
300191 SINO GEOPHYSICAL 300234 ZHEJIANG KAIER NEW MATS. 
300192 SUZHOU KINGSWOOD PRINT. INK 300235 SHENZHEN KINGSUN SCTC. 
300193 SHENZHEN JASIC TECH. 300236 SHANGHAI SINYANG SEMICON.MATS. 
300194 CHONGQING FUAN PHARM. (GP.) 300237 SHANDONG MEICHEN SCTC. 
300195 MASTERWORK MACHINERY 300238 GRANDHOPE BIOTECH 
300196 JIANGSU CHANGHAI CPST. MATS. 300239 BAOTOU DONGBAO BIO TECH 
300197 SHENZHEN TECHAND ELG.& ENVM. 300240 JIANGSU FEILIKS INTL. LOGIST. 
300198 FUJIAN SUPERPIPE 300241 SHENZHEN REFOND OPEL. 
300199 HYBIO PHARMACEUTICAL 300242 MIG TECHNOLOGY 
300200 BEIJING COMENS NEW MATS. 300243 SHANDONG RUIFENG CHM. 
300201 XUZHOU HANDLER SPC.VEH. 300244 ZHEJIANG DA DIAGNOSTICS 
300202 LIAONING JULONG FINL. EQU. 300245 SHANGHAI DRAGONNET TECH. 
300203 FOCUSED PHT. (HGZO.) 300246 GUANGDONG BIOLIGHT MEDITECH 
300204 STAIDSON (BEJ.)BIOPH. 300247 ANHUI SAUNAKING 
300205 WUHAN TIANYU INFO.IND. 300248 ZHENGZHOU BRAND-NEW CAP ELTN. 
300206 EDAN INSTRUMENTS 300249 SICHUAN YIMIKANG ENV. TECH 
300207 SUNWODA ELECTRONIC 300250 HANGZHOU CNCR-IT 
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300251 BEIJING ENLIGHT MDA. 300294 JIANGXI BOYA BIOPHM. 
300252 KINGSIGNAL TECH. 300295 EVERYDAY NETWORK 
300253 SHANGHAI KINGSTAR WINNING SFTW. 300296 LEYARD OPTOELECTRONIC 
300254 SHANXI C&Y PHARM. 300297 BLUEDON INFO.SCTY.TECHS. 
300255 HEBEI CHANGSHAN BIOCH. PHARM. 300298 SINOCARE 
300256 ZHEJIANG FIRSTAR PANEL TECH. 300299 FUCHUN COMMUNICATIONS 
300257 ZHEJIANG KAISHAN COMPR. 300300 HAKIM INFO.TECH. 
300258 JIANGSU PAC.PRECN.FRGG. 300301 SHENZHEN CHANGFANG LIGHT EMITTING DIODE LTG. 
300259 HENAN SUNTRONT TECH. 300302 TOYOU FEIJI ELECTRONICS 
300260 KUNSHAN KINGLAI HYGIENIC MATS. 300303 SHENZHEN JUFEI OPTOELECTRONICS 
300261 ABA CHEMICALS 300304 JIANGSU YUNYI ELECTRIC 
300262 SHANGHAI SAFBON WT.SER. 300305 JIANGSU YUXING FILM TECH. 
300263 LUOYANG LONGHUA HEAT TFER.TECH. 300306 HANGZHOU EVERFINE PHOTO- E-INFO 
300264 AVIT 300307 NINGBO CIXING 
300265 JIANGSU TONGGUANG ELT. W&C. 300308 SHANDONG ZHONGJI ECEQ. 
300266 HANGZHOU XINGYUAN FILTER TECH. 300309 GI TECHS.(BEJ.) 
300267 HUNAN ER-KANG PHARM. 300310 GUANGDONG EASTONE CEN. TECH. 
300268 WANFU BIOTECH. (HUNAN) AGRI.DEV. 300311 SURFILTER NETWORK TECH. 
300269 SHENZHEN LIANTRONICS 300312 BOOMSENSE TECHNOLOGY 
300270 OB TELECOM ELTN. 300313 XINJIANG TIANSHAN AHBY. BIO-ENGINEERING 
300271 BEIJING THUNISOFT 300314 NINGBO DAVID MED.DVC. 
300272 SHANGHAI CANATURE ENV. PRDS. 300315 BEIJING OURPALM TECHNOLOGY 
300273 ZHUHAI HOKAI MED.INSTS. 300316 ZHEJIANG JINGSHENG MCL&ECL. 
300274 SUNGROW POWER SUPPLY 300317 SHENZHEN JIAWEI PHOTOVOLTAIC LTG. 
300275 CHONGQING MAS SCI & TECH 300318 BEIJING BOHUI INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY 
300276 HUBEI SNE.INTEL.CNEQ. 300319 SHENZHEN MICROGATE TECHNOLOGY 
300277 SHENZHEN HIRISUN TECH. 300320 JIANGYIN HAIDA RUBBER AND PLASTIC 
300278 HUBEI HUACHANGDA INTEL. EQUP. 300321 SHANDONG TONGDA NEW MATERIALS 
300279 WUXI HODGEN TECH. 300322 HUIZHOU SPEED WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 
300280 NANTONG METALFORMING EQU. 300323 HC SEMITEK 
300281 GUANGDONG JINMING MCH. 300324 BEIJING WATERTEK ITECH. 
300282 BEIJING IRTOUCH SYS. 300325 JIANGSU DEWEI ADVANCED MATERIALS 
300283 WENZHOU HONGFENG ELECT. ALLOY 300326 SHANGHAI KINETIC MEDICAL 
300284 JIANGSU TRSP.RESH.INST. 300327 SINO WEALTH ELECTRONIC 
300285 SHANDONG SINOCERA FUNCTIONAL MRA. 300328 DONGGUAN EONTEC 
300286 SHANGHAI ACREL 300329 HAILUN PIANO 
300287 BEIJING PHILISENSE TECH. 300330 SHANGHAI HUAHONGJT SMART SYSTEM 
300288 GUIYANG LONGMASTER INFO. & TECH. 300331 SVG OPTRONICS 
300289 BEIJING LEADMAN BCM. 300332 TOP RSO.CVT.ENGR. 
300290 BRINGSPRING SCTC. 300333 SINOSUN TECHNOLOGY 
300291 BEIJING HUALUBAINA FILM & TV 300334 TIANJIN MOTIMO MEMBRANE TECHNOLOGY 
300292 JIANGSU WUTONG COMMS. 300335 GUANGZHOU DEVOTION THM. TECH. 
300293 SHENYANG BLUE SILV.IND. AUTO.EQU. 300336 SHANGHAI NEW CUL.MDA.GP. 
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300337 YINBANG CLAD MRA. 600479 ZHUZHOU QIANJIN PHARM. 
300338 CHANGSHA KAIYUAN INSTS. 600482 FENGFAN STOCK 
300339 JIANGSU HOPERUN SFTW. 600483 FUJIAN NANFANG TEX. 
300340 JIANGMEN KANHOO IND. 600491 LONG YUAN CONSTRUCTION GP. 
300341 MOTIC (XIAMEN) ELEC.GP. 600493 FUJIAN FYNEX TEX.SCTC. 
300342 CHANGSHU TIANYIN ELECTROMECHANICAL 600495 JINXI AXLE 
300343 LECRON ENERGY SAVING MATERIALS 600497 YUNNAN CHIHONG ZINC & GERMANIUM 
300344 BEIJING TAIKONG PANEL INDUSTRY 600540 XINJIANG SAYRAM MOD. AGRIC. 
300345 HONYU WEAR RESISTANT NEW MATERIALS 600543 GANSU MOGAO INDL.DEV. 
300346 JIANGSU NATA OPTO-ELECTRONIC MRA. 600572 ZHEJIANG CONBA PHARM. 
300347 HANGZHOU TIGERMED CNSL. 600960 SHANDONG BINZHOU BOHAI PISTON CO. 
300348 SHENZHEN SUNLINE TECH. 600961 ZHUZHOU SMELTER GROUP 
300349 ZHEJIANG GOLDCARD HIGH-TECH 600962 SDIC ZHONGLU FRUIT JUICE 
300350 SHENZHEN HUAPENGFEI MODERN LOGISTICS 600963 YUEYANG FOR. & PAPR. 
300351 ZHEJIANG YONGGUI ELEC. EQU. 600966 SHANDONG BOHUI PAPER INDL. 
300352 BEIJING VRV SOFTWARE 600967 BAOTOU BEIFANG CHUANGYE 
300353 KYLAND TECHNOLOGY 600969 HUNAN CHENDIAN INTL.DEV. 
300354 DONGHUA TESTING TECH. 600970 SINOMA INTL.ENGR. 
300355 INNER MOI.HTMS.DGRT. GRIG. 600971 ANHUI HENGYUAN COAL IND. & ELEC. 
300356 ELEFIRST SCTC. 600973 BAOSHENG SCI. AND TECH. INNOVATION 
600017 RIZHAO PORT 600975 HUNAN NEW WELLFUL 
600022 SHANDONG IRON & STL. 600976 WUHAN JIANMIN PHARM. GROUPS 
600035 HUBEI CHUTIAN EXPRESSWAY 600978 GUANGDONG YIHUA TIMBER INDUSTRY 
600048 POLY REAL ESTATE GP. 600979 SICHUAN GUANGAN AAA PUBLIC 
600114 NBTM NEW MATS.GROUP 600981 JIANGSU HIGH HOPE 
600143 KINGFA SCI.& TECH. 600982 NINGBO THERMAL POWER 
600249 LIUZHOU LIANGMIANZHEN 600983 HEFEI RONGSHIDA SANYO ELECTRIC 
600284 SHAI.PUDONG RD.AND BDG. CON. 600984 SHANXI CON.MCH. 
600325 HUAFA INDUSTRIAL ZHUHAI 600985 ANHUI LEIMINGKEHUA 
600354 GANSU DUNHUANG SEEDS 600986 KEDA GROUP 
600387 ZHEJIANG HAIYUE 600987 ZHEJIANG HANGMIN 
600405 BEIJING DYNAMIC POWER CO. 600988 CHIFENG JILONG GDMNG. 
600410 BEIJING TEAMSUN TECH. 600990 ANHUI SUN-CREATE ELTN. 
600420 SHANGHAI MODERN PHARM. 600991 GAC CHANGFENG MOTOR 
600421 WUHAN NATIONAL PHARMS. 600992 GUIZHOU WIRE ROPE 
600438 TONGWEI 600993 MAYINGLONG PHARM.GP. 
600444 ANHUI GROTONG HI-TECH PIPES INDUSTRY 600995 YUNNAN WENSHAN ELECTRIC PWR. 
600452 CHONGQING FULING ELEC. PWR.INDL. 600998 JOINTOWN PHARM.GP. 
600455 BUT'ONE INFORMATION 600999 CHINA MERCHANTS SECS. 
600461 JIANGXI HONGCHENG WTW. 601000 TANGSHAN PORT GROUP 
600463 BEIJING AIRPORT HIGH-TEC PARK CO. 601001 DATONG COAL INDUSTRY 
600467 SHANDONG HOMEY AQUATIC DEV. CO. 601002 GEM-YEAR INDUSTRIAL 
600470 ANHUI LIUGUO CHM. 601003 LIUZHOU IRON & STEEL 
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601006 DAQIN RAILWAY 601101 BEIJING HAOHUA EN.RSO. 
601007 JINLING HOTEL 601106 CHINA FIRST HVY.IND. 
601009 BANK OF NANJING 601111 AIR CHINA LIMITED 
601010 WENFENG GT.WLD.CHN.DEV. 601113 YIWU HUADING NYLON 
601011 QITAIHE BAOTAILONG COAL & COAL CHEMS. 601116 SANJIANG SHOPPING CLUB 
601012 XI'AN LONGI SCN.MATS. 601117 CHINA NAT.CHM.ENGR. 
601018 NINGBO PORT 601118 CHINA HAINAN RUBBER IND. GP. 
601028 JIANGSU YULONG STL.PIPE 601126 BEIJING SIFANG ATMTN. 
601058 SAILUN 601137 NINGBO POWERWAY ALLOY MATERIAL 
601088 CHINA SHENHUA EN. 601139 SHENZHEN GAS 
601098 CHINA SOUTH PBL. & MDA. GP. 601158 CHONGQING WATER GP. 
601099 PACIFIC SECURITIES 601166 INDUSTRIAL BANK 
601100 JIANGSU HENGLI HIP.OIL CYLD. 601168 WESTERN MINING 
In Table A7.1, all the A share IPOs from 2004 to 2012 are listed by following the ascending order of 
the local stock market code on the China stock market.  
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Table A7.2 Lists of VC Companies 
Name Name Name 
ABC Capital CCI Investment China-Belgium Equity Investment Fund 
ABC VC Management CDB Capital China Link Asia Holdings 
Actmax Investment CDF Capital, Hua Cheng Changzhou Hi-tech Capital 
Alex Investment CDF Capital, Suzhou Chinese Innovation Group 
Alfa Investment Management CDing Hui Venture Chongqing VC 
Anhui Technology Investment Century Fang Zhou VC Chuang Dong Fang Capital 
Asian Allied International Ltd Century Tianfu VC CICC Alternative Investment Limited 
Bai Na Investment Century VC CITIC Investment 
Bai Rui Innovation VC Chang An Innovation Investment CITIC PE 
Bai Shun Investment Chang Jang VC CITIC Union 
Bao Li Jia Chang Run Investment CMS Zhi Yuan Capital 
Bao Sheng S&T Investment Changsha Gui Gu VC CMTECH 
Beijing Capital Investment Chang Sha Xing Ye VC Co Bridge Capital 
Beijing Cyber Globe Chang Ting VC LP Comway VC 
Beijing Hua Yun Equity Investment Chang Yuan Ying Jia Costone VC Guangzhou 
Beijing Tain Tu Xing Ye Investment Chang Yun Xin An China Ever Bright Inter. Joint Venture 
Beijing Yiyun Clean Techonology VC LP China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Cowin Capital 
Beijing Zhong Fan Hua Ruan Investment Changzhou Jin Ling Hua Ruan VC Partnership Cowin Capital LP 
Bejing VC Changzhou Xin Hui VC Cowin Capital Venture Technology LP 
Bing Yuan An Investment Cheer Yard Investment CRCI 
Bing Yuan Investment Cheng Ming Da Investment Crown Team International Investment 
Bing Yuan VC Cheng Dang VC CVC 
Binzhou VC Cheng Xin VC CVVC 
BOC Investment Chen Neng Hi tech investment CXC Capital 
Boho Investment China Capital Management Da Hua S&T Investment 
Bo Xin Capital China Crane Dalian Hai Rong Hi-tech VC 
Bridge Capital China Gao Xin Investment De Bang Rui Jing Investment Management 
Bridge Fu Ka Capital China Science Bai Yun VC De Dao Investment 
Bright Stone China Science Chun Sheng No.1 LP De Rui Heng Feng VC 
Broad Resource Investment Ningbo China Science Danxia VC LP De Tong Yin Ke VC LP 
CAC Capital China Science Hong Yi HK VC Ding Hong VC 
Caep VC China Science Hong Yi VC Ding Yuan Investment 
Cai Hong VC China Science Huang Hai Ding Yun Jia Hui Investment Management 
Cai Xin VC China Science Hui Shang VC Dongguan Ke Chuang Investment 
Care All Capital China Science Hui Tong VC Dong Jin VC 
Carlyle China Science Hui Xing VC LP Dong Sheng VC 
CAS Investment Management China Science Merchants VC East Sky Investment 
CAS Rui Hua VC China Science Merchants VC, Guangdong East-lake VC 
CCB International Asset Management China Science Song Shan Lake VC Fund Ever Bright Capital 
CCB International Capital China Science Yuan Dong Ever Yong VC 
CCG China VC Fang Xiang Investment 
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Fen Hui VC Greenwoods Asset VC Heng Sheng Investment 
FFH GS Pharma Heng Tian Tech Investment 
First Solution ltd Guangdong Technology VC He Tai Growth VC 
Fortune Synergy Guangdong Xin Da VC HFT Capital 
Fortune VC Guangzhou Technology VC Hida Investment 
Fosun Industry Investment Gui Shi VC LP Hong De Long Sheng Investment 
Fosun Medical Investment Guo Fu Fund Hong Jing VC 
Gold Stone Guo Jia Venture Capita Hong Ling VC LP 
Fosun Purun Investment Guo Ke New Economy Investment Hong Ma VC 
Fosun VC Guo Lian Zhuo Cheng VC Hong Qiao VC 
Franchise Investment Guo Run VC Hong Rui VC 
Fu Hai Yin Tao Guosen Hong Sheng VC Hong Shan VC Investment 
Fu Hui Heli Investment LP Guotai Ju Nan Investment Management Hong Shu VC 
Fujian Jin Da VC Guo Xin Hong Ji Investment Hong Ta VC 
Fu Quan Investment Guo Yuan Direct Investment Hony Capital 
Fuson Industry Investment GVCGC Hope Bridge Capital 
Fuson Pin Xin Investment Haerbin Innovation Capital Hou Tu VC 
Fu Tian Innovation Capital Haerbin Technology Investment HTI 
Fu Wei VC Haian Tao Jin VC HTVC Group 
Fuxin VC Haihui Growth VC LP Hua Cheng Hua Li VC 
Gao De S&T VC Haihui Investment Management Huahan Investment 
Gao De VC Hai Tong Kaiyuna Capital Hua Hao Investment 
Gao Jin VC Hang Xin Investment Hua Heng VC 
Genetic Investment Hang Yuan Fu VC Hua Hong Cai Xin 
George Investment Hangzhou Hi-tech VC Hua Ou VC 
Gfxinde Investment Hangzhou Lian Chuang Yong Jin LP Hua Tai Zi Jin 
GGV Hangzhou Ling Feng Sai BoLe Hua Xing VC 
GIC Hangzhou Sai Zhi VC Hubei Hi-tech Investment 
GIG Hanlin VC LP Hui Chao Gong Jin VC 
GIG Chuang Fu Harmony Capital Hui Jin Lifang Capital LP 
GIG Hui Fu Hebei De Ren VC Hui Quan Investment 
GIG Rong Hua He Guang Capital LP Hui Sheng Yong Tai VC 
GIG Rong Yuan He Guang Yuan Jian Capital Hui Yin Guang Chang Technology Innovation Park 
Gionee Innovation Investment Hefei Innovation Investment Hui Zhi VC 
Fosun Pingyao Investment Management Hefei Technology Venture Investment Hunan Cai Xin VC 
Golden Yours He Ji Investment Hunan New Energy VC Fund LP 
Golden Yours Zhi Du He Jun Capital Hunan Zhong Jin VC 
Goldman Sachs He Jun Hui Sheng Equity Investment Hust VC 
Good Capital Henan VC IDG. Guangdong 
Govtor Capital Heng Li VC IDG. Tianlong  
Govtor Mingly China Growth Fund Heng Rou VC IER VC 
Greenwoods Asset Management Heng Rui VC IFC 
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Infore Capital Group Jun Wei Investment MS Fiber Holding Limited 
Infotech JVR International Nanchang High-Tech Investment 
Intel Capital Ke Feng Techonology Investment Nanchang VC 
Intel Investment Ke Lian VC Nanjing Dian Liang A Investment Centre 
IP CATHAY ONE Ke Sheng Investment Nantong Gao Sheng Growth VC 
Ivy Capital Ke Xing VC Nantong GPCP LP 
Jiahua Zhuo Yue Investment LP KPCB Nantong Tian Zi Wei Investment LP 
Jiang Du S&T VC Kunlun Calaxy National Development Creation Capital Management 
Jiangsu Jin Sha Jiang VC Mian Yang S&T Industrial Investment Fund Natixis S.A 
Jinke Gao Chuang investment Management Lai Zhou Hi tech Investment New Enterprise Investment 
Jianguo VC Lan Shan Investment New Horizon 
Jinda VC Lan Shi VC New Margin Capital 
Jing Tian I and II (IDG) Lan Yi VC New Margin Capital, Yongjin 
Jingfa VC Lao Shan VC New Oriental 
Jiangsu Tian Shi VC Leading Capita Nian Li Da VC 
Jinli VC Leaguer Tsing-Yuan VC Ningbo Dong Yuan VC 
Jin Rong Xin Run He VC LP Leaguer Tsing-Yuan VC , Wuxi NJVC 
Jin Rui Da Investment Management Leaguer Tsing-Yuan VC, Changzhou Nomura Holdings 
Jin Ye Investment Legend Capital OCBC Capital 
Jin Yi Da VC Legend Capital I LP OFC 
Jiuding (Bao Jia) VC LP Legend Holdings OFC LP 
Jiuding (Jia Xing Jia Hao)VC LP Lei Shi Xin Yuan Tianjin LP Orange Golden Cube Capital 
Jiuding (Kun Wu) Investment Lian Chuang Ce Yuan Investment Orchid Asia 
Jiuding (Long Tai) VC LP Lian Sheng VC Oriza Holdings 
Jiuding (Ou Wen) VC LP Liaoning Ke Fa Industrial Corp Parallel 
Jiuding (Shang Qi) VC LP Li Bao Feng Yi Capital LP PDSTI 
Jiuding (Xia Qi) VC LP Li Da VC Perpetual Treasure Ltd 
Jiuding (Zheng Dao) VC Liu He Capital Pilot VC 
Jiuding (Zhou Yuan) VC LP Li Yan Equity Investment Ping An Cai Zhi Investment Management 
Jiupai Investment Li Yuan VC Ping An Innovation Capital 
Jiuzhou Investment Group VC LNVC Platinum VC 
Join State Limited Long Bo Investment Prax Capital 
Joint Fortune Capital Long Shan Sai Bo Le VC Primrose Capital 
Jolmo Capital Lute Investment Principal Capital 
Jolmo Capital China Venture Mai Tian Li Jia Principle Equity Investment 
Jolmo Partners Martix QDSTVC 
JS Ding Hong VC Merrill VC Qian Yuan Sheng VC 
JS Gao Sheng Hi-tech VC Kun Shan Venture Equity Qi Xing VC 
JS High-tech Investment Growth VC Ming I and II (IDG) QM8 
JS Ying Neng VC Ming Hua Investment Raystone Capital LP 
JSVC Min Sheng supermarket Raystone TaiHe LP 
Jun Run Equity Investment Mount Kellett Capital RC Investment 
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Rong Gao VC Sheng Yu Investment Suzhou High-tech Guo Fa VC 
Rong Sheng VC Shenzhen Fortune Caifu VC Management Suzhou Kai Feng VC 
Ruide Feng Hua Management Shenzhen Fortune Caixin VC Management Suzhou Song He Capital LP 
RuiFu Shi Dai Investment Shenzhen Fortune Caizhi VC Management SXSTF 
RuiHua Feng Neng Investment Shenzhen Hen Yuan investment SZMC 
Rui Hua Investment Shenzhen Innovation Capital Investment SZVC 
Ru Shan Investment Shenzhen Shi Fang Lian VC Tai Hao Sheng Da VC 
Saicmotor VC Shenzhen Songhai VC Tai Yin VC 
SAIF II Shenzhen Zuo Jia Hui Zhi VC TB nature ltd 
SAIF III Mauritius Shi Ji Investment TB Polymer Limited 
SAIF Tianjin Shi Long International TDF Capital 
Sai Ji Investment Shou Chuang Growth TEDA VC 
San Sheng Capital Shou Yu Investment THVC 
SBCVC SHTIC Tian An Group 
SBCVC Tianjin LP Shun Tai VC Tian Jin Bo Xin 
SBI & TH VC SIDVC SRSI 
Shanghai Jin Bo Investment and 
Development 
Tsinghua University Education 
Foundation 
Tianjin Da Chen Creation Fortune Equity 
Investment  
SDIC Sino-Century Shanghai Techonology Investment 
SCGC Sino Wisdom Dianshi VC Sino-Swiss VC 
SEAVI Sino Wisdom Haiyue VC Tianjin OFC Partnership 
Sequoia Capital Fund II Sino Wisdom RuiyinVC Tianjin VC 
Sequoia Capital LP Sino Wisdom Shengyin VC Tianjin Wei De Capital LP 
Shanghai Bo Feng VC Sino Wisdom VC Tian Tu Capital 
Shanghai Bo Run Small Ville Wealth VC Tian Yi Investment 
Shanghai Can Rong VC Smart Base Tian Yue VC 
Shanghai Dong Zhen VC SNDVG Tong Fang VC 
Shanghai Fan Ya Strategy Invst. Softbank Xin Chuang LP Tong Lian VC 
Shanghai Hong Hua Capital SOHA Tong Ying VC 
Seasonal Capital South China Investment Top Vantage VC 
Shanghai Ling Hui VC Sova Capital Tsinghua Science Park 
Shanghai Nano VC Spread Energy Limited TTGC 
Shanghai New Allicance Capital Tianjin Da Chen Creation Equity Investment 
Tianjin Dachen Shengshi Equity 
Investment 
Tianjin De Tong Investment Partnership SSJ Investment TTGC Angle LP 
Shanghai Xin Lian VC Standard Chartered Principal Finance TTGC LP 
Shanghai Zi Chen Investment Stone Capital TTGC Shanghai 
Shang Li Investment Suda Investment TTGC Sunshine 
Shan Shan VC Sun Bridge Capital TTGC Wuhan LP 
Shan Shui Equity Investment Sun Bridge Chuang Yuan Investment Tuspark 
Shaoxing Pingan Investment Sure Joyce Limited Tuspark Venture 
Sheng Hua Kang Yaun VC LP Suzhou Da Dao VC LP Veken Capital 
Sheng Hua Yang VC Suzhou Gao Yuan VC Vertex Group 
Sheng Jing Jia Hua Investment Suzhou Hai Fu Investment Vision Investmen 
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Walden Xin Rong VC Fund LP Zhe Jiang Yi Cheng VC Fund 
Wan ChuanJi Equity Investment Xin Rui Investment Zhe Jiang Yi Du VC 
Warburg Pincus Yan Tai Kunde Investment Zhe Ling Capital 
Wei Mei VC Ya Yin Investment LP Zheng Dai United Investment 
Wei Shi VC YHVC Zheng Tong VC 
Wei Tong Assets Management Yi He VC Zhi Cheng Hai Wei 
WI Harper Ying Ming VC LP Zhi He Capital VC 
Wintech Investment Management Ying Tong VC Zhong Bao VC 
Wuhan Borun Investment Yi Run VC Zhong Ke Yu Xiang VC LP 
Wuhan Optics-Valley Fund Yi Tong Sen Yuan Investment Zhong Ke Yue Lu VC Fund 
Wuhan Optics-Valley VC Yi Wen Innovation Capital Zhong Da VC 
Wuhan S&T Investment Yi Yuan Zhi Di VC Zhong Hao New Energy Investment 
Wuhu Da Cheng VC Yong Hua Capital Zhong He VC 
Wuhu Rui Ye Equity Investment You Feng VC Zhong Jing Century VC 
Wuxi Hua Ruan VC Partnership Younger Investment Yang Zhou VC 
Xiamen Huo Ju VC Yuan Feng VC Zhong Ke Ke Rui VC 
Xiang Cheng VC Yuan Sheng Equity Investment Zhong Cheng Xin Financial Cons. Investment 
Xiang He Equity Investment LP Yuan Wang VC Zhong Cheng Xin Fang Quan Investment 
Xiang Jiang Industry Investment Yue Cai Investment Zhong Ling VC 
Xiang Rong VC Zhang Jiang High tech Zhong Ou VC 
Xiang Tang VC Zhao Xing VC Zhong Zheng Da Dao Equity Investment 
Xiang Tou Hi-tech Venture Zhe Jiang Fuxin VC Zhu Hai Hua Chuang Investment Management 
Xi Ge Ma VC Zhe Jiang Goldsun VC Zhu Hai Tsinghua Science Park 
Xi Nao VC Zhe Jiang Jia Yin Investment Zi Jiang VC 
Xing Ye VC Zhe Jiang Lan Shi VC ZSVC 
Xin Hu VC Zhe Jiang Ou Xin VC ZVC 
Xin Hua Feng Yin VC Zhe Jiang University VC  
Xin Nuo Tai VC Zhe Jiang VC  
In Table A7.2, all the VC firms that have invested the China A share IPOs listed between 2004 and 
2012 are listed by following the alphabetical order from A to Z. 
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